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American constitutional theory has been cyclical, understanding the 
Constitution sometimes as a product of will and sometimes as a product of 
reason.' Neither reason nor will ever completely disappears, but an age 
can usefully be characterized by either its majoritarian, consensual cast or 
its rationalist, scientific outlook. Chief Justice Marshall's Court, for ex- 
ample, was committed to the idea of reason in politics: To Marshall, the 
Constitution was the product of political science.2 This faith in a conver- 
gence of constitutional order and a science of politics disappeared in the 
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the participants in the Yale Faculty Workshop for their many helpful comments. I am particularly 
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1. "Reason" and "will" are the psychological faculties by which we pursue knowledge, on the one 
hand, and give consent, on the other. The political analogue to the psychological contrast of reason 
and will is the contrast between government founded on political science and government founded on 
popular consent. For an examination and elucidation of these basic concepts, see Kahn, Reason and 
Will in the Origins of American Constitutionalism, 98 YALE L.J. 449, 450-51 (1989). 
2. For a description of Chief Justice Marshall's understanding of the Constitution, see Kahn, 
supra note 1, at 479-87. 
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ante-bellum period. It was replaced by the belief that the Constitution 
rests on will alone. The purpose of constitutional interpretation, on this 
view, was to determine the object of that will, or, in more traditional 
terms, the intent of those who drafted and ratified the Constitution. By 
the end of the nineteenth century, the Constitution was again understood 
as a product of reason.3 The Lochner court believed that the Constitution 
was to be approached through a science of law that linked the exposition 
of the common law to contemporary social science, in particular to social 
darwinism.4 
Contemporary constitutional theory, however, offers something differ- 
ent. Not a repetition of the cycle, but an attempt to break out of it. Much 
of contemporary constitutional theory is an effort to find a new conceptual 
model for constitutional order, one that simultaneously acknowledges rea- 
son and will. The conflict of reason and will continues to dominate the 
theoretical debate, but no longer as alternatives between which a choice 
must be made. Rather, reason and will appear as thesis and antithesis for 
which constitutional theory must now find a creative synthesis.' 
In seeking such a synthesis, contemporary constitutional theory is fol- 
lowing the pattern of the Founders. Even more self-consciously than con- 
temporary theorists, the Founders understood the need to combine politi- 
cal science and popular will. The synthesis they imagined, and thought 
they achieved, was one in which popular consent was given to the princi- 
ples of political science. This harmonization achieved expression in the 
popular ratification of the Constitution-itself the product of scientific de- 
liberation at Philadelphia. 
For the Founders, the means to achieve this synthesis was simply argu- 
ment: The people had to be persuaded to consent to a constitutional order 
3. See, e.g., A. BICKEL, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE IDEA OF PROGRESS 15-16 (1978) (on 
linkage of Constitution, a rational Court and social darwinism); J. CARTER, LAW: ITS ORIGIN, 
GROWTH AND FUNCTION 132-36 (1907); C. TIEDEMAN, THE UNWRITTEN CONSTITUTION OF THE 
UNITED STATES 144 (1890); F. WHARTON, COMMENTARIES ON LAW 62-68 (1884). The cycles 
continue through the legal realist attack upon scientific formalism, with a corresponding re-emergence 
of will as the fundamental basis of American political order. For a dramatic interchange between will 
and reason compare L. HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS (1958) with Wechsler, Toward Neutral Princi- 
ples of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1959). I am working on a book-length manuscript 
that will present a complete account of these cycles and place them within a theory of the ordered 
development of a number of larger paradigms of the character of constitutional order. 
4. See generally B. TWISS, LAWYERS AND THE CONSTITUTION (1942) (on the successful cam- 
paign by conservative lawyers to move the Court in this direction). 
5. Not all theorists, of course, participate in this effort to find a synthesis. Two recent examples in 
which this dialectic of reason and will breaks out into the open and is portrayed as an irresolvable 
tension are Brest, The Fundamental Rights Controversy: The Essential Contradictions of Normative 
Constitutional Scholarship, 90 YALE L.J. 1063 (1981) (Madisonian democracy rests on unsolved 
contradiction between majoritarianism and individual rights) and Tushnet, Following the Rules Laid 
Down: A Critique of Interpretivism and Neutral Principles, 96 HARV. L. REV. 781 (1983) (judicial 
principles intended to limit place of subjective will of individual judge are themselves undermined by 
necessary reliance upon social consensus). Interestingly, while both Brest and Tushnet see an irresolv- 
able tension in existing constitutional theory, both conclude by invoking the possibility of creating a 
new community of discourse as a means of resolving the tension. 
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that was scientifically correct.6 The nation as a whole, at the moment at 
which it imposed a constitutional order upon itself, had to engage in, and 
act upon, political science.7 In this idea of joining reason and will, each 
moment remained conceptually distinct. Science and popular will could, 
and in fact were, brought together in the circumstances of post- 
revolutionary America, which included an historically unique capacity of 
political leaders to use, and of the people to be persuaded by, scientific 
argument.8 The Founders did not expect this openness to political science, 
on the part of both the leaders and the people, to continue indefinitely. 
Contemporary constitutional theorists share the goal of synthesis but no 
longer try to bring reason to will through argument directed at the general 
populace.9 This is not the age of enlightenment, but of mass media. Few 
believe that the synthesis of reason and will can be accomplished through 
a national debate in which will is persuaded by reason.10 The locus of 
such a synthesis must, therefore, be elsewhere. Increasingly, that locus is 
found in the concept of "community." Community functions not as a geo- 
graphical place, but as a conceptual model of order that combines ele- 
ments of reason and will. 
The community that has captured the imagination of constitutional the- 
ory is one in which the only relevant activity is discourse. This community 
talks itself into an historical identity. Argument-the appeal to principles 
and reasons-remains critical to the identity of this community, not just 
because talk about values must be clear and consistent. More importantly, 
only through discourse are common values revealed and maintained. This 
discursive element of community replicates much of the function of reason 
in classical political theories. But discourse here does not have the ab- 
stract, universal quality of classical, natural-law theories of political sci- 
ence. Rather, the community's discourse is historically specific. 
The object of this communal talk is the values of the particular commu- 
6. This statement characterizes their theory, not their practice. For an account of the less than 
ideal nature of the actual ratification debate, see J. MAIN, THE ANTIFEDERALISTS 187-248 (1961). 
For an elaboration of the Federalists' theoretical vision, see Kahn, supra note 1, at 462-67. 
7. The Federalist Papers, for example, were a product of a remarkable, enlightenment optimism 
that rational argument could create an entire nation of scientific, political craftsmen, i.e., a nation in 
which each citizen participated in, and so willed, the scientific construction of constitutional order. 
8. See THE FEDERALIST No. 49, at 315 U. Madison) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961) ("[T]he existing 
constitutions were formed in the midst of a danger which repressed the passions most unfriendly to 
order and concord; of an enthusiastic confidence of the people in their patriotic leaders, which stifled 
the ordinary diversity of opinions on great national questions...."). 
9. That this idea continued to have appeal as recently as the post-war period is clear from the 
writings of Dean Rostow. See, e.g., E. Rostow, Democratic Character of Judicial Review (I), in THE 
SOVEREIGN PREROGATIVE: THE SUPREME COURT AND THE QUEST FOR LAW 147, 167-68 (1962) 
("The Supreme Court is . . . an educational body, and the Justices are inevitably teachers in a vital 
national seminar."). This theme was continued by Bickel. See infra notes 64-65 and accompanying 
text. 
10. Among contemporary theorists discussed in this article, Ackerman comes closest to this view. 
But, even he believes this synthesis of reason and will to be possible for the national community only 
at extraordinary moments in the political life of the nation. For a more extreme view, see Brest, 
Constitutional Citizenship, 34 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 175 (1986). 
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nity. The concept of the discursive community, accordingly, includes the 
particularity of membership and history. This focus on the particular his- 
tory of this community replicates much of the function of will in classical 
theories of consent."' The contemporary idea of community, therefore, of- 
fers a model of "discursive particularity" or of "historicized reason" that 
bridges the traditional dichotomy of reason and will. 
The attraction and power of the model of community is evident first in 
this synthesis of reason and will. The model gains even more power, how- 
ever, in the explanation it may offer of the relationship of the individual 
to the state. A constitutional theory that rests upon the model of reason 
understands constitutional order as an expression of objective, universal 
principles that are the product of a science of politics. Constitutional order 
is legitimate, under this theory, because reason is the normatively valuable 
component of personality. To the degree that one rejects or opposes the 
constitutional order, one is acting irrationally. The state is, therefore, our 
better self.12 
A theory of constitutional order based on will overcomes the gap be- 
tween the individual and the state by relying on the concept of consent. 
On this view, in confronting the constitutional order, the individual con- 
fronts only that to which he has already consented to be bound. The bind- 
ing character of law derives from an affirmative act of the individual: 
That act alone overcomes the divide between citizen and state. The state 
may not be our better self, but nevertheless we still confront only an objec- 
tification of our selves. 
Between reason and will, traditional constitutional theory faced a prob- 
lematic choice.'3 To choose the abstract principles of reason was to deny 
any place for the particularity of membership. To choose will, on the 
other hand, threatened to undermine the moral ground of the constitu- 
tional order: Rights are not simply the product of consent. Either choice 
rendered problematic the historical character of the state, which is not 
adequately expressed by either the timeless character of reason or the im- 
11. A theory of consent must, for example, begin by defining membership in the community: Only 
when membership has been specified is it possible to determine whose will is relevant. See Brilmayer, 
Shaping and Sharing in Democratic Theory: Towards a Political Philosophy of Interstate Equality, 
15 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 389, 399-400 (1987). 
12. The classic exposition of this view is Madison's discussion of "a faction." See THE FEDERAL- 
IST No. 10 (J. Madison). For him, faction was the political expression of the irrational passions of 
individuals. The problem of political order was that of simultaneously achieving individual virtue and 
the rule of reason in the state. See Kahn, supra note 1, at 458-61. The same identification of reason, 
the public good, and individual virtue reappears in the Lochner Court. It is seen more recently in the 
attempt to ground judicial review in "neutral principles." See Wechsler, supra note 3, at 16 (collaps- 
ing any distinctions among reason, neutral principles, justice and law). 
13. As did traditional political philosophy. For example, in The Apology, Plato offers a model of 
the role of reason in the state, while in The Crito, he offers a model of a role of will. Accordingly, as 
many have observed, the Socrates of the Crito is a problematic figure in light of the Socrates of the 
Apology. See R. KRAUT, SOCRATES AND THE STATE 11-12 (1984); Weinrib, Obedience to the Law in 
Plato's Crito, 27 AM. J. JURIS. 85 (1985); Woozley, Socrates on Disobeying the Law, in THE PHI- 
LOSOPHY OF SOCRATES 299 (G. Vlastos ed. 1971). 
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mediacy of consent.'4 Either model, then, attempts to legitimate the state 
at a substantial cost to a full concept of the autonomous individual. To 
save the state, the individual seems required to sacrifice either reason or 
will, the one renders him an abstraction, the other amoral. Precisely this 
incommensurability of a two-termed psychology of faculties-reason and 
will-and the historical character of the state has caused the cycles of 
reason and will in constitutional theory. 
Contemporary theories of community offer a new model of the relation- 
ship between the individual and the constitutional order. Instead of a 
problematic relationship of part (citizen) to whole (state), in which either 
the part or the whole threatens to subsume the other, the new com- 
munitarians understand the relationship of the individual to the political 
order as that of the microcosm to the macrocosm. We create and maintain 
our personal identity in the very same process by which communal iden- 
tity is created and maintained. Thus, the historically specific discourse, 
which is at the center of communitarian theory, simultaneously creates the 
individual and the community. Individual identity does not exist apart 
from the discourse that creates and sustains the community.15 There is no 
self to understand, apart from the community, just as there is no commu- 
nity apart from the members. Neither the community nor the individual 
has any priority-temporally, conceptually, or normatively. Individual 
and community are two perspectives on a single process of discursive par- 
ticularity. Within this universe of discourse, we cannot separate the talker 
from the talking: Both the individual and the community exist only in the 
talking. 
The move to a communitarian model in constitutional theory reflects 
larger trends in political and moral theory."6 Nevertheless, the new em- 
phasis on community can also be understood from within the discipline 
itself. The emergence of community is a response to particular problems 
in the history of constitutional theory. Yet, the move to a communitarian 
model creates unique problems in constitutional theory. This essay takes 
this intradisciplinary perspective and aims to accomplish three goals. 
14. See Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U.L. REV. 204, 225 
(1980) ("Even if the adopters freely consented to the Constitution . . . this is not an adequate basis 
for continuing fidelity . . . for their consent cannot bind succeeding generations" (citation omitted)). 
For an application of the dynamics of the temporality of consent to a contemporary legal problem, see 
Kahn, Gramm-Rudman and the Capacity of Congress to Control the Future, 13 HASTINGS CONST. 
L.Q. 185 (1986); see also Eule, Temporal Limits on the Legislative Mandate: Entrenchment and 
Retroactivity, 1987 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 1379. 
15. This view finds its strongest philosophical expression and defense in the writings of Michael 
Sandel. See, e.g., M. SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND ITS CRITICS 6 (1984) ("[T]he story of my life is 
always embedded in the story of those communities from which I derive my identity."); see also id. at 
5 ("[W]e cannot conceive our personhood without reference to our role as citizens, and as participants 
in a common life."). 
16. See, e.g., B. BARBER, STRONG DEMOCRACY: PARTICIPATORY POLITICS FOR A NEW AGE 
(1984); A. MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE (1981); J. POCOCK, THE MACHIAVELLIAN MOMENT 
(1975); M. SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE (1982). 
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First, I hope to demonstrate how the model of community responds to 
serious problems in traditional constitutional theory. In Part I, I expose 
those problems through an examination of Alexander Bickel's classic, The 
Least Dangerous Branch. The weakness of Bickel's work, I argue, lies in 
his effort to ground the authority of reason in a model of popular consent. 
This turn to consent ultimately undermines both the authority of the 
courts and the privileged place Bickel affords to reason in political dis- 
course. Much of the appeal of the communitarian model in contemporary 
constitutional theories can be understood as a response to these 
problems.17 
Second, I hope to demonstrate the dominance of the model of commu- 
nity in contemporary constitutional theory.18 There are two main schools 
of contemporary constitutional theory: the new republicans, whom I dis- 
cuss in Part II, and the interpretivists, whom I treat in Part III. Both 
schools understand community on the model of what I have described as 
discursive particularity or historicized reason."' Both use this model to 
reconceptualize the relationship of the individual to the state. Neverthe- 
less, the two schools ask different questions and use community to provide 
different answers. The new republicans ask how the existing institutions 
of American government should operate. They respond with a theory of 
community that provides a ground for a normative critique of institutional 
practice. The interpretivists ask how law is possible. They respond with a 
theory of meaning that rests upon the discursive community. 
While I cannot offer an exhaustive account of each school, I have tried 
to organize the discussion in a way that responds to the unique problem 
each school suggests for constitutional theory. For the new republicans, 
that problem is the institutional location of the community of discourse. 
Each of the new republicans I discuss places that community in a differ- 
ent institution of governance.20 For the interpretivists, that problem is not 
to provide an institutional location for a communal discourse, but to dif- 
ferentiate among many such communities of discourse. Each of the inter- 
17. Together these problems point again to the problematic relationship of reason and will in 
constitutional theory. Bickel could only answer the question of the Court's legitimacy by appealing to 
consent (will), yet he claimed the Court's unique role was to bring principled discourse (reason) to 
political decisionmaking. 
18. See generally Cornell, In Defense of Dialogic Reciprocity, 54 TENN. L. REV. 335, 335-36 
(1987) (concept of community links the debate between liberalism and its critics with the debate over 
the role of law as interpretation). 
19. See supra text accompanying note 11. 
20. The possible institutional locations are limited to the Court, see infra Part II, Section B 
(discussing Michelman), the Congress, see infra Part II, Section C (discussing Sunstein), and the 
people as a whole, see infra Part II, Section A (discussing Ackerman). The last of these possibilities 
obviously creates its own institutional difficulties-i.e., the people must organize themselves-but 
those institutional difficulties play a central role in Ackerman's theory. See infra notes 82-91 and 
accompanying text. There remains one additional possible location for the discursive community for 
the new republicans: the executive branch. Sunstein has come the furthest in filling this space. See C. 
SUNSTEIN, INTERPRETING THE REGULATORY STATE (forthcoming). 
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pretivists I discuss reaches a different resolution of this problem of 
privileging one discursive community over others.2" 
Finally, I hope to demonstrate the inability of the model of community 
to provide a normative account of legal authority. The unifying factor in 
the problems of both the new republicans and the interpretivists is the 
difficulty of supporting a concept of authority within a communal, discur- 
sive framework. Ultimately, each of the new communitarians fails for the 
same reason: The authoritarian character of constitutional law is inconsis- 
tent with the egalitarian quality of the community of discourse. My ac- 
count of each theorist, accordingly, involves a juxtaposition of authority 
and community. In each instance, we are left with either an unsupported 
claim of authority or an invitation to the anarchy of diverse discursive 
communities. Theory and law cannot meet on the field of community, 
because the law remains bound to a concept of authority that can find no 
place in the discursive community. The emergence of community as the 
central conceptual structure of contemporary theory, therefore, accounts in 
part for the growing divide between theory and practice in constitutional 
law. 
I. THE LEGACY OF ALEXANDER BICKEL 
A. Bickel's Recreation of the Founders' Constitutional Project 
Alexander Bickel begins a new generation of constitutional theory by 
rediscovering the conceptual framework of the Founders.22 He casts into 
contemporary form the Founders' understanding of the problem of consti- 
tutionalism in a democratic political order, which is the need to achieve 
popular consent to a governmental order based upon reason.23 
Bickel agrees with the Founders that the ultimate foundation of Ameri- 
can constitutional order must be popular consent: "[O]n the supreme occa- 
sion, when the system is forced to find ultimate self-consistency, the prin- 
21. For the interpretivists the possibilities are: 1) to fail to privilege any discursive community, 
inviting anarchy, see infra Part III, Section B (discussing Cover); 2) arbitrarily to privilege one com- 
munity's discourse as authoritative, see infra Part III, Section A (discussing Fiss); or 3) to try to 
ground the authority of one community in the theory of interpretation itself, see infra Part III, Sec- 
tion C (discussing Dworkin). 
22. Cf. Kronman, Alexander Bickel's Philosophy of Prudence, 94 YALE L.J. 1567 (1985) (claim- 
ing that Bickel had very little influence on subsequent development of constitutional theory). 
Kronman does not capture the constitutional/political character of Bickel's thought because he focuses 
on the personal virtues that a judge must have to accomplish the political task that Bickel sets out. 
Kronman's perspective remains largely psychological-the virtue of prudence is his object-instead of 
political. For other works that follow the Bickelian structure of identifying the institutional role of the 
Court as that of bringing reason to political choice and that then see the problem of judicial review as 
that of finding a mechanism by which majoritarian consent is given to the expression of reason, see, 
e.g., M. PERRY, THE CONSTITUTION, THE COURTS AND HUMAN RIGHTS (1982); Wellington, Com- 
mon Law Rules and Constitutional Double Standards: Some Notes on Adjudication, 83 YALE L.J. 
221 (1973). 
23. Bickel's own preferred historical analogy is Lincoln's view of the slavery issue. 
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ciple of self-rule must prevail."24 Nevertheless, he sees, as they did, that 
the achievement of political legitimacy based wholly on popular consent is 
hardly a guarantee of reasonableness in general, or of moral and political 
value in particular. Just as the Founders distinguished between govern- 
ment based on consent and "good" government-and sought a coincidence 
of the two-so Bickel writes that our "society [is] dedicated both to the 
morality of government by consent and to moral self-government. ..25 
Elsewhere he states that "[s]uch a government must be principled as well 
as responsible. ..". Principled government rests on reason; responsible 
government responds to the will of the people. 
The moral and political values of a political order, then, must come 
from outside of the principle of consent, which is given institutional ex- 
pression in majoritarianism.27 These values depend upon substance, and 
not simply process. Accordingly, Bickel sees a need for the entrance of 
substantive values into the political system, and, therefore, the need for a 
political institution responsible for introducing these values. The problem 
is to find a way in which that responsibility can operate without under- 
mining the consensual foundation of the whole. Following Madison, 
Bickel seeks a "republican remedy for the diseases most incident to repub- 
lican government."28 
Despite this similarity in the analysis of the problem of constitutional 
order, there is a striking difference between the Founders and Bickel. For 
the Founders, the synthesis of reason and will was to be achieved at a 
single moment-the moment of popular ratification of the work of the 
political scientists who drafted the Constitution.29 For Bickel, that mo- 
ment of complete synthesis is projected into the indefinite future. For him, 
there is no actual, single moment at which reason and will are fully inte- 
grated; rather, there are many moments at which popular consent is given 
to particular substantive principles. Accordingly, the problem of constitu- 
tionalism is to create a process by which the society can continually move 
closer to that end-point. Bickel's explanation of judicial review is an ac- 
count of the Court's institutional role in sustaining and managing this 
process. 
24. A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 261 (1962). Compare THE FEDERALIST No. 
22, supra note 8, at 152 (A. Hamilton) ("The fabric of American empire ought to rest on the solid 
basis of THE CONSENT OF THE PEOPLE . . . that pure, original fountain of all legitimate 
authority."). 
25. A. BICKEL, supra note 24, at 199. 
26. Id. at 29 (emphasis added). 
27. This is not to say that majoritarianism is not in itself a substantive principle of some value. 
But that value may not be sufficient to overcome unjust results reached by majority decision. See J. 
SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM, AND DEMOCRACY 242 (3d ed. 1950) (democratic majority 
may be a "rabble" pursuing criminal or stupid ends). 
28. THE FEDERALIST No. 10, supra note 8, at 84 (J. Madison). 
29. The Founders did not believe that subsequent to ratification reason becomes irrelevant to the 
operations of government. Rather, they saw the underlying constitutional order, the basic structure of 
government, as based on a complete synthesis. 
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While this shift in temporal attitudes has important consequences for 
the details of the institutional explanation that Bickel offers, it does not 
affect the nature of the integration of reason and will that characterizes 
constitutional governance.30 That integration remains contingent upon the 
ability of reason to persuade and of will to be persuaded. These are quali- 
ties that change with historical circumstances. The marriage of reason and 
will, therefore, remains subject to the constant possibility of divorce. 
There is no third concept for Bickel-just as there was none for the Foun- 
ders-that in its essence provides a unity of reason and will.3" 
B. The Countermajoritarian Difficulty and the Turn to the Future 
Perhaps the most memorable lines that Bickel ever wrote are the 
following: 
[T]he reality [is] that when the Supreme Court declares unconstitu- 
tional a legislative act or the action of an elected executive, it thwarts 
the will of representatives of the actual people of the here and now; 
it exercises control, not in behalf of the prevailing majority, but 
against it. That, without mystic overtones, is what actually 
happens.32 
In rejecting "mystic overtones," Bickel suggests a certain hardheaded- 
ness.33 He will look at "what actually happens," within the interplay of 
the institutions of American politics. What he sees is an institution-the 
Supreme Court-that exercises the "power to apply and construe the 
Constitution, in matters of the greatest moment, against the wishes of a 
legislative majority, which is, in turn, powerless to affect the judicial 
decision."34 
30. The attitude toward time is a central organizing principle in distinguishing and explaining 
various constitutional theories. Bickel's orientation towards the future presents a striking contrast, for 
example, to the originalist's orientation toward the past. See, e.g., Bork, Tradition and Morality in 
Constitutional Law, in AM. ENTERPRISE INST., FRANCIS BOYER LECTURERS ON PUBLIC POLICY 10 
(1984) ("[F]ramers' intentions with respect to freedoms are the sole legitimate premise from which 
constitutional analysis may proceed."). For an example of a "present-oriented" theory, see Welling- 
ton, supra note 22 (on role of contemporary consensus). 
31. This lack of synthesis characterizes Bickel's political and legal thought, but not necessarily his 
psychological theory. Bickel's concept of "prudence"-a psychological virtue-may offer a model of 
synthesis. See infra text accompanying notes 52-55. 
32. A. BICKEL, supra note 24, at 16-17. 
33. Bickel attacks traditional justifications of judicial review for either invoking a "mystical" iden- 
tification of the "people now" with the people who ratified the constitution or for building a theory of 
implied consent out of what is in fact uninformed, passive acquiescence. Id. at 17-21. For contempo- 
rary attempts to reconstitute both branches of traditional theory, see Ackerman, The Storrs Lectures: 
Discovering the Constitution, 93 YALE L.J. 1013 (1984) (developing an intertemporal concept of 
"we-the-people") and Amar, Philadelphia Revisited: Amending the Constitution Outside Article V, 
55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1043 (1988) (theory of implied consent requires possibility of non-Article V 
amendments through alternative, majoritarian process). 
34. A. BICKEL, supra note 24, at 20; see also id. at 19: 
[Niothing can finally depreciate the central function that is assigned in democratic theory and 
practice to the electoral process; nor can it be denied that the policy-making power of represen- 
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Bickel begins his resolution of the countermajoritarian difficulty by fo- 
cusing on what he calls a "truism": "[Mlany actions of government have 
two aspects: their immediate, necessarily intended, practical effects, and 
their perhaps unintended or unappreciated bearing on values we hold to 
have more general and permanent interest."3 This distinction allows him 
to identify the institutional role of the Court. Once we know what the 
Court can do well, we can ask whether that function is both valuable in 
itself and consistent with the general commitment to democratic, electoral 
legitimacy. 
While the political branches are good at tending to the first aspect of 
public action-the "immediate, necessarily intended, practical ef- 
fects"-they are not good at tending to the second aspect-the effect on 
values of "general and permanent interest." The courts are the institution 
best suited to "be the pronouncer and guardian of such values."" While 
this is cast initially as a distinction between short- and long-term interests, 
Bickel quickly comes to speak of it as a distinction between actions based 
on expediency and actions based on principle.37 The courts', and in partic- 
ular the Supreme Court's, capacity to serve this function is rooted in their 
institutional character.38 "Judges have, or should have, the leisure, the 
training, and the insulation to follow the ways of the scholar in pursuing 
the ends of government.""' These personal and institutional characteristics 
allow courts to focus on the "enduring values of a society," the society's 
principles. Good government, accordingly, requires scholarship as well as 
political responsiveness.40 Bickel is suggesting that the judge may compete 
with the politician's claim to represent the community. Different aspects 
of a community's values require different kinds of representative institu- 
tions. By focusing on substance-i.e., what is represented-Bickel seems 
to have shorn representation from its traditional roots in the electoral 
process.4' 
tative institutions, born of the electoral process, is the distinguishing characteristic of the sys- 
tem. Judicial review works counter to this characteristic. 
35. Id. at 24. 
36. Id. 
37. Id. at 25. For a comparable distinction between principle and policy, see R. DWORKIN, TAK- 
ING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 22-23 (1977). 
38. There is an inverse relationship here between the order of the inquiry and the order of politi- 
cal legitimacy. The inquiry moves from institutional character to the object or purpose of the institu- 
tion. But in political life, it is the nature of the object to be represented-enduring values-that 
justifies an institution of the character of the courts. 
39. A. BICKEL, supra note 24, at 25-26; cf. Fiss, The Supreme Court, 1978 Term-Foreword: 
The Forms of Justice, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1, 12-14 (1979) (grounding this function of courts in 
judicial procedures, rather than judicial psychology). 
40. Bickel starts here the theme of the importance of academic scholarship to constitutional gov- 
ernance. The institutional model of the judge as a kind of academic takes a prominent place in the 
theorizing of many of Bickel's followers. See, e.g., M. PERRY, supra note 22, at 100-02; Fiss, supra 
note 39; Wellington, supra note 22. 
41. For a recent, thought-provoking analysis of judicial review that relies on a similar claim about 
the two-fold character of representation of community interests, see Seidman, Ambivalence and Ac- 
countability, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1571 (1988). 
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Even assuming that Bickel has correctly identified a representative 
function that the courts could perform well, the argument has not yet of- 
fered a justification of judicial review. The gap between the institutional 
account and the still-to-be-offered normative account is implicit in his 
characterization of his goal: "The search must be for a function which 
might (indeed, must) involve the making of policy . *" If the courts 
make policy when they engage in judicial review, then what is it that 
privileges this policy over that made by the majoritarian political institu- 
tions of government? To describe it as representative of long-term, rather 
than short-term, values, or as principled instead of expedient, is hardly 
sufficient.43 
Unless Bickel is willing to defend a normative difference between prin- 
ciple and policy in a way that can be reconciled with the primacy he 
accords to democratic legitimacy, calling a choice "principled" will not do 
the work required. Why should the community prefer principle to expedi- 
ency, or long-term values to short-term interests? Why should the legisla- 
ture not make exceptions to general and enduring values, when this repre- 
sents the wishes of a present majority of the community? Consistency 
among values over time is not an obvious first principle of legitimate, 
democratic government." Why should the relative value of conflicting pol- 
icy judgments not be an issue for the people themselves to determine 4 
In fact, Bickel is not willing to make an argument for the priority of 
principle over short-term interests in general or in a democratic polity in 
particular."' Thus, the institutional explanation of the role of the 
42. A. BICKEL, supra note 24, at 24. I am not the first to focus on this passage of Bickel's as 
posing the critical problem of legitimacy. See J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 103-04 (1980); 
M. PERRY, supra note 22, at 122-23 (Perry's response to Ely). 
43. Bickel does not claim that principles, or long-term values, are themselves second order prefer- 
ences-i.e., preferences about preferences. Cf. Sunstein, Legal Interference with Private Preferences, 
53 U. CHI. L. REV. 1129, 1140 (1986) ("Laws may . . . reflect the majority's . . . second-order 
preferences, at the expense of first-order preferences."). 
44. For an argument linking consistency and legitimacy, see Dworkin's theory of "integrity" dis- 
cussed below. See infra text accompanying notes 301-28. 
45. Nor is Bickel on solid ground when he suggests that long-term values may not be clearly in 
focus when the political branches act. Surely, in the most controversial instances of judicial review, the 
conflict is over these long-term values; it is not between the short-term and long-term perspectives. 
Consider, for example, slavery, segregation, abortion, capital punishment, and apportionment. The 
constitutional issue in these cases is hardly a matter of taking a "sober second look" at long-term 
consequences. Rather, it is one of identifying and responding to politically entrenched wrongs. 
46. Bickel's distinction between principles, or enduring values, on the one hand, and preferences, 
or policies of expedience, on the other hand, begins the modern tradition of dualist accounts of the 
character of political discourse. See, e.g., infra Part II, Section A (discussing Ackerman on constitu- 
tional and normal politics); Part II, Section B (discussing Michelman on positive and negative free- 
dom); Part III, Section B (discussing Cover on jurisgenerative and jurispathic legal process). Calling 
only one form of discourse "principled," however, is probably not a helpful way of drawing the 
distinction. Bickel's terminology reflects again the twofold psychology of reason and will which he 
inherited most immediately from the lively debate between Hand and Wechsler. See supra note 3. For 
Bickel, this psychological distinction is projected onto an institutional framework. This institutional 
character of his thought reflects the influence of the "legal process" school at Harvard, where Bickel 
had been a student. See H. Hart & A. Sachs, The Legal Process: Basic Problems in the Making and 
Application of Law 179-85 (1958) (unpublished manuscript); Amar, Law Story, 102 HARv. L. REV. 
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Court-pointing to a political function that the Court is best able to per- 
form-does not in itself explain either the legitimacy or value of this func- 
tion in a general system of democratic governance. To solve this problem, 
Bickel turns to the future. 
The "passive virtues" constitute the means by which the Court can look 
to the future. Much of Bickel's early work is an assessment of the function 
and value of these "passive virtues."47 These are devices by which the 
Supreme Court can avoid making a constitutional decision: "The essen- 
tially important fact, so often missed, is that the Court wields a threefold 
power. It may strike down legislation as inconsistent with principle. It 
may validate, or . . . 'legitimate' legislation as consistent with principle. 
Or it may do neither."48 When the Court does neither, it pushes the issue 
into the future.4' 
Bickel's explanation of the importance of judicial inaction is framed in 
terms of a need for the Court "to maintain itself in the tension between 
principle and expediency."50 Following Wechsler before him,"' he argues 
that the Court must always decide cases on a wholly principled basis. 
That is its institutional role. Unlike Wechsler, however, Bickel argues 
that the Court need not always decide the constitutional issue presented. 
The passive virtues allow the Court to avoid constitutional rulings. They 
allow principle to be silent in the face of short-term politics. A court that 
understands when such silence is appropriate exercises the virtue of "pru- 
dence."52 Prudence is, accordingly, the virtue of managing the conflict of 
reason and will. 
Prudence is required because a society governed entirely by principle 
would self-destruct: "No society, certainly not a large and heterogeneous 
one, can fail in time to explode if it is deprived of the arts of compromise 
"6 Nevertheless, if the Court is to maintain the institutional role 
that Bickel has identified, that compromise cannot be with the values that 
it is responsible for bringing to public policy-making. Rather, compromise 
688 (1989). 
47. See Bickel, The Supreme Court, 1960 Term-Foreword: The Passive Virtues, 75 HARV. L. 
REV. 40 (1961); A. BICKEL, supra note 24, at 111-98. 
48. A. BICKEL, supra note 24, at 69 (emphasis in original). 
49. The classic critique of Bickel's theory of the passive virtues is Gunther, The Subtle Vices of 
the "Passive Virtues"-A Comment on Principle and Expediency in Judicial Review, 64 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1 (1964) (passive virtues are inconsistent with Bickel's own demand for principled adjudication). 
50. A. BICKEL, supra note 24, at 69. Just as Bickel's substantive position can be seen as a synthe- 
sis of that of Hand and Wechsler, see supra note 46, his procedural position can also be understood as 
such a synthesis. While Hand had argued that there is no necessity that the Court exercise its jurisdic- 
tion in any case, and that the decision whether or not to engage in judicial review must always be 
based on political considerations, see L. HAND, supra note 3, at 15, Wechsler had argued that when- 
ever jurisdiction exists, the Court must exercise it. See Wechsler, supra note 3, at 9. Bickel's explana- 
tion of the passive virtues is intended to satisfy both Hand's prudentialism and Wechsler's formalism. 
51. See Wechsler, supra note 3, at 15. 
52. See Kronman, supra note 22, at 1569 (arguing that prudence is central, organizing concept of 
Bickel's entire corpus). 
53. A. BICKEL, supra note 24, at 64. 
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must be exercised outside of, not within, the domain of substantive princi- 
ple. The passive virtues "are the techniques that allow leeway to expedi- 
ency without abandoning principle."4 The moment of principled judg- 
ment is simply postponed, pushed into the indefinite future. 
The Court, then, must engage in a kind of politics of principle. It must 
politically manage its own role of bringing principle into the political or- 
der. To move too quickly or too far would be self-defeating; to move too 
slowly or too little would be to fail in its responsibilities. 
This account, while fuller, still leaves open the critical question of legit- 
imacy. Even when the Court can get away politically with the exercise of 
judicial review, and even when it exercises that function in a principled 
way, what makes its rulings legitimate? Here it is not enough to say that 
"[n]o good society can be unprincipled,"" because the issue is not good- 
ness but legitimacy. Furthermore, even the claim that a good society must 
be principled hardly tells us which principles are the right ones for any 
particular society. Nor does it tell us how to recognize or formulate a 
principle: Any reasonably good rhetorician can turn a statement of policy 
into a statement of principle and vice-versa."6 Given this, the conflict be- 
tween the courts and the political institutions of representative government 
can always be recast as a conflict over principle. 
Bickel's response is to offer an explanation of the democratic legitima- 
tion of the work of the Court. Principles are entitled to govern the social 
order only when those principles themselves receive the consent of the gov- 
erned. Bickel expresses this idea in a striking sentence: "The Court should 
declare as law only such principles as will-in time, but in a rather im- 
mediate foreseeable future-gain general assent."57 The legitimacy of ju- 
dicially articulated principle derives not from past constitutional decision, 
but from future political confirmation. The rule of reason, if that is what 
the courts use, is legitimate only insofar as it can stand on the consent of 
the governed. Thus, the content and level of generality of moral principle 
is determined not by abstract logic, but by the moral beliefs of the larger 
community. 
The Court's political responsibility is, therefore, to gain general consent 
to the principles that it articulates. In another striking phrase, Bickel 
writes that the Court "labors under the obligation to succeed.""8 When it 
54. Id. at 71. 
55. Id. at 64. 
56. See R. DWORKIN, supra note 37, at 22-23 ("The distinction can be collapsed by construing a 
principle as stating a social goal . . . or by construing a policy as stating a principle . . . or by 
adopting the utilitarian thesis that principles of justice are disguised statements of goals...."). Even 
if we could agree on the need for principles, there remains a problem with the level of generality at 
which principle should be formulated. The level of generality often determines outcomes. See Bork, 
Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1, 7-8 (1971); Greenawalt, 
The Enduring Significance of Neutral Principles, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 982, 987-88 (1978). 
57. A. BICKEL, supra note 24, at 239. 
58. Id. 
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fails, it has no right to impose principle, regardless of the abstract or theo- 
retical merits of the position." Prudence, then, is not just the efficient 
management of principle; rather, it is the means to achieve the legitima- 
tion of principled governance. Conversely, an imprudent Court will be not 
only ineffective, but also illegitimate. 
While initially Bickel's characterization of the judiciary as a representa- 
tive institution seems to focus on substance, not procedure, in the end he 
relies upon a quasi-electoral model of representation to overcome the 
countermajoritarian difficulty. The difference between the Court and 
more overtly political institutions is that for the Court the moment at 
which popular consent is expressed comes after, not before, the institu- 
tional action. Courts are representative institutions because they must gain 
the consent of the governed, just as the more directly political institutions 
of government must have that consent.60 
C. Discourse, Community and Legitimacy 
The possibility of obtaining popular legitimacy for judicial review is 
rooted both in the kind of society in which the Court operates and in the 
techniques of persuasion that it can deploy. Here, Bickel introduces two 
ideas that have become critical to the constitutional jurisprudence of those 
who follow him: first, the idea of the historical "moral unity" of the com- 
munity; and second, the idea of the Court as a participant in a dialogue 
about that moral unity. 
The Court can follow principle in America, and expect popular legiti- 
mation of its decisions, because of the moral unity of the country. On this 
point it is worth quoting Bickel in full: 
Very probably, the stability of the American Republic is due in large 
part . . . to the remarkable Lockeian consensus of a society that has 
never known a feudal regime; to a "moral unity" that was seriously 
broken only once, over the extension of slavery. This unity makes 
possible a society that accepts its principles from on high, without 
fighting about them. But the Lockeian consensus is also a limitation 
on the sort of principles that will be accepted.6' 
59. See id. at 28 ("Are we sufficiently certain of the permanent validity of any other principle 
[beyond popular sovereignty] to be ready to impose it against a consistent and determined majority 
60. For a theory of judicial review that also rests upon fundamental values and appeals to the 
future, but does not seek legitimacy in a theory of popular consent, see M. PERRY, supra note 22, at 
98-102 (arguing for prophetic function of judicial review). 
61. A. BICKEL, supra note 24, at 30. Bickel's claim about the "Lockeian consensus" in American 
political history was soon to be challenged in a range of historical works focusing on the non-Lockeian 
aspects of the American tradition. See, e.g., B. BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERI- 
CAN REVOLUTION (1967); J. POCOCK, supra note 16; G. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN 
REPUBLIC (1969). 
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The Court's function, then, is not so much to mediate between abstract 
principle and political expediency, but between past and future. While it 
appears to deliver principles from on high, "on high" turns out to be sim- 
ply the past of this particular community. 
Through the Court's exploration of history, it comes to understand the 
substantive moral principles that characterize this particular society. Its 
institutional role is to explicate those principles as rules of decision for 
current policy. However, in pursuing that role the Court faces an external 
measure: Its formulation of principle is either accepted by the populace or 
rejected. History alone offers no legitimacy for principle.62 Nevertheless, 
the fact that American history demonstrates a certain moral unity makes it 
likely that the community will continue to accept the principles which it 
has held in the past. The legitimacy of judicial review hinges on this pos- 
sibility becoming a reality.s3 
The legitimacy of the Court's articulation of principle, accordingly, de- 
pends upon the possibility of the society remaining, or at least becoming, a 
society with a moral vision that coincides with that of the Court. These 
two points, however, are not unrelated. The Court does not merely serve 
up the moral history of the country and then wait to see if this is still 
accepted as a ground of action. Rather, the Court helps mold the future 
which will, in turn, legitimate the substantive principles of decision upon 
which the Court relies. 
Bickel adopts from Dean Rostow the metaphor of the Court as 
"teacher[] in a vital national seminar.""4 The metaphor, however, is 
rather inaccurate in two senses. First, for Bickel, the Court does not have 
the authority of a teacher: In a democratic polity, ultimately it is what the 
people say that counts. Second, and more importantly, Bickel believes that 
the Court is less a teacher than a participant in a dialogue. Again, it is 
worth quoting his views in full: 
Over time, as a problem is lived with, the Court does not work in 
isolation to divine the answer that is right. It has the means to elicit 
partial answers and reactions from the other institutions, and to try 
tentative answers itself. When at last the Court decides that "judg- 
ment cannot be escaped," the answer is likely to be a proposition "to 
which widespread acceptance may fairly be attributed," because in 
the course of a continuing colloquy with the political institutions and 
62. At least one contemporary scholar holds just the opposite view. Instead of arguing that con- 
temporary, popular consent is a limit on historically validated principle, Michael McConnell argues 
that principled decisionmaking acts as a limit on historical consent. See McConnell, On Reading the 
Constitution, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 359, 361-62 (1988). 
63. Thus judicial review continues to have the contingent quality of the founding's success in 
bringing together reason and will. See supra notes 4-7 and accompanying text. 
64. See A. BICKEL, supra note 24, at 26 ("The Justices, in Dean Rostow's phrase, 'are inevitably 
teachers in a vital national seminar.' " (quoting Rostow, The Democratic Character of Judicial Re- 
view, 66 HARV. L. REV. 193, 208 (1952))). 
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with society at large, the Court has shaped and reduced the question, 
and perhaps because it has rendered the answer familiar if not obvi- 
ous. In these continuing colloquies, the profession-the practicing 
and teaching profession of the law-plays a major role . . . . But in 
American society the colloquy goes well beyond the profession and 
reaches deeply into the places where public opinion is formed."' 
If we ask what it is that is discussed in this continuing dialogue, the an- 
swer can only be the "moral unity" of the community. This is a dialogue 
that never ends, because it is constantly constructing that moral unity 
anew. 
The Court, then, is engaged in a dialogue concerning the character of 
the community of which it is both a part and a representative. Prudence 
now can be seen as the virtue of the court as a participant in this dialogue: 
When the Court successfully carries out its dialogical responsibilities, it 
exercises the virtue of "prudence."" When the dialogue is successful, the 
Court is entitled to a claim that it is a legitimate representative of the 
community.7 Because the judicial decision itself is only a part of the dia- 
logue, the ultimate measure of success is never in the past or the present, 
but only in the future. Success depends upon what is said in response to 
the decision. 
D. Conclusion: Bickel's Legacy 
In the end, Bickel's own work must be evaluated as an aspect of the 
larger dialogue within which he placed the work of the Court. Whether 
he was successful or not depends upon the character of the dialogue that 
he generated. Viewed in retrospect, Bickel's most important contribution 
was not in the identification of the passive virtues, the issue upon which 
he concentrated his attention. Rather, it was in his answer to the continu- 
ing problem of how to join reason and will in American constitutional 
theory. Here, he introduced two critical ideas: the moral unity of the com- 
munity and the court as a participant in an historically situated dialogue. 
When he argued that judicial review is best understood as a dialogue 
about the moral unity of the community, he combined these ideas in a 
way that was to have a tremendous impact on the next generation of con- 
65. Id. at 240. 
66. The strongest contemporary defender of the political virtue of prudence is Kronman, see 
supra note 22, much of whose work is devoted to providing a model of the relationship between law 
and statesmanship, both of which, he argues, are founded on prudence. See also Kronman, Practical 
Wisdom and Professional Character, 4 Soc. PHIL. & POL'Y 203 (1986); Kronman, Living in the 
Law, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 835 (1987). 
67. There is a running together of two distinct concepts of representation at this point in Bickel's 
theory. On the one hand, to the degree that he borrows from the electoral model of consent, Bickel 
offers a model of the representative as "agent" for the represented. On the other hand, to the degree 
that he argues that the Court acts only as a part of a larger dialogical whole, he suggests a model of 
"symbolic" representation. On the different meanings of representation, see H. PITKIN, THE CON- 
CEPT OF REPRFSENTATION (1967). 
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stitutional theorists. They took this framework and freed it from the con- 
ventional constraints of electoral politics that Bickel still accepted. In their 
view, Bickel maintained far too much faith in a model of legitimacy 
founded on popular consent. This in turn was rooted in his erroneous 
belief that reason and will remain separate moments in the life of the 
community. 
Once separated, reason and will cannot be brought together again by 
any institutional management of the Court's role. Thus, Bickel's reliance 
on public opinion as the ultimate grounds of judicial legitimacy, which led 
quickly to a "consensus" school of fundamental rights theorists,8 has been 
repeatedly criticized on the grounds that the Court is no better, and per- 
haps worse, than the political branches in perceiving and acting upon the 
underlying values of the community.69 Public opinion, even if cast into the 
future, remains too weak a ground upon which to found the democratic 
legitimacy of the Court.70 Public opinion will never speak with a single 
voice. The Court's claim to popular support is always subject to challenge, 
precisely in the name of public opinion, by the more directly political in- 
stitutions of government. Contemporary constitutional theory will try to 
avoid this charge by reconstructing the idea of "representation": The 
Court's representational claim will no longer depend upon an electoral 
model, or upon controversial claims of majority support. 
Bickel's continued acceptance of the separation of reason and will also 
undermined his claim for the priority of principle over expediency, or 
long-term values over short-term interests. By privileging will over reason, 
Bickel rendered obscure this distinction's political relevance.7' Any interest 
could become politically paramount if supported by a sufficient popular 
consensus, even if it were difficult-which it generally is not-to recast a 
short term interest as a principle. Contemporary theorists will revitalize 
Bickel's political dualism by recasting it as a distinction between republi- 
can and nonrepublican politics. 
The means that contemporary theorists use to overcome the dichotomy 
of reason and will were already present in the concepts of discourse and 
community, which Bickel began to bring together in his concept of "pru- 
68. See, e.g. Grey, Do We Have an Unwritten Constitution?, 27 STAN. L. REV. 703, 709 (1975); 
Perry, Abortion, The Public Morals, and the Police Power: The Ethical Function of Substantive Due 
Process, 23 UCLA L. REV. 689 (1976); Perry, Substantive Due Process Revisited, 71 Nw. U.L. 
REV. 417 (1977); Wellington, supra note 22. 
69. See Brest, supra note 5, at 1083-85; J. ELY, supra note 42, at 63-69. 
70. Bickel himself came to criticize sharply what he characterized as the Warren Court's "reliance 
on the intuitive judicial capacity to identify the course of progress." A. BICKEL, supra note 3, at 
173-74. 
71. Thus, Bork follows the implications of Bickel's own argument when he writes: 
Even if we assume that courts have superior capacities for dealing with matters of principle, it 
does not follow that courts have the right to impose more principle upon us than our elected 
representatives give us. Governmental decisions will involve a mix of, or a tradeoff between, 
principle and expediency. 
Bork, Styles in Constitutional Theory, 26 S. TEX. L.J. 383, 389 (1985). 
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dence." Bickel's failure was a failure truly to understand the significance 
of his own theory. The meaning of his discourse, like the legitimacy of the 
Court's work, lay just in the future. 
II. THE SHIFTING PLACE OF THE NEW REPUBLICAN COMMUNITY 
A. Ackerman and the Recovery of a National Community 
Ackerman begins with Bickel's expression of the countermajoritarian 
difficulty: When the Court reverses a decision of the political branches, 
while it may invoke the "people," it in fact "thwarts the will of represent- 
atives of the actual people of the here and now; it exercises control, not in 
behalf of the prevailing majority, but against it."72 Bickel's focus on the 
countermajoritarian difficulty symbolizes, according to Ackerman, a fail- 
ure on the part of modern constitutional theorists to understand the true 
character of the object of their theory: the Constitution. Because they have 
lost sight of the Constitution, it must be "discovered" anew.73 
Ackerman argues that the countermajoritarian difficulty, which defined 
the problem of theory for Bickel, rests on a "levelling" premise. That 
premise assumes that no normative distinctions can be drawn among the 
variety of ways in which the people of a community make political deci- 
sions. On this premise, for example, differences in the character of politi- 
cal action-e.g., differences between popular participation in the selection 
of congressmen and in the selection of representatives to a constitutional 
convention-do not result in normatively distinguishable political actions. 
Only if we accept this levelling premise can the actions of legislatures and 
those of constitutional conventions appear equally to be actions of "the 
people."74 
The leveller has no good answer to the question of why we should pre- 
fer the actions of representatives of the people past to the actions of the 
representatives of the people now." In each case, the people have acted in 
the only way in which they are capable-by consenting to actions by their 
representatives. If all political action occurs on a level field, the only rele- 
vant distinction would seem to be that between past and present. In a 
democracy, normative priority must be given to a present majority, be- 
72. Ackerman, supra note 33, at 1013 (quoting A. BICKEL, supra note 24, at 17). 
73. There is a great irony in Ackerman's claim of loss, given the substantial parallels between 
Bickel's and the Founders' understandings of the problem of constitutionalism as well as their resolu- 
tions of that problem. See supra notes 21-30 and accompanying text. 
74. The constitutional convention does not exhaust alternative unconventional forms of politics for 
Ackerman. Indeed, much of his theory is devoted to giving life to a political dualism that finds less 
formal analogues to the constitutional convention. 
75. Ackerman traces this levelling tendency back to what he describes as the "foundational" texts 
of academic political science and academic constitutional theory: Woodrow Wilson's CONGRESSIONAL 
GOVERNMENT (1885) and James B. Thayer's The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of 
Constitutional Law, 7 HARV. L. REV. 129 (1893). "In these foundational texts of the modern Ameri- 
can university, the dangerous tendency of our governmental institutions to act undemocratically is 
already established as a central source of scholarly anxiety." Ackerman, supra note 33, at 1015. 
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cause the alternative would effectively empower a present minority to con- 
trol a present majority.7s The institutional levelling Ackerman describes 
embraces a further levelling among the ends of political action. "[B]y defi- 
nition, the leveller treats all acts of political participation as if they were 
accompanied by the same degree of civic seriousness."77 The leveller, 
therefore, cannot make a politically relevant distinction between principle 
and policy, or between long-term values and short-term interests. Legiti- 
macy, for the leveller, derives from consent, not reason.78 
Pursued to its logical conclusion, Ackerman argues, levelling will pro- 
duce a theory of constitutional law that views the function of the Supreme 
Court as the protection and perfection of the structures of the everyday 
politics of representation. Since everyday politics is informed by a com- 
petition among private interests, in which each factional interest strives to 
use government to minimize its burdens and maximize its benefits, level- 
ling reduces politics and the meaning of the public order to just such a 
coordination of conflicting private interests.80 Levelling, then, represents a 
political world-view that simultaneously drains the Constitution of any 
special, public meaning, undermines the necessary conditions of the demo- 
cratic legitimacy of a substantive judicial review, and reduces citizens to 
private individuals using politics for the pursuit of purely personal ends.8' 
For Ackerman, the meaning of the Constitution must still be "discov- 
ered" because no account which accepts the levelling premises of modern 
liberal democracy can make sense of our constitutional institutions. 
Rather, constitutionalism only makes sense on the basis of a political dual- 
76. This idea is given visible effect, for example, in the traditional rule of statutory interpretation, 
which resolves conflict between statutory commands by acknowledging the supremacy of the later 
statute. The traditional rule is embodied in the doctrine of "implied repeal." See, e.g., H. BLACK, 
HANDBOOK ON THE CONSTRUCTION AND INTERPRETATION OF THE LAWS 351-56 (1911); T. 
SEDGWICK, A TREATISE ON THE RULES WHICH GOVERN THE INTERPRETATION AND CONSTRUC- 
TION OF STATUTORY AND CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 127-28 (1857); Kahn, supra note 14, at 197. 
77. See Ackerman, supra note 33, at 1038; see also supra note 71 (discussing Bork). 
78. Both of these problems of levelling were visible in Bickel's theory. Despite his attraction to a 
principled politics, he was compelled to accept the ultimate authority of a present majority, see supra 
text accompanying notes 56-59, and to recognize the problematic character of a distinction of princi- 
ple from policy, see supra text accompanying notes 41-45. 
79. This is Ackerman's account of Ely's theory presented in Democracy and Distrust. See Acker- 
man, supra note 33, at 1048 ("In [Ely's] view, private citizens can legitimately expect that the courts 
will protect only those constitutional rights which keep our regularly elected representatives electorally 
accountable and suitably broad-minded in the exercise of their lower-track functions."). For a similar 
view of Ely's theory as the perfection of conventional constitutional theory, see Parker, The Past of 
Constitutional Theory-And Its Future, 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 223 (1981). 
80. To the leveller, politics is merely an alternative to a market mechanism for coordinating di- 
verse, conflicting private interests. See, e.g., R. DAHL, A PREFACE TO DEMOCRATIC THEORY (1956); 
J. SCHUMPETER, supra note 27, at 250-83; D. TRUMAN, THE GOVERNMENTAL PROCESS: POLITI- 
CAL INTERESTS AND PUBLIC OPINION (2d ed. 1971); Becker, A Theory of Competition Among Pres- 
sure Groups for Political Influence, 98 Q.J. ECON. 371 (1983). 
81. While levelling has these consequences, it is nevertheless perfectly compatible with the liberal 
pluralism entrenched in the famous footnote four of Carolene Products. See infra notes 241-42 and 
accompanying text. Thus, it is no accident that John Ely, whom Ackerman describes as the "arche- 
typical" leveller, Ackerman, supra note 33, at 1047, takes the Carolene Products footnote as the 
foundational text for his own theory of constitutional law. 
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ism, which breaks with the levelling present in order to recover a republi- 
can past. For Ackerman, constitutional politics is republican politics, and 
this must be distinguished from the ordinary politics of our day-to-day 
lives. The difference between these two forms of politics is the difference 
between a politics founded on a community of discourse and a politics of 
private individuals. Republicanism reconceptualizes the character of pub- 
lic order as a domain in which individuals construct their identity through 
the dialogical creation of a community. 
Against the leveller's reduction of all politics to the "normal" politics of 
self-interest, Ackerman juxtaposes a qualitatively different manner of 
public life that occurs at unique moments in the history of the nation. 
These moments of constitutional politics are characterized by their "pub- 
lic-regarding forms of political activity, in which people sacrifice their pri- 
vate interests to pursue the common good in transient and informal associ- 
ation."82 Constitutional politics is distinguished from normal politics, 
then, by virtue of its end, its institutional nature, and its characterization 
of public life. 
While in normal politics each individual pursues his private interests, 
in constitutional politics "people sacrifice their private interests to pursue 
the common good."8" This contrast between private interests and the com- 
mon good is not between selfishness and altruism. For some people, altru- 
ism-helping others at some apparent cost to one's self-interests-may be 
their private interest. Some people are like that; they are like that even in 
moments of normal politics. The common good is not the wellbeing of 
others, nor even the aggregate of all individual members' well-being. 
Rather, it is the well-being of the community understood as a single, his- 
torical entity. It is the good of the whole, which exists prior to any differ- 
entiation among community members.84 
Institutionally, constitutional politics, or the politics of the common 
good, occurs within "transient and informal political association."85 The 
first of these characteristics is far more important than the second. In fact, 
Ackerman argues that constitutional politics may, under some circum- 
stances, make extraordinary use of the normal institutions of political 
life.86 The "transient" character of constitutional politics is indicative of 
its extraordinary character. Constitutional politics is "transient" because 
no citizen can live a wholly public, political life. Citizens remain individu- 
als with private interests. A wholly public life is not possible because the 
82. Ackerman, supra note 33, at 1020. 
83. Id. 
84. In considering this common good, we take that attitude toward the public order which Dwor- 
kin characterizes as "personification." See infra notes 317-19 and accompanying text. On the idea of 
the common, or public, good in republican theory in general, see Sunstein, Beyond the Republican 
Revival, 97 YALE L.J. 1539, 1554-55 (1988). 
85. Ackerman, supra note 33, at 1020. 
86. See id. at 1055-56 (describing institutional roles in process of structural amendment). 
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private demands of desire, family and career must continue to be met.7 
Constitutional politics is transient, then, for just the same reasons that 
revolutions are transient: It takes extraordinary effort, which can only be 
brought on by extraordinary circumstances, to move from the private to 
the public life.88 Thus, the republican theory that Ackerman develops de- 
nies the possibility of "permanent revolution." Instead, it asserts the per- 
manent possibility of revolution. More precisely, it invites the latter, by 
subordinating the structures of normal politics to future constitutional mo- 
ments. It institutionalizes revolution, without reducing revolutionary polit- 
ics to normal politics. 
Finally, and most importantly, the character of public life changes dra- 
matically when we move from normal to constitutional politics. In normal 
politics, the character of interaction is competitive: "[Flactions try to ma- 
nipulate the constitutional forms of political life to pursue their own nar- 
row interests." The individual can stand apart from this ordinary politi- 
cal competition and assess how best to use the mechanisms of political life 
to advance personal ends. In constitutional politics, on the other hand, the 
method of interaction is debate: The American citizen finds "deeper 
meaning on those rare occasions when the American people . . . after 
sustained debate and struggle, . . . hammer out new principles to guide 
public life."90 These principles are neither rules for the governance of 
some foreign community, nor rules that a majority simply imposes upon 
the private activities of individual citizens.9' Rather, these principles are 
constitutive of the identity of this public body and so of the citizens who 
compose it. 
Ackerman frequently appeals to the language of self-identity in describ- 
ing constitutional politics: At these unique moments citizens "invest a cer- 
tain aspect of their personality with heightened significance" ;92 we "rede- 
fine, as private citizens, our collective identity";93 "constitutional law . . . 
has always provided us with the language and process within which our 
political identities could be confronted, debated, and defined."94 Thus, in 
constitutional politics, the individual does not stand apart, already formed, 
87. Ackerman speaks of George Washington as a paradigm of public virtue, someone for whom 
"the good life is the political life," which is now beyond the reach of purely private citizens. Id. at 
1032 (emphasis in original). Of course, even Washington had a private life of family and career, 
although both have been appropriated by the public in the myth that Washington has become. 
88. See id. at 1032-33. 
89. Id. at 1022. Ackerman goes on to write that normalml politics must be tolerated in the name 
of individual liberty." Id. The important word here is "individual," not "liberty." Liberty is essen- 
tially contested: Constitutional politics makes an equal claim to liberty, but it is no longer an "individ- 
ual" liberty. 
90. Id. at 1039. 
91. In both cases, preferences would remain "exogenous" to politics. See Sunstein, supra note 43, 
at 1138-69 (distinguishing among kinds of preferences). 
92. Ackerman, supra note 33, at 1041. 
93. Id. at 1050 (emphasis in original). 
94. Id. at 1072. 
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from the mechanisms of political interaction. The process of constitutional 
politics is not a means to an end-personal and private-that exists apart 
from the process itself. Self-creation is an end in itself. This is the classic 
republican idea of life in the polis, presented now within a model of com- 
munity as discursive particularity. 
The difference between constitutional politics and normal politics, then, 
is the difference between the republican vision of community as the do- 
main of self-creation through mutual, dialogical engagement and the lib- 
eral vision of the public order as a mechanism for the advancement of 
private ends.95 "The first, recalling the grandeur of the Greek polis, in- 
sists that the life of political involvement serves as the noblest ideal for 
humankind. The second, recalling a Christian suspicion of the claims of 
secular community, insists that the salvation of souls is a private af- 
fair . . .."96 In this dualism, Ackerman's sympathies are clear: "Normal 
politics must be tolerated in the name of individual liberty; it is, however, 
democratically inferior to the intermittent and irregular politics of public 
virtue associated with moments of constitutional creation."97 The polis 
must replace the church if we are to re-discover the Constitution. The 
private epiphany of grace is to be replaced by the constitutive process of 
dialogue in the public community. The inferior politics of the ordinary 
reflects the inferior virtues of liberalism compared to those of 
republicanism. 
The constitutional role of the Court follows easily from this account of 
a dualist politics. The Court is to preserve, in times of normal politics, the 
substance of communal self-identity achieved in prior moments of consti- 
tutional politics. The Court, then, represents the community's better self: 
It represents its public identity to its private constituents.98 Thus, the 
Court speaks for the people in a way in which the ordinary institutions of 
political representation do not, because the "people" as such do not really 
exist in normal politics. The "people" only exist at those critical moments 
of history when the entire nation engages in an identity-generating dia- 
95. See Horwitz, History and Theory, 96 YALE L.J. 1825, 1832 (1987) ("Liberalism has stood 
for a subjective theory of value, a conception of individual self-interest as the only legitimate animat- 
ing force in society . . . and denial of any conception of an autonomous public interest independent of 
the sum of individual interests. Republicanism has stood for the primacy of politics. . . It has em- 
phasized the growth and development of human personality in active political life. It has proceeded 
from some objective conception of the public interest...."). 
96. Ackerman, supra note 33, at 1043. Ackerman's idea is clear here, even though he fails to 
recognize the communal character of the Christian tradition. That tradition offered an alternative 
community to that of the state, not simply a domain of private salvation. See E. PAGELS, ADAM, EVE 
AND THE SERPENT (1988); P. HANSON, THE PEOPLE CALLED: THE GROWTH OF COMMUNITY IN 
THE BIBLE (1986). Moreover, at various points in the Christian tradition, the Church itself used the 
state to impose "salvation" upon citizens. See generally P. JOHNSON, A HISTORY OF CHRISTIANITY 
191-264 (1976). 
97. Ackerman, supra note 33, at 1022-23 (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted). 
98. Ackerman pursues this dualist conception of politics into his description of the individual 
himself, whom he characterizes as a "private citizen." The private citizen is contrasted with both the 
"perfectly private person[]" and the "perfectly public citizen[]." Id. at 1042-43. 
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logue. In holding forth the meaning of the Constitution reached by the 
people at those moments, the Court has a better claim qua representative 
than do the electoral institutions of government. Those institutions re- 
present the aggregate of private interests, but no such aggregate consti- 
tutes "the people." Thus, only when we abandon levelling, can we under- 
stand the Court's representative role in a democracy. With that 
understanding, the countermajoritarian difficulty is "dis-solve[d]."99 
There is, of course, a good deal of Bickel in Ackerman's account. The 
dualistic account of politics, the reliance on public dialogue, and the un- 
derstanding of the Court as a "representative" institution are all ideas 
introduced by Bickel. Both theorists are concerned with weakening the 
representational claims of the elected political institutions of govern- 
ment.100 Neither Ackerman nor Bickel shows much concern for actual 
elections as uniquely privileged expressions of the public will. Despite 
these similarities, Ackerman seems to embrace precisely the kind of "mys- 
tic" reification of the people that Bickel attacked.101 Ackerman's response 
to Bickel's critique is rooted in his claims about the self-generative charac- 
ter of the republican community of dialogue. The strength of this response 
rests on the connections Ackerman can demonstrate between the institu- 
tional structure he describes and the theory of community upon which he 
relies. The problems with his theory emerge at just this juncture. 
Ackerman's dualism is projected into the linear progress of American 
history. The people who speak in a constitutional moment of high politics 
are never, or at least are rarely, the people of the present moment: Most 
of the people, most of the time, pursue normal politics. Whatever or who- 
ever this popular sovereign-"we the people"-was, it was not me, nor 
you, nor any of the rest of us. Indeed, it is not even likely to have been 
most of the actual people around when "we the people" was acting. The 
participants in the constitutional politics of 1787 surely did not include 
women, blacks, or the propertyless.102 Neither can we speak of universal- 
ism in describing the constitutional politics of the post-civil war period.'03 
Ackerman's description of constitutional politics as a politics of the "na- 
tional community" has, in reality, a very thin standard of "national" 
participation. 
99. Id. at 1016. 
100. Ackerman argues that the ordinary, representative institutions were purposely designed to 
have a complex and conflicting relationship to "the people." Id. at 1028-29. Because of those con- 
flicts, any representational claim by these institutions will necessarily be problematic. 
101. See supra notes 31-32 and accompanying text. One might say that Ackerman's whole effort 
is to "demystify" this mysticism. That he is not entirely successful is well captured in Michelman's 
recent characterization of Ackerman: "Surprisingly, another authoritarian constitutional theorist is 
Bruce Ackerman." Michelman, Law's Republic, 97 YALE L.J. 1493, 1497 n.11 (1988). 
102. See Simon, The Authority of the Framers of the Constitution, 73 CAL. L. REV. 1482, 1498 
n.44 (1985) (only 2.5% of population voted in favor of ratification of Constitution). 
103. See J. JAMES, THE FRAMING OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT (1956); James, Is the 
Fourteenth Amendment Constitutional? 50 Soc. Sci. 3 (1975). 
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Ackerman's response to this might be that it is not the universalism of 
participation and assent but rather the quality of political life that distin- 
guishes constitutional from normal politics. That is a fine answer, but it is 
ultimately not an answer consistent with the claims he wants to make for 
the dialogical community. Such a reliance on qualitative rather than 
quantitative characteristics of political participation is inadequate for 
three closely related reasons, the net effect of which is to raise precisely 
the problem of the legitimacy of constitutional authority that Ackerman 
seeks to escape. 
First, to focus on the quality of participation inevitably raises troubling 
issues concerning the continuity of the community. If quality is what mat- 
ters, it must be because there are substantively correct political principles 
which are more likely to be discovered in constitutional politics. But if this 
is true, then the grounds of the geographical and historical continuity of 
the community are threatened. Why not just look to the outcome of consti- 
tutional politics wherever and whenever it occurs? Perhaps we could learn 
a good deal about the meaning of justice, equality and due process, for 
example, by looking to the contemporary, revolutionary politics of the 
Third World. We certainly could learn much from the French Revolu- 
tion. This answer would, in short, convert a theory of discursive particu- 
larity and historicized reason into an epistemological claim about the 
character of inquiry likely to lead to the discovery of "natural law." The 
claim for quality, therefore, cannot be so abstract as to undermine the 
sense that it is our history which is important. But then we still need an 
explanation of why it is important. 
Second, by projecting constitutional politics into the past, Ackerman 
creates a problem of constitutional interpretation. His Justices must inter- 
pret the content of past constitutional moments, in which they did not 
participate and in which their identities were not formed. Their access to 
the past accomplishments of "the people" must be mediated through the 
tools of historical inquiry. Constitutional provisions-particularly what 
Ackerman labels "structural amendments"-hardly carry their meanings 
on their faces.'04 A theory of intertemporal identity, which is ultimately 
what Ackerman seeks in his idea of "we the people," must still be sup- 
ported by a theory of interpretation. To the degree that interpretation is 
controversial, the very identity of "we the people" is thrown into question. 
The effect of controversy both over theories of interpretation as well as 
over particular interpretations is to reintroduce the countermajoritarian 
difficulty. The stronger the distinction becomes between past and present, 
between the object of interpretation and the interpreting institution, the 
104. See Ackerman, supra note 33, at 1071 ("[W]e will require nothing less than a dualistic 
reinterpretation of every significant event in our constitutional history...."). 
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more the Court will be isolated in its claim to represent "we the people" 
of the past against all of us right now. 
While Ackerman is surely correct in asserting that the possibility of a 
structural amendment relieves the Court of some difficult interpretive 
problems-in particular finding a textual hook upon which to hang the 
changing meaning of substantive due process 05-this possibility raises 
other problems that are just as difficult. At any given time, constitutional 
adjudication is likely to focus on problems at the edge, not the center, of 
accepted doctrine. Saying that there was a structural amendment hat le- 
gitimated the welfare state during the New Deal struggle,'06 for example, 
hardly tells us whether Texas must equalize the financial resources of its 
various school districts'07 or whether a state must provide equal access to 
public funding for child birth and abortion.'08 These questions are not 
likely to be answerable from the historical sources alone, even if we dra- 
matically expand the relevant and legitimate historical sources.'09 To the 
degree that the Justices must look outside of history for a resolution, we 
confront in renewed form the countermajoritarian difficulty, even if we 
were to accept the premise of an intertemporal identity of "we the 
people." 
Finally, and most importantly, Ackerman's theory seems particularly 
troubled by the deficiencies in participation in past constitutional mo- 
ments. Such deficiencies pose an obvious problem to his claim that in re- 
publican constitutional politics there is a process of simultaneous elf- 
generation of the citizen-the individual-and the people-the commu- 
nity. A citizen not involved in the process may "consent" to the creation of 
"the people" by others, but his own political experience is mediated 
through that consent. This is hardly a politics of self-creation. Thus, even 
at moments of constitutional politics, there may be a substantial gap be- 
tween "the people" and the people. 
This asymmetry between "the people" and the rest of us becomes even 
more problematic as one considers the temporal character of Ackerman's 
account. Ackerman argues that a successful effort to pursue a contempo- 
rary constitutional politics must meet a condition of universality."0 With- 
out universal participation-or something approaching it-there is not the 
requisite legitimacy for a change in the content of the higher law that 
expresses the American political identity. But imagine that we could de- 
termine that the total number of people engaged in constitutional politics 
in 1787 or 1868 was "x" and that we could further determine that cur- 
105. See id. 
106. Id. at 1053-55. 
107. See San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973). 
108. See Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977). 
109. See Powell, Rules for Originalists, 73 VA. L. REV. 659 (1987) (history yields interpreta- 
tions, not legal facts). 
110. See Ackerman, supra note 33, at 1042-43. 
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rently some "x + y" are engaged in constitutional politics. Nevertheless, 
according to Ackerman, the Court remains bound by the results of the 
earlier moment, unless "x + y" meets a standard of contemporary univer- 
sality. Why? What does the past have over the present, if it is neither 
numbers or truth?"' 
Ackerman's answer seems to rest on a theory of implied consent. All 
those not presently engaged in constitutional politics have implicitly con- 
sented to that understanding of the Constitution reached at prior moments 
of constitutional politics. In the absence of at least a majority's participa- 
tion,"l2 there is not sufficient consensus for a change in constitutional doc- 
trine."3' This theory now, however, is approaching dangerously close to 
the levelling premises of Bickel: Both Ackerman and Bickel seem to seek a 
measure of contemporary popular consent to the principled discourse they 
describe. This poses a peculiar difficulty for Ackerman, however, given his 
commitment to a dualist model of politics."14 
Ackerman acknowledges that, under conditions of normal politics, citi- 
zens' attitudes towards political issues are frequently characterized by ap- 
athy, ignorance, and selfishness.'15 If that is so, why should those attitudes 
be respected over the constitutional politics of a contemporary minority? 
This is precisely what is at issue when Ackerman imposes a unanim- 
ity-or even a majority-requirement on constitutional politics. Of course, 
Ackerman does not contend that apathy, ignorance, and selfishness are 
definitive of the constitutional self-understanding, but precisely at that 
moment he appeals to an "implied," popular self-understanding directed 
at prior moments of constitutional politics. Only then can the self- 
understanding of those not engaged in the communitarian dialogue of con- 
stitutional politics stand on the same field as that of those so engaged. 
Ackerman has substituted an implied self-understanding for implied con- 
sent, but the object and effect are the same.'16 
111. Given the growth of our nation's population, the problem identified in the text is not just a 
problem arising from less than complete participation in a national dialogue in the past. 
112. Requiring a supermajority would seem problematic. See Amar, supra note 33, at 1073. 
113. Ackerman comes closest to acknowledging the implied-consent basis of his argument in 
describing the meaning of a judicial decision holding a statute unconstitutional: "[T]he Court's back- 
ward-looking exercise in judicial review is an essential part of a vital present-oriented project by 
which the mass of today's private citizenry can modulate the democratic authority they accord to the 
elected representatives who speak in their name...." Ackerman, supra note 33, at 1050. Since the 
usual answer of the people to the Court is "no answer," the operative effect of this statement is to 
understand a failure "to modulate" as implied consent to continue as before. 
114. While Ackerman accuses modern levellers of levelling "down," i.e., of reducing all political 
actions to the lowest common denominator, Ackerman seems guilty of levelling "up." He must implic- 
itly raise up the level of political action engaged in during normal politics, in order to constitute a 
majority's understanding of constitutional politics that may compete with an actively engaged, discur- 
sive minority. 
115. Ackerman, supra note 33, at 1034. 
116. See J. Waldron, A Perfect Technology of Justice (paper delivered at Legal Theory Work- 
shop, Yale Law School, Mar. 16, 1989) (Ackerman's self-understanding argument plays role essen- 
tially indistinguishable from ordinary contractarian arguments). 
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Ackerman's explanation of the legitimacy of an authoritative past rests, 
then, on a theory of contemporary consensus that simply substitutes an 
implied self-understanding for an implied consent. However, once he ac- 
knowledges that the legitimate authority of the past depends upon the be- 
liefs of the contemporary generation, there is little reason to favor implied, 
over actual, beliefs. If that is so, we are back at the countermajoritarian 
difficulty. To avoid the consequences of levelling, Ackerman must envision 
not simply a dualism of political life in the historical life of the nation, but 
must project that dualism implicitly into the political psychology of every 
citizen at every moment."17 
Implied consent arguments, moreover, are notoriously slippery. How 
exactly do we know to what the ordinary citizen has implicitly consented, 
or, in Ackerman's terms, the content of his implied self-understanding? 
Given the choice between government by a current minority or a past 
majority, it is surely not clear what choice has been implicitly made."8 
Implied consent too often turns out to be a vehicle for obtaining present 
legitimation of a substantive norm that, in fact, has its source in some 
other-i.e., nonconsensual-theory. The same problem plagues claims 
about implied self-understanding. 
Each of these problems of continuity, interpretation and revision is sim- 
ply a reformulation of Bickel's countermajoritarian difficulty. That these 
problems can be reformulated as questions about Ackerman's theory sug- 
gests that his discovery of "the people" as a dialogical community is not a 
sufficient answer to the problems of modern constitutional theory. To sat- 
isfy the demand for a national dialogue constitutive of identity, he must 
project that dialogue into the past. But precisely in doing that, he renders 
the dialogue incapable of supporting the authoritative claims of constitu- 
tional law in the present. 
The problems with Ackerman's theory, accordingly, arise out of his at- 
tempt to couple a model of republican dialogue with a claim of contempo- 
rary authority. Ackerman tries to find authority in a picture of national 
dialogical community, but the model of discursive particularity is not rea- 
sonably constrained by either of the principles of temporal uniqueness or 
geographical comprehensiveness to which he appeals. Either we take seri- 
ously the dialogue or the numbers. The marriage of numbers and dialogue 
may be possible at unique moments of history, but that is an empirical 
117. Accordingly, Ackerman might save his theory by acknowledging a kind of political schizo- 
phrenia in which citizens are simultaneously pursuing constitutional and normal politics. Despite his 
characterization of individuals as "private citizens," I see no particular reason to believe this to be 
true. Such a view would wholly undermine his cyclical interpretation of constitutional history. Fur- 
thermore, the communitarian dialogue of self-creation is simply not present as a national phenomenon 
during times of normal politics. 
118. It is not at all clear that it even makes sense to speak of choice here. Perhaps different 
choices have been implicitly made by different people. 
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proposition, not a matter of theory."' When history does not work out 
that way, we cannot avoid the choice. Bickel ultimately chose numbers. 
Ackerman's problems arise from his effort to avoid the choice by insisting 
that numbers and dialogue remain united in a national identity. But the 
cost of maintaining that view is too high; he must give up real dialogue for 
an implied dialogue, and real community for an "implied" community. 
Ackerman attempts to dissolve Bickel's antimajoritarian difficulties by 
offering a republican theory of political self-identity. In the end, however, 
he cannot justify the limits he places on the discourse that defines the self. 
The limits come from outside of the discourse. For Ackerman these limits 
come from the institution of a national political discourse. Other new 
republicans, however, have far less confidence in the capacity of the peo- 
ple to enter a dialogical community. When forced to choose between the 
discourse and the people, they choose the discourse. 
B. Michelman: The Supreme Court as a Community 
Michelman understands his recent essay, Traces of Self-Government, as 
following upon the work of Ackerman.'20 Michelman accepts Ackerman's 
goal of using the conceptual model of the discursive community to provide 
an account of the institutional character of self-government in the Ameri- 
can polity, but finds Ackerman's institutional resolution unsatisfactory. 
He wants to save the republican vision of self-government from the 
problems that arise from Ackerman's attempt to make us all potential, if 
not real, republicans. In place of a national community of dialogue, he 
proposes an alternative vision of the dialogical community that is the locus 
of republican self-government. For Michelman, that community is consti- 
tuted by the discourse among the nine members of the Supreme Court. 
Rousseau, Michelman argues, was right: Republicanism cannot exist in 
a community larger than a Swiss canton.'2' The self-generative commu- 
nity of dialogue is, contrary to Ackerman's claim, beyond the reach of "we 
the people." As a "people," we are irretrievably lost to normal politics. If 
there never was a "we the people," then, the Court's authority cannot 
119. See supra notes 8-10 and accompanying text. 
120. Michelman, The Supreme Court, 1985 Term-Foreword: Traces of Self-Government, 100 
HARV. L. REV. 4, 16 n.65 (1986) [hereinafter Michelman, Traces]. Michelman sees both Cover and 
Ackerman as his intellectual predecessors. Of Cover, Michelman says: "This essay is for him. I hope 
it shows well his inspiration." Id. at 4. Later, he speaks of his argument as extending, but not deepen- 
ing, Cover's work in Nomos and Narrative. See Michelman, Traces, at 16. Of Ackerman, 
Michelman states that his own argument that "the republican tradition, and its relation to American 
constitutionalism, points away from the countermajoritarian difficulty as the true focus of democratic 
concern," id., is "merely an elaboration] of the work of Bruce Ackerman." Id. at 16 n.65. I focus on 
this particular work of Michelman's because of the unique argument it provides about the character 
and function of the Supreme Court. In his more recent work, Michelman has, himself, moved away 
from this Court-centered perspective on the discursive community. See, e.g., Michelman, supra note 
101, at 1531 (arguing for "non-state centered notion of republican citizenship"). 
121. J. ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT 83 (trans. C. Sherover 1974) (appropriate size is 
that "in which every member can be known by all"). 
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come from the past acts of such a subject.'22 Accordingly, Ackerman's at- 
tempt to find a community in the past leaves us all presently subject to a 
very uncommunitarian vision of judicial authority.'23 
The loss of a national republican community, however, does not mean 
that there is no place in our constitutional system for the discursive partic- 
ularity that constitutes republican self-government. Rather, the theoreti- 
cian's task is to find the place at which that discourse can, and should, 
occur and so inform constitutional governance. By relocating the republi- 
can community into a narrow part of the nation's political life, 
Michelman hopes to resolve the various difficulties discovered in Acker- 
man's expansive vision of the dialogical self-construction of the people. 
Thus, Michelman's new model of republicanism seeks to overcome the 
problems of continuity, interpretation and revision that undermined Ack- 
erman's account.'24 
While Michelman may meet each of these difficulties, his project never- 
theless raises disturbing questions about the character and usefulness of 
the concept of a discursive community. From an institutional perspective, 
the concept appears extraordinarily unstable: Where is the community of 
constitutional self-government? Who are its members? If the new republi- 
cans' project is to marry community and authority, the unstable character 
of community suggests a deeper problem with the linkage of these two 
concepts in constitutional theory. 
There are three moments to Michelman's argument. First, he identifies 
republicanism with self-government and self-government with freedom.'25 
Second, he denies both that republican self-government is possible in 
politics on a national scale and that the Constitution sought to establish a 
republican model of participatory self-government in the national political 
process.'26 Third, he defends a place for republicanism in the constitu- 
tional scheme by offering the dialogical community or discursive particu- 
larity as the proper model for constitutional adjudication by the Supreme 
Court.'27 Each of these points needs elaboration. 
Michelman explains the fascination of contemporary legal and political 
theory with republicanism by noting its powerful response to "the Carte- 
sian Anxiety: The sense of entrapment between nihilism on the one hand, 
122. See Michelman, Traces, supra note 120, at 65 ("Certainly the author [of the authoritative 
constitutional interpretation] is not 'We the People' in anything like the demystified sense that allows 
Ackerman his victory over Bickel." (footnote omitted)). See also id. at 74 ("Unable as a nation to 
practice our own self-government (in the full, positive sense) . . ."). 
123. See id. ("In the final analysis, the People vanish, abstracted into a story written by none of 
us."). 
124. See supra notes 118-19 and accompanying text. 
125. See Michelman, Traces, supra note 120, at 26-27. 
126. See id. at 57; infra notes 141-42 and accompanying text. 
127. Michelman offers the model for other courts as well, but focuses especially on the Supreme 
Court. See Michelman, Traces, supra note 120, at 74. 
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and domination on the other."'28 Nihilism and domination are both the 
product of what Michelman calls "negative" freedom.'29 Negative free- 
dom is the view that "moral choice proceeds not from publicly certifiable 
grounds or reasoning, but from the inexplicable private impulses of indi- 
viduals, objectively unfounded and rationally unguided."130 This is a the- 
ory of the extreme subjectivity of choice, of the impotence of moral reason- 
ing and of the relativism of moral values. 
From the perspective of negative freedom, a choice is valuable only to 
the degree that it reflects a particular individual's own ends. Apart from 
the individual, or individuals, who actually have those ends, a choice has 
no value. Translated into a political theory, negative freedom leads to ni- 
hilism and domination. In the absence of an external, objective standard, 
action reflects either the subject's own arbitrary choice-nihilism-or 
someone else's choice-domination."3' The difference is only in the iden- 
tity of the person choosing, not in the qualitative character of the choice. 
Between nihilism and domination there is, from the perspective of nega- 
tive freedom, no third possibility, representing an objective or public 
ground of moral and political value, which we might call justice. 
Michelman argues that contemporary answers to the dilemmas of nega- 
tive freedom focus on the idea of an historically situated, dialogical com- 
munity: themes of "dialogue," "history," "responsibility," and "identity" 
together "characterize a modern project of ethical reconciliation through 
dialogue, in search of freedom."1' Rejecting the extreme subjectivity of 
negative freedom, this alternative perspective argues that normative dis- 
putes are resolved "by conversation, a communicative practice of open and 
intelligible reason-giving"'33 in which the decision-maker must take im- 
mediate responsibility for the construction of a "normative history," 
within which the dispute may be situated and so resolved.134 The unique, 
historical dialogue that is constitutive of the particular community, there- 
128. Id. at 24. 
129. See id. at 25. For elaboration of the distinction between negative and positive freedom, see 
also 1. BERLIN, Two Concepts of Liberty, in FOUR ESSAYS ON LIBERTY 118 (1969); Taylor, Kant's 
Theory of Freedom, in 2 PHILOSOPHY AND THE HUMAN SCIENCES: PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS 318 
(1985) (elaborating concept of positive freedom). 
130. Michelman, Traces, supra note 120, at 25 (citation omitted). This is the psychological- 
ethical side of the political phenomenon of "levelling" that Ackerman describes. See supra notes 
74-82 and accompanying text. 
131. While "nihilism" and "domination" are used to characterize negative freedom, they are 
likely to be so used only by someone who accepts the possibility of positive freedom. They express the 
subordinate, defective character of negative freedom. Someone who is not concerned with positive 
freedom is more likely to use the term "utility" to distinguish choices within the domain of negative 
freedom. 
132. Michelman, Traces, supra note 120, at 33. 
133. Id. at 34. 
134. The idea of a "normative history," id. at 35, directly links Michelman's work to that of both 
Ackerman and Cover. On Cover, see infra notes 248-51 and accompanying text. This idea was al- 
ready implicit in Bickel's appeal to the "moral unity" of the American political tradition. See supra 
note 68 and accompanying text. 
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fore, provides the public, objective ground for a theory of "positive free- 
dom." Republicanism is the expression of positive freedom as a political 
doctrine. 
Between the alternatives of nihilism and domination, then, republican- 
ism promises positive freedom. Republicanism remains a doctrine of free- 
dom because the rule of action is given by the subject to him or herself. 
Yet it is not nihilistic: the rule of action has an objectivity grounded in a 
particular community's discourse. This public discourse provides an exter- 
nal measure of reasonableness: "This view of the human condition implies 
that self-cognition and ensuing self-legislation must . . . be socially situ- 
ated; norms must be formed through public dialogue and expressed as 
public law. Normative reason . . . cannot be a solitary activity."'35 
This is the same theme of self-generation through a communal dialogue 
upon which Ackerman relied. On this view, the community's political and 
moral norms do not stand as external demands, dominating individual 
choice; rather, they are themselves an expression of individual identity. 
Individual and communal identity are only two perspectives on a single 
phenomenon: discursive particularity. This understanding of community 
makes possible an objective model of self-government. "Public law" is 
identified with "self-legislation"; in coming to know the law, then, the 
individual achieves "self-cognition." 
In this community of discourse, according to Michelman, modern 
republicans seek to find an expression of the unity of the subjective and 
the objective, and so of the individual and the universal, which does not 
rest upon an abstract concept of human nature."36 Positive freedom in its 
contemporary appearance lacks the completely universal aspiration of 
Kantian ethics, in which the giving of an objective moral rule to the self 
requires the denial of the historical uniqueness of the individual. For 
Kant, all selves give themselves precisely the same moral rules. The con- 
temporary concept of the universal-that which functions as the moment 
of law in republican self-government-cannot gain its legitimacy from any 
claim that it is the "essence" of human nature. Negative freedom is too 
much with us to tolerate such a claim. Instead, the objectivity of law is 
founded in the dialogue of a particular community. The "universal" is 
now tailored to the particular community of discourse. What looks like a 
universal moral rule-a principle of justice-is such only for the commu- 
nity in which it appears. 
In all of this, Michelman is covering the common ground of contempo- 
rary theory, even if that ground sometimes resembles a marsh, rather than 
dry land. He admits that republicanismim is not a well-defined historical 
doctrine" and that "it figures less as canon than ethos, less as blueprint 
135. Michelman, Traces, supra note 120, at 27. 
136. See id. at 28-31. 
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than as conceptual grid, less as settled institutional fact than as semantic 
field for normative debate and constructive imagination."'37 This is surely 
a good description of the role of republicanism in contemporary constitu- 
tional theory. Michelman's own account of republicanism remains more 
ethos than blueprint. Nevertheless, his originality arises precisely to the 
extent that he does offer an institutional blueprint. 
Michelman's account, so far, has been one of the possibility of a repub- 
lican politics of self-government. It has not been an analysis of the institu- 
tional structure of American politics. To make the move from possibility 
to actuality, Michelman asks "where, if anywhere, can we find self- 
government inside the Constitution?"'38 He responds that the question is 
"undeniably baffling . . . because the document so obviously charters not 
a participatory democracy but a sovereign authority of gover- 
nors-representatives-distinct from the governed.""3 The republicans, 
on his view, lost the original constitutional debate. The antifederalists ob- 
jected to the proposed Constitution precisely because they believed that the 
creation of a national, representative government would deny the commu- 
nitarian conditions necessary for self-government on the republican 
model.140 Those conditions include direct participation in a discourse 
about the moral unity of the community. The antifederalists correctly per- 
ceived that power would pass to national representatives. Citizens would, 
correspondingly, lose contact with the public deliberation required to 
maintain positive self-government. American national government was in- 
tended to be and has become generally a structure of authority over the 
individual citizen. The institutions of government stand over the citizen 
not as expressions of self-identity but as coercive powers. 
Michelman identifies a paradox in the continued strength that republi- 
canism shows in constitutional theory, "despite its obvious impracticality 
in the national constitutional setting.""' Republicanism is impractical be- 
cause national government is government through institutions, which may 
be more or less representative, but which are certainly not participatory or 
dialogical in the strong sense required by positive freedom. Ackerman's 
effort to reconstruct a national republican tradition is reduced by 
137. Id. at 17. 
138. Id. at 56. 
139. Id. at 57. 
140. See id. at 19. Michelman presents this description of constitutional history as a summary of 
the views put forth in G. STONE, L. SEIDMAN, C. SUNSTEIN & M. TUSHNET, CONSTITUTIONAL 
LAW (1986). Nevertheless, he seems to embrace it when he speaks of "the historical defeat of [civic- 
republicanism] antifederalist defenders." Michelman, Traces, supra note 120, at 74. For a different 
view of the appropriate characterization of the debate between the federalists and antifederalists, see 
Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38 STAN. L. REV. 29 (1985), discussed infra at 
notes 161-62 and accompanying text. 
141. Michelman, Traces, supra note 120, at 74. Michelman's later work no longer seems to 
accept this "obvious impracticality," see Michelman, supra note 101, although he continues to believe 
that the discursive community of self-government is not likely to occur within the political institutions 
of national governments. 
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Michelman to a problem of judicial authority. Even for Ackerman, he 
writes, "[i]n the final analysis, the People vanish, abstracted into a story 
written by none of us . . . unless we happen to be justices."'42 
This, according to Michelman, is an inadequate account of republican- 
ism because positive freedom requires active participation in a communal 
dialogue. Positive freedom cannot be achieved by compliance with a set of 
authoritative rules, even if they emerge from someone else's dialogue. Self- 
government is an activity, not a set of substantive rules. To speak of the 
Court "representing" the content of a past republican moment of constitu- 
tional politics, is, according to Michelman, already to move from self- 
government to external authority. 
Michelman abruptly cuts through the institutional bafflement created 
by the juxtaposition of constitutional authority and republican self- 
government by making a startling suggestion. While the Constitution does 
not establish a republican citizenry, it does establish a republican Su- 
preme Court. If we are searching for a model of positive freedom, for a 
republican community of self-government founded on a model of discur- 
sive particularity, we need look no further than to the Supreme Court 
itself: "[T]he courts, and especially the Supreme Court, seem to take on as 
one of their ascribed functions the modeling of active self-government that 
citizens find practically beyond reach."'43 Thus, within the institutional 
structure of the American constitutional order, Michelman finds a com- 
munity that is uniquely privileged to engage in the discourse of republican 
self-government. He preserves the possibility of positive freedom some- 
where in the system by converting the Court into a community of 
discourse. 
Judging, for Michelman, is not primarily an activity of applying the 
law to the parties."44 Rather, it is an activity of self-government within the 
community of the Court itself: "Judges [must be committed] to the process 
of their own self-government."1145 A republican Supreme Court is one in 
which each Justice participates in a communal dialogue among this group 
of nine citizens. In participating in that dialogue, the Justice simultane- 
ously gives the law to himself and creates a communal identity. This is a 
Court in which the process of voting on an outcome is subordinated to a 
discourse on the moral unity of the community of the Court itself.148 
142. Michelman, Traces, supra note 120, at 65. See also id. at 16 ("My reading of the republi- 
can tradition, and its relation to American constitutionalism . . . confirms that, however Bickel's diffi- 
culty may or may not be resolved, the Court is, vis-a-vis the people, irredeemably an undemocratic 
institution."). 
143. Id. at 74. 
144. Compare Fiss, The Social and Political Foundations of Adjudication, 6 LAW & HUMAN 
BEHAV. 121, 121 (1982) (contrasting "dispute resolution" model of adjudication with model that un- 
derstands adjudication as "process by which the values embodied in an authoritative legal text . . . 
are given concrete meaning and expression"). 
145. Michelman, Traces, supra note 120, at 75. 
146. For an alternative vision of the Court as dialogical community, see Burt, Constitutional Law 
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Michelman follows Bickel in looking to the unique institutional capaci- 
ties of the Court as the starting point for his analysis.147 What for Bickel 
had been a community of scholars with the leisure for sustained intellec- 
tual inquiry-a private, individualistic image-becomes for Michelman a 
dialogical community engaged in the self-generative process of positive 
freedom. More importantly, Michelman, like Ackerman before him, takes 
up Bickel's insight that the Court must be understood as itself a "repre- 
sentative" institution. Yet Michelman's republican Court is representative 
in quite a different sense from either Bickel's forward-looking Court or 
Ackerman's backward-looking Court. 
For Bickel, the Court's legitimacy depended ultimately upon its repre- 
sentation of public opinion. Bickel's creativity was in understanding that 
the Court is not passive in its representational qualities; rather, it partici- 
pates in the formation of the public opinion it is to represent. Ackerman 
rejected the forward-looking quality of Bickel's account of representation. 
His Court represented the substantive content of past decisions of "we the 
people." Both Bickel and Ackerman, accordingly, invite questions about 
the accuracy or correctness of judicial interpretation, because for each 
there is a gap between the representative (the Court) and the represented 
(the people). Michelman escapes that problem of interpretation by col- 
lapsing the distinction between the Court and what it represents.'48 
Judicial representation, for Michelman, is not something other than, or 
apart from, the representative. The Court represents by symbolizing the 
possibility of self-government. It represents to the rest of the nation the 
possibility of a dialogical community and thus the possibility of positive 
freedom and self-government. The Court represents this possibility by 
providing an example of it. The Court represents the possibility of our 
free selves, to our necessarily unfree, political selves. "Unable as a nation 
to practice our own self-government (in the full, positive sense), we . . . 
can at least identify with the judiciary's as we idealistically construct 
it. )149 
The collapse of the represented and the representative frees 
Michelman's account of the problems encountered in Ackerman's republi- 
canism. Because a republican Court does not even try to preserve the past 
constitutional achievements of "we the people" in the face of conflicting 
contemporary interests, neither the intertemporal problem nor the prob- 
lem of consent arises with respect to judicial review. Both of these 
problems arise out of the use of an agency model to legitimate judicial 
and the Teaching of the Parables, 93 YALE L.J. 455 (1984) (Court should follow "pedagogic strat- 
egy" of ensuring inclusion of all minority viewpoints in communal discourse). 
147. See supra notes 38-41 and accompanying text. 
148. In so doing he rejects both the future and the past as sources of representation. Michelman's 
Court exists squarely in the present. 
149. Michelman, Traces, supra note 120, at 74. 
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review, but that is precisely what Michelman denies. Michelman's Court 
is engaged always in the construction of a contemporary narrative in 
which the past figures, but does not control.150 A republican Court may 
have problems of interpretation, but these are problems with the quality 
of its internal dialogue. They are not problems with the relationship of its 
decision-making to some substantive content outside of the Court itself. 
Interpretation is now a characteristic of self-government, not an external 
measure of legitimate authority. 15 A "correct" interpretation does not le- 
gitimate a judicial decision by virtue of its correspondence to some reality 
outside of the Court itself. 
Michelman envisions a republican court in a generally nonrepublican 
system of government. This is a strange new sort of "mixed" govern- 
ment.152 Instead of mixing the rule of the one and the many, or of aristoc- 
racy and democracy, it mixes positive and negative freedom, republican 
self-government and representative authoritarianism. Even the institu- 
tional character of the Court mixes positive freedom with authoritative 
domination. Michelman does not deny the authoritative character of the 
Court from the perspective of those outside of its communal discourse. 
More importantly, his analysis of the internal character of the Court as a 
community of dialogue does not provide a legitimating foundation for this 
authoritative, external character. In disavowing a nonsymbolic quality, 
Michelman abandons any effort to ground the content of the Court's au- 
thoritative pronouncements in a politics of consent. Neither may he appeal 
to the authority of universal reason, in the natural law tradition."63 Thus, 
it remains possible, and indeed necessary, to ask what it is that privileges 
the discursive particularity of this particular community: Why is the dia- 
logue of the Court authoritative, or more precisely, why should it be 
authoritative? 
Michelman's answer to this problem of legitimacy seems to be simply 
that positive freedom is better than negative freedom, and positive freedom 
within the Court is the best we can do within the existing institutional 
framework of American constitutional government. Neither proposition, 
however, is self-evidently true. That positive freedom relieves the Carte- 
sian anxiety may suggest that any individual would be wise to choose his 
own positive, over negative, freedom. But that hardly tells us that positive 
150. For an elaboration of this view, see R. DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE (1986), discussed infra at 
Part III, Section C. Michelman embraces Dworkin's account of interpretation. See Michelman, 
Traces, supra note 120, at 66-73. 
151. Accordingly, "interpretation" in both the republican and interpretivist accounts must be dis- 
tinguished from the more conventional claims of "interpretivism" in constitutional theory. See, e.g., 
Ely, Constitutional Interpretivism: Its Allure and Impossibility, 53 IND. L.J. 399 (1978); Perry, 
Interpretivism, Freedom of Expression, and Equal Protection, 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 261 (1981). 
152. Compare Michelman's discussion of mixed government in Harrington's thought as founded 
on the idea that "distribution of office [is] . . . inclusionary, an affirmation of the universality of the 
republic and of the good of self-government." Michelman, Traces, supra note 120, at 46. 
153. See supra text accompanying note 136 (denying universal telos). 
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freedom is better than negative freedom in a political organization. This is 
especially true if the suggestion is that we accept a minority's positive 
freedom at the cost of a majority's negative freedom. In short, even if we 
accept the distinction between positive and negative freedom as 
Michelman elaborates it, nothing follows with respect to any particular 
institution of government or even with respect to government organization 
in general. 
Similarly, the proposition that this is as much positive freedom as we 
can find in American constitutional structure does not appear to be true 
even on Michelman's own premises. We can have more positive freedom 
if we accept less authority. This is the same battle that was fought out 
between the federalists and antifederalists. It is a battle that is refought 
most vividly in the conflict between the "jurisgenic" and "jurispathic" that 
Robert Cover describes."64 The Constitution has not made this choice be- 
tween authority and anarchy for us. Rather, that line is itself always sub- 
ject to challenge.""' 
Sometimes Michelman seems to argue that recognition of the positive 
freedom of the Court is a step in a process toward the positive freedom of 
the larger body politic. 
[I]f freedom consists of socially situated self-direction-that is, self- 
direction by norms cognizant of fellowship with equally self- 
directing others-then the relation between one agent's freedom and 
another's is additive: One realizes one's own only by confirming that 
of the others. This seems to hold no less for a judge than for any 
other agent.' 
Yet Michelman has already argued that this cannot be true as a political 
proposition,' because the institutional character of a national citizenry 
makes positive freedom in national politics impossible. The issue will 
never be incremental progress toward national self-government on the re- 
publican model, but always one of choice between national authority and 
the anarchy implicit in the endless possibility of distinct new communities 
emerging to claim for themselves positive self-government. 
154. See infra text accompanying notes 247-48. I cite Cover both because he is discussed below 
and because Michelman acknowledges an intellectual debt to him. But Michelman, to borrow one of 
Cover's favorite words, has done "violence" to Cover's vision of the anarchical character of positive 
self-government. Michelman seems to come closer to Cover's view of the anarchic character of positive 
self-government in his more recent work. See Michelman, supra note 101. 
155. For example, this line is at issue in much federalism jurisprudence, see, e.g., FERC v. Mis- 
sissippi, 456 U.S. 742, 788 (1982) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (arguing for state freedom from federal 
control on grounds that states "serve as laboratories for the development of new social, economic, and 
political ideas"), and in cases involving the autonomy of alternative, nonpolitical communities, see, 
e.g., Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977) (protecting private choice as to constitu- 
tion of family from authoritative state regulation); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (protect- 
ing idiosyncratic religious community from uniform state regulation). 
156. Michelman, Traces, supra note 120, at 75. 
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Michelman attempts to meld authority and community. On the one 
hand, he affirms that "Justices engaged in adjudication and judicial re- 
view are not for this purpose citizens; rather, they are organs of the state, 
the ultimate oracles of its law."' 67 On the other hand, he urges a model of 
adjudication as dialogical self-government within the community of the 
Court. This is ultimately a conjunction of incompatible concepts. It is not 
that the Court does not, or should not, engage in such dialogue; but 
whether it does or not simply has nothing to do with the legitimacy of its 
exercise of authority over the rest of us. Republican self-government 
imagines a process in which an individual's values are molded through 
participation in the dialogue of an historically situated community. This 
means that between those within and those outside of that dialogical com- 
munity there may be no common ground by which to evaluate disagree- 
ment. Accordingly, republicanism is not self-validating to those outside of 
the community. Yet Michelman has placed most of the nation irretriev- 
ably outside of the self-governing community of American political life. In 
order to respond to the problems of continuity, interpretation and revision 
that characterized Ackerman's theory, Michelman has created an incur- 
able problem of republican elitism.'68 
Republican elitism generates its own unique problem, which becomes 
clear when we turn to a competing republican theorist, Cass Sunstein. 
The juxtaposition of Sunstein and Michelman exposes a conflict among 
elites, each claiming for itself the republican title. The Court will always 
speak in a situation of conflict with some other institution of government. 
That other institution can construct just as strong a claim as the Court to 
speak out of an exercise of positive freedom or republican self- 
government. 
C. Sunstein: Congress as a Community of Discourse 
All of the new constitutional theorists of both the republican and inter- 
pretivist schools share a concept of positive freedom characterized by dis- 
cursive particularity. For all of them, the community of discourse is to 
transform ordinary politics into a process of self-government and self- 
creation. Republicans differ from interpretivists in their effort to frame 
this model of community in terms of political institutions. Precisely from 
this institutional perspective, however, the weakness of the republicans is 
most evident: They are unable to agree on the institutional setting within 
which this self-constitutive dialogue occurs. Thus, in place of Ackerman's 
157. Id. 
158. On the elitism of traditional federalist accounts of politics, see J. APPLEBY, CAPITALISM AND 
A NEW SOCIAL ORDER: THE REPUBLICAN VISION OF THE 1790s, 8-19 (1984). For a skeptical ac- 
count of the new republicanism, raising the problem of elitism from a contemporary perspective, see 
Fitts, Look Before You Leap: Some Cautionary Notes on Civic Republicanism, 97 YALE L.J. 1651 
(1988). 
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extraordinary institutions which arise in moments of high politics, or 
Michelman's Supreme Court, Cass Sunstein looks to Congress as the lo- 
cus of the republican community. 
Sunstein provides a mix of historical, legal and moral arguments in 
support of the claim that the responsibility of Congress is not simply to 
exercise authority in response to constituent pressures, but rather to en- 
gage in mutual deliberation about the common good. His historical argu- 
ment borrows from recent work on the importance of republican, rather 
than Lockean, themes to the Framers.'69 Instead of reading Federalist 
No. 10 as an early work on the virtues of pluralist politics,'60 Sunstein 
sees the Framers, particularly Madison, as appropriating much of the ar- 
gument of the antifederalists with respect to the danger of faction (private 
interest groups) and the need for a politics based upon a "face-to-face 
process of deliberation and debate."'' 
According to Sunstein, the federalists and antifederalists agreed that the 
end of politics was the common good and that the means to get there was 
through dialogue founded on the civic virtue of the participants. Corre- 
spondingly, they shared a common understanding of the problem of fac- 
tion as the use of political power for the satisfaction of private interests. 
The disagreement between federalists and antifederalists lay primarily in 
their conflicting visions of where and how legitimate republican politics 
could be pursued. 
For the antifederalists, republican politics had to be participatory at the 
level of citizenry. Therefore, it had to occur, as much as possible, within 
the local community. For the federalists, the only hope for a politics that 
would not be corrupted by private interests was to relocate the community 
of discourse to the level of national political institutions and, particularly, 
to the national legislature: "Representatives would have the time and tem- 
perament to engage in a form of collective reasoning. . The represent- 
atives of the people would be free to engage in the process of discussion 
and debate from which the common good would emerge."'6 Unlike 
Michelman, who suggests that the republicans largely lost the constitu- 
tional debate, Sunstein argues that far less was at stake. The constitu- 
tional debate was essentially one among republicans, who disagreed only 
on the geography of dialogical self-government. 
Shifting from history to law, Sunstein argues that throughout constitu- 
tional law one finds a consistent rejection of the pluralist model of interest 
group politics.'63 That a statute is the product of a fair competition among 
159. See supra note 61 and accompanying text. 
160. See Diamond, Ethics and Politics: The American Way, in THE MORAI FOUNDATIONS OF 
THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 39 (R. Horwitz 2d ed. 1979). 
161. Sunstein, supra note 140, at 37; see also Sunstein, supra note 84, at 1558-60. 
162. Sunstein, supra note 140, at 41. 
163. See generally Sunstein, Naked Preferences and the Constitution, 84 COL-UM. L. REV. 1689 
(1984). 
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competing private interest groups is never a sufficient argument for its 
"reasonableness." The political process alone is never "due process." 
Rather, the common ground of diverse constitutional norms is that legisla- 
tion must be justified by reference to a public purpose, which is something 
other than the politically strongest private interest. Legislators, accord- 
ingly, are constitutionally required to deliberate on and select public 
values. 
This constitutional prohibition on the legislative pursuit of what Sun- 
stein calls "naked preferences"-the distribution of public resources solely 
on the basis of political power-is "the best candidate for a unitary con- 
ception of the sorts of government action that the Constitution prohib- 
its."'164 Because the responsibility for republican government is located 
squarely within the legislature, the Supreme Court's republican responsi- 
bilities become derivative or indirect.'66 The judiciary's role is not to pur- 
sue within the community of the Court a republican politics of discursive 
particularity; rather, its role is to police the process of republican politics 
within the legislative branch.'66 
The heart of Sunstein's argument, however, is neither the historical nor 
the legal claim, both of which are no more than controversial, descriptive 
propositions. Even if he were correct on both, it would hardly follow that 
we should encourage the republican aspects of our political institutions 
and traditions over the pluralist aspects-even Sunstein admits that both 
aspects are there.167 For that, we need a normative argument that we will 
get "better" laws from a legislature that understands itself as a commu- 
nity of dialogue. 
Posing the issue in this way, however, demonstrates the difficulties cre- 
ated by Sunstein's mixture of conventional legal argument and republican 
theory. The general attractiveness of the idea of a community of discourse 
derives from the concept of personal autonomy it offers-positive free- 
dom-and the possibility of grounding the legitimacy of a political order 
in that concept. Republicanism promises to bridge the gap separating the 
citizen from the state through a model of dialogical engagement in which 
the individual and the community, the speaker and the discourse, are si- 
multaneously created. Once that community of discourse has been located 
in Congress-Sunstein's legal and historical move-the theoretical idea of 
positive freedom, of giving the rule of law to oneself, can have little power 
outside of the elite membership of that institution. This is the dilemma 
164. Id. at 1693. 
165. For an analogous strategy for legitimating the work of the Court by describing its function as 
that of policing the political process of other institutions, see J. ELY, supra note 42. Of course, Ely 
and Sunstein disagree dramatically on the norms that are to govern the political process. 
166. While Michelman has a republican Court facing a nonrepublican legislature, Sunstein has a 
nonrepublican court facing a republican legislature. 
167. See e.g., Sunstein, supra note 84, at 1558 ("There can be little doubt that elements of both 
pluralist and republican thought played a role during the period of the constitutional framing."). 
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that Michelman confronts directly in his appeal to the symbolic function 
of the Court.'68 
Congress may be free, but from the perspective of the ordinary citizen, 
the law still appears as the imposition of an authoritarian, external rule. 
Instead of being able to emphasize republicanism as positive freedom, as 
the giving of the rule of action to oneself, Sunstein is, therefore, forced to 
emphasize the "public good." Statutes founded on legislative deliberation 
will be better than those that represent naked preferences. This, of course, 
is a proposition about which we are entitled to be skeptical.'69 Minimally, 
we are entitled to ask for some evidence and an explanation of the meth- 
odology behind that evidence: What exactly is the measure of the public 
good used in making an evaluation? 
This is not to say that Sunstein is completely immune to the attractions 
of the traditional republican ideal of positive freedom. He emphasizes, for 
example, that republican politics does not take preferences as "exoge- 
nous,' i.e., as formed prior to, and apart from, the political process. 
Rather, it sees preferences as "endogenous," i.e., as the results of the po- 
litical process. 70 Through the legislature's own discourse, therefore, pref- 
erences are to be shaped. Preferences are a central aspect of personhood 
and thus self-identity is, at least to some degree, a product of this commu- 
nal discourse. But whose preferences and whose identities have been 
shaped? If Sunstein means those of legislators, then he must explain why 
the rest of us should prefer to have statutes based on their preferences as 
opposed to our own prepolitical, exogenous preferences. If he means those 
of citizens, then he must explain how a dialogue in which we are not 
participants can have this self-generative effect. Finally, if he means the 
state's preferences, then he must explain the meaning of this personifica- 
tion of the state.171 
Sunstein usually seems to take the first of these options. He is over- 
whelmingly concerned with legislative motivation.172 If so, the republican 
argument for positive freedom does not ever bridge the gap between gov- 
ernors-it is their positive freedom-and citizens. To the governed, how- 
ever, outcomes are likely to remain more important than process. 
168. For Michelman, the Court does not represent us as our political agent, but represents, as a 
work of political artistry, the possibility of positive freedom. See supra notes 142-43 and accompany- 
ing text. 
169. See generally Mashaw, The Economics of Politics and the Understanding of Public Law 65 
CHI.[-]KENT L. REV. 601 (1989) (arguing that substantial empirical work needs to be done to deter- 
mine actual effects of different political ideologies on legislative product); see also Fitts, The Vices of 
Virtue: A Political Party Perspective on Civic Virtue Reforms of the Legislative Process, 136 U. PA. 
L. REV. 1567 (1988). 
170. See Sunstein, supra note 84, at 1548-49. 
171. For such a theory of state personification, see Dworkin, infra notes 317-19 and accompany- 
ing text. 
172. This theme is most evident in Naked Preferences, supra note 163, but it is evident through- 
out Sunstein's rather sizable corpus. 
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Sunstein is forced, therefore, to return to a more conventional argument 
that a republican legislature will produce better laws: "The republican 
conception . . . reflects a belief that debate and discussion help to reveal 
that some values are superior to others. Denying that decisions about val- 
ues are merely matters of taste, the republican view assumes that 'practi- 
cal reason' can be used to settle social issues."'173 To defend the normative 
value of a republican Congress, Sunstein finds that he must defend an 
objective public good.174 Nevertheless, his argument is at its weakest at 
just this point. 
The weakness is twofold. First, his own theory indicates that the nature 
of the good appears quite differently to those within and those without the 
community of dialogue. This was the point of the distinction between ex- 
ogenous and endogenous preferences. The legislators are likely, therefore, 
to have quite a different understanding of the public good than the rest of 
the citizenry who do not participate in that community of discourse. The 
public good will not appear as a common good and, without that, there is 
no measure. Second-and one suspects because of the failure to find a 
common measure-Sunstein offers a remarkably thin idea of the commu- 
nity of discourse out of which the public good is to emerge. For Sunstein, 
that community is accomplished as soon as something is said. That some- 
thing may be virtually anything.175 All that appears to be prohibited is a 
vote without discourse. Yet even Sunstein admits that it is not very diffi- 
cult to frame a reason, even a public-sounding reason, for every choice, 
including one based on personal preferences.176 If the measure of commu- 
nity is simply the giving of reasons, the republican community becomes 
too thin to support much of a notion of positive freedom and altogether 
too thin to support a substantive vision of the public good. 
Sunstein's normative account of the republican community of dialogue 
is in danger of collapsing into the trivial point that it is better to think 
before you act. Legislation that is carefully considered beforehand is likely 
to be more effective and to meet social goals more adequately. One does 
not have to be a republican to agree with that.177 One hardly needs a 
173. Sunstein, supra note 140, at 31-32 (footnote omitted). Elsewhere Sunstein speaks of "some- 
thing like an objective public good." Id. at 42. 
174. "Practical reason" is the epistemological correlate of an objective public good. See Sunstein, 
supra note 84, at 1554-55. 
175. See Sunstein, supra note 163, at 1698-99 (distinguishing weak and strong views of prohibi- 
tion on government distributions based on raw political power, but recognizing dominance of former). 
176. See id. at 1728 ("For practical purposes, the line between public value and naked prefer- 
ences is quite thin, since attempts to protect particular groups are usually justifiable as responsive to 
some public value."); see also J. ELY, supra note 42, at 125-31 (expressing skepticism "that a method 
of forcing articulation of [legislative] purposes can be developed that will be both workable and 
helpful"). 
177. This point is vividly made in Sunstein's choice of United States R.R. Retirement Bd. v. 
Fritz, 449 U.S. 166 (1980), as an example for the elaboration of the republican model of legislative 
behavior. In Fritz, one group of beneficiaries was harmed through legislative ignorance: "Congress 
was unaware of that harm and indeed had sought to prevent it." Sunstein, supra note 140, at 71. 
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theory of community, or even a theory of discourse, to support that pro- 
position. Everyone is for talking through problems; the important issue is 
what gets said. There is a substantial risk here, then, of the trivialization 
of the idea of the community of discourse. 
Sunstein has stumbled over precisely the problem of authority that 
troubles each of the constitutional theorists of community. He wants si- 
multaneously to recognize the authority of the legislature and to recognize 
the power of the idea of a community of dialogue. The two ideas, how- 
ever, operate in wholly different dimensions. The legislature may or may 
not be a self-generative, dialogical community, but this has nothing to do 
with the authority the institution exercises over the rest of the political 
community. Sunstein strives for compatibility between these ideas of dia- 
logue and authority by so weakening the idea of community that little is 
left standing but the authority of the state. 
None of these problems are unique to Sunstein; all are equally applica- 
ble to Michelman's theory that the Court is the locus of the community of 
discourse. He too needs to argue that we get better law out of such a 
Court, even from the perspective of the nonrepublican majority. While he 
does suggest that, the suggestion stands as a bald assertion: "Judges' ac- 
tions may augment our freedom. As usual, it all depends. One thing it 
depends on, I believe, is the commitment of judges to the process of their 
own self-government."'78 Whether or not it depends on that, I do not 
know. But nothing Michelman or Sunstein has told us has brought us any 
closer to an answer. 
The same problem of juxtaposing the republican community and the 
nonrepublican life of the rest of us plagued Ackerman's theory. The only 
difference was that for Ackerman the problem appeared in a temporal, 
rather than an institutional form. But this difference amounts to less than 
it might appear, because-as Michelman demonstrates-it easily trans- 
lates into an institutional form as one shifts focus to the problem of inter- 
pretation of a past act of "we the people."1179 
The problem of authority has not been resolved by the new republicans. 
Each offers an image of positive freedom through self-government within 
a dialogical community. But that community fails to make contact with 
the authority of constitutional law as we normally experience it. That 
experience is simultaneously temporal and institutional. The Constitution 
is an historical artifact and in recognizing its authority we recognize the 
continuity of the present with the past. The rule of law-including the 
Constitution-represents the authority of past political acts over the pre- 
sent. Yet this idea of temporality is mediated through institutions that 
Surely, no one will disagree that a Congress that acts in ignorance and on the basis of misrepresenta- 
tion is unlikely to accomplish the ends it sets for itself. 
178. Michelman, supra note 120, at 75. 
179. See supra note 124 and accompanying text. 
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wield authority in the present. They may look to the past for rules of 
decision, but their function is to exercise authority over the contemporary 
social order. The new republicans have tried to meld authority and com- 
munity at both points: Ackerman uses community to explain the temporal 
quality of constitutional authority; Michelman and Sunstein use commu- 
nity to explain how existing institutions should act. But in each case, the 
grounds of authority are neither explained nor justified by the model of 
community. The interpretivists more directly recognize the problem of au- 
thority, but ultimately offer no better solution. 
III. THE INTERPRETIVISTS' USE OF COMMUNITY 
The juxtaposition of Sunstein and Michelman points to a fundamental 
problem in communitarian-based theories of constitutional law: Too many 
communities can be fit within the dialogical mold. Because of the institu- 
tional presuppositions the new republicans bring to their inquiry, they 
never directly confront this problem. They construct the problem of choice 
such that the possibilities are radically limited from the start: The people 
as a whole, the Court, and the Congress are the only options they see.180 
But just as choice among these possibilities appears arbitrary-from the 
perspective of both the critic and the non-participating citizen-so the 
limits on the domain of choice appear arbitrary. The constraint on possi- 
ble communities comes from a source external to the communal-dialogical 
foundations of the theory and thus requires separate justification. What 
the grounds of that justification might be are not addressed by the new 
republicans. The interpretivists differ from the new republicans precisely 
in their confrontation with this possibility of a proliferation of dialogical 
communities. They too appeal to the model of discursive particularity, but 
they free this model from the institutional presumptions that artificially 
constrain the domain of possible communities. This does not mean that 
they simply accept an anarchical expansion of dialogical communities. 
Each interpretivist, however, confronts the possibility of such an expan- 
sion. Each of them can, therefore, be usefully examined in terms of the 
juxtaposition of anarchy and authority. Each must find a way of explain- 
ing authority in light of the anarchical implications of the dialogical 
community. 
This tension between anarchy and authority is at the center of Robert 
Cover's essay Nomos and Narrative."8" The same tension is at the center 
of Owen Fiss' work on interpretation and adjudication.182 Fiss and Cover, 
180. Cf. supra note 20. 
181. Cover, The Supreme Court, 1982 Term-Foreward: Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARv. L. 
REV. 4 (1983). 
182. See Fiss, Objectivity and Interpretation, 34 STAN. L. REV. 739 (1982) [hereinafter Fiss, 
Objectivity]; Fiss, Conventionalism, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 177 (1985) [hereinafter Fiss, 
Conventionalism]. 
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however, reach radically different conclusions: Cover embraces anarchy; 
Fiss pursues authority. Fiss sees a successful integration of community 
and hierarchy, while Cover sees only the pathos of conflict between the 
anarchical creation of meaning through community and the death of 
meaning in the exercise of authority. 
Both Cover and Fiss are in the Bickelian tradition of grounding consti- 
tutional law in the discursive particularity of an historically situated com- 
munity. Despite their radically different conclusions, they share a common 
understanding of community as creating the very possibility of law. Each 
is attracted to a particular form of community: Fiss to the professional 
community; Cover to the religious community. The professional commu- 
nity, however, offers Fiss a source of stability and authority, while the 
religious community offers Cover only the pluralism of sects. 
Yet a different approach is pursued by Ronald Dworkin, who offers the 
most philosophically rigorous and complete account of the meaning and 
significance of discursive particularity in the creation and maintenance of 
law."83 Dworkin aims to ground the legitimacy of law in the character of 
a particular kind of political community. His hope is to ground the privi- 
leged place-i.e. the authority-of this community within a theory of in- 
terpretation. Dworkin's account, however, fails to justify the privileged 
place of this particular community. Because his theory of community is so 
complete, the character of his failure tells us a great deal about the possi- 
bility of successfully using the model of dialogical community to support 
the legitimacy of legal authority. 
A. Fiss: Hierarchy and Authority in the Professional Community 
"Adjudication is interpretation," Fiss announces in the opening line of 
his essay Objectivity and Interpretation."84 This is a statement about the 
conceptual foundations of law: about how law is possible."8" This need to 
explain "how law is possible" arises out of the nihilist's challenge in con- 
temporary legal theory. The nihilist, according to Fiss, properly "fastens 
on the objective aspiration of the law and sees this as a distinguishing 
feature of legal interpretation.""" The nihilist, however, is unable to find 
the requisite objectivity in constitutional adjudication. Thus, a defense of 
constitutional law, responsive to this challenge, must provide an explana- 
tion of the objectivity that characterizes adjudication. For Fiss, the objec- 
tivity of interpretation provides such an explanation. Fiss, accordingly, has 
183. See R. DWORKIN, supra note 150. 
184. Fiss, Objectivity, supra note 182, at 739. 
185. Fiss writes that "a recognition of the interpretive dimensions of adjudication . . .will also 
deepen our understanding of law and . . .might even suggest how law is possible.." Id. at 740. In a 
later essay, he describes his earlier article as follows: "I was trying to explain how law is possible." 
Fiss, Conventionalism, supra note 182, at 189. 
186. Fiss, Objectivity, supra note 182, at 742. 
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two tasks: first, to describe that kind of objectivity; second, to demonstrate 
that it is sufficient to satisfy the demands for an objective rule in constitu- 
tional law. 
Fiss' account of interpretation turns to the familiar features of discur- 
sive particularity.'87 Interpretation denies a separation of the subject from 
object-in this case, the judge from the law. The law does not confront 
the judge as a set of formal rules, which he has only to apply. But neither 
does the judge come to the law as a free subject, able to exercise his will in 
the direction of his own personal interests and values. A claim for radical 
subjectivity would be just as false as a claim for radical objectivity. In 
place of these extremes, Fiss describes interpretation, and so adjudication, 
as a synthesis: "[A]n activity that affords a proper recognition of both the 
subjective and objective dimensions of human experience."'88 
Fiss locates the objectivity of adjudication in a set of "disciplining rules" 
which structure the interaction of text and judge. To be a judge is to 
respond to the text through the application of disciplining rules, "which 
constrain the interpreter and constitute the standards by which the cor- 
rectness of the interpretation is to be judged. ..."189 Application of these 
rules not only constrains the freedom of the judge, but is constitutive of 
the practice of judging.'90 We understand what it means to be a judge by 
understanding the rules that are put into play in adjudication. 
We come to adjudication, then, with an understanding of the function 
of judging, defined by a set of rules that we expect to be put in play by 
the judge. Adjudication has a settled-and thus objective-meaning for 
those who accept these rules. The reality of the disciplining rules makes 
possible agreement on what it means to judge, on who is a judge, and on 
who is performing properly in his role as a judge. In this way, the rules 
are both descriptive and normative; they combine an "is" and an 
"ought."'' Anyone who rejected these rules, or who had a different un- 
derstanding of the appropriate rules, would come to different conclusions 
as to who is a judge and how a judge should operate.'92 
The group of individuals who share the same understanding of the dis- 
ciplining rules that define adjudication constitutes the "interpretive com- 
187. Fiss himself recognizes the larger theoretical context within which he is writing: "[Interpre- 
tation] has emerged in recent decades as an attractive method for studying all social activity." Id. at 
739 (citing Taylor, Interpretation and the Sciences of Man, 25 REV. METAPHYSICS 3 (1971); Tay- 
lor, Understanding in Human Science, 34 REV. METAPHYSICS 25 (1980)). 
188. Fiss, Objectivity, supra note 182, at 739. 
189. Id. at 744. 
190. Stated in this way, it becomes clear that one function of the rules is to specify the appropriate 
text. Thus, text does not stand wholly apart from rules, although a variety of systems of rules may 
share a common text. For example, not just lawyers, but historians as well, "read" the constitutional 
text. 
191. See Dworkin, infra notes 334-37 and accompanying text, discussing a similar collapse of the 
"is" and the "ought" in interpretation. 
192. The source of the disciplining rules constitutive of the judge's role is discussed infra at note 
199. 
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munity." There is a critical reciprocity between rules and community: 
"[T]he disciplining rules that govern an interpretive activity must be seen 
as defining or demarcating an interpretive community consisting of those 
who recognize the rules as authoritative."'93 Someone outside of the inter- 
pretive community is, regardless of his legal situation, outside the jurisdic- 
tion of the judge: He may be coerced by the violence of law, but he does 
not acknowledge the authority of law. For someone inside the community, 
however, the exercise of legal authority can be measured against objective 
standards. 
Interpretation, thus, shares the objectivity of the interpretive commu- 
nity. This is not the objectivity of a universal natural law, but neither is it 
the free subjectivity of nihilism. Judging is objective within a particular 
community, because the judge applies the disciplining rules to which that 
community adheres. Fiss refers to this as "bounded objectivity": "It is 
bounded by the existence of a community that recognizes and adheres to 
the disciplining rules used by the interpreter and that is defined by its 
recognition of those rules."'94 To the degree that the judge fails to submit 
to the community's rules, he is not judging at all: He is "abusing" his 
public office for private ends.195 
For Fiss, then, community is the anchor of interpretation. Interpreta- 
tion is only possible because of community. Since adjudication is interpre- 
tation, adjudication rests on community. Without an interpretive commu- 
nity, subjectivity and objectivity would split apart into an irreconcilable 
dichotomy.'96 
The description I have so far offered leaves out a critical element of 
Fiss' account: the singular character of the interpretive community of law. 
For Fiss, the account of interpretation in adjudication is no different in its 
essential meaning-generating function from the account of the general 
phenomenon of interpretation as the central explanatory device of all so- 
cial activity.'97 In other social activities, however, meaning may be con- 
tested through the freedom "to leave one community and to join or estab- 
lish another. .".1 In law, Fiss contends, there is only one interpretive 
community. If there were to be a plurality of competing communities in 
193. Fiss, Objectivity, supra note 182, at 745. 
194. Id. at 745. 
195. Because Fiss insists that there is only one interpretive community of law, a judge who oper- 
ates outside of that community's disciplining rules will appear to be a "private" actor rather than a 
member of a competing public community. This rejection of a public pluralism raises the problem of 
"cliques," discussed below. See infra text accompanying note 237. 
196. This is the same dichotomy of nihilism and domination that Michelman identified with neg- 
ative freedom. See supra note 131 and accompanying text. 
197. See supra note 187. In addition to Charles Taylor, Fiss acknowledges his debt to the work of 
Clifford Geertz. See Fiss, Objectivity, supra note 182, at 739 n.2 (citing C. GEERTZ, NEGARA: THE 
THEATRE STATE IN NINETEENTH CENTURY BALI (1980); C. GEERTZ, Deep Play: Notes on the 
Balinese Cockfight, in THE INTERPRETATION OF CULTURES 412 (1973)). 
198. Fiss, Objectivity, supra note 182, at 746. 
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law, then there would be no adequate response to the nihilists' challenge 
of adjudicative indeterminacy. Thus, the objectivity of law must be de- 
fended by identifying a singular and authoritative community within the 
larger society. Fiss does this by privileging a particular community: the 
legal profession.'99 
Assessment of the objectivity Fiss affords constitutional adjudication re- 
quires both an external and an internal critique.200 The external critique 
examines the nature and status of the legal, professional community 
within which Fiss claims constitutional adjudication occurs.20' The inter- 
nal critique looks at the character and effects of the disciplining rules that 
operate within that community to determine whether they can yield the 
kind of results Fiss needs to defeat the nihilists' challenge. 
1. The External Critique 
For Fiss, the interpretive community that is to provide objectivity to 
constitutional interpretation is the professional community of lawyers: 
Lawyers speak to judges and judges speak to lawyers. Lawyers know how 
the constitutional text is to be read. They can recognize a professionally 
competent reading, even when they disagree with that reading. They 
know the range of legitimate sources and the appropriate moves that can 
be made with those sources. Fiss repeatedly emphasizes that objectivity 
does not require agreement, but only constraint on the subjective freedom 
of the judge.202 Professional training and membership in the professional 
community is the source of that constraint.203 
From an external perspective, however, the problem of objectivity is not 
simply that of the existence of constraints on the subjective freedom of the 
judge. Constraints, for example, that are a function of the judge's partici- 
pation in a religious community may be objective-they really do limit the 
possibilities of judicial choice-but they are hardly a reassuring response 
to the nihilist. Nor are they a satisfying response to anyone else worried 
199. See Fiss, Conventionalism, supra note 182, at 183 ("The judge's choice is constrained by a 
set of rules . . . that are authorized by the professional community of which the judge is part (and 
that define and constitute the community)."). Fiss is unclear on whether this community is the same 
for all adjudication. For example, are state bars, which are responsible for the articulation and devel- 
opment of state law, constitutive of separate communities? 
200. For a similar use of an "external" and "internal" critique of a constitutional theory, see 
Tushnet, supra note 5, at 786-804 (critique of originalism). 
201. At various points, Fiss too speaks of an "external critic" of the law. See, e.g., Fiss, Objectiv- 
ity, supra note 182, at 749-50. But for Fiss, the external critic looks only to the results of the legal 
process: He asks whether the results meet some non-legal normative standard. 
202. See, e.g., id. at 747 ("Nothing I have said denies the possibility of disagreement in legal 
interpretation."). 
203. Fiss is unclear on the relationship between concepts of identity and consent with respect to 
the meaning of membership. See supra notes 92-99, 111-18 and accompanying text (discussing iden- 
tity and consent in Ackerman's theory). For example, he speaks of judges as a "part" of a professional 
community which is "defined and constituted" by rules, Fiss, Conventionalism, supra note 182, at 
183, yet also speaks of membership in the community as resting on "a commitment to uphold and 
advance the rule of law itself." Fiss, Objectivity, supra note 182, at 746. 
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about the political legitimacy, rather than the political psychology, of ad- 
judication. Objectivity in adjudication must provide a ground for the legit- 
imacy of judicial interpretation, which means a ground for its authority. 
That legitimacy cannot arise from constraint alone. Fiss, after all, suggests 
that literary critics are also constrained by the disciplining rules of their 
professional, interpretive community. Nevertheless, no one would suggest 
that it follows from this that they can or should be given political 
authority. 
A theory of the authoritative character of judicial interpretation must, 
therefore, explain the relationship between the professional community of 
lawyers and the larger national community. Without such an explanation, 
the objectivity offered by the former may, from the perspective of the lat- 
ter, appear just as arbitrary as the personal, judicial subjectivity that Fiss 
fears. Imagine, for example, a professional community that operated 
under the disciplining rule of the founders' intent, while the larger com- 
munity interpreted democratic self-government to require the consent of a 
present majority. It does not require much imagination to envision a pro- 
fessional community wildly out of sync with the political community.204 
The claim that the Constitution is a "legal document" is not in itself 
sufficient to legitimate the disciplining rules of this professional commu- 
nity.206 At least it is not sufficient unless the argument is made that the 
larger political community, which also interprets the constitutional text, 
uses the same disciplining rules as the legal community. If there is a dif- 
ference, we still need an explanation of why the professional community 
of lawyers should have, or has been given, authority over the political 
community-an authority given effect whenever the courts hold a statute 
unconstitutional.20 Perhaps Fiss would argue that the rules used by the 
larger political community-or is it communities?-contain a principle of 
deference to the lawyers on such "legal" issues. This proposition, how- 
ever, is hardly self-evident.207 Lawyers may have successfully occupied the 
field of constitutional interpretation, but that in itself is hardly a ground 
of legitimate authority. It was, after all, the search for a link between the 
larger community and the professional community of lawyers and judges 
204. It may be that self-consciousness about the need for objectivity within the professional com- 
munity is itself a force that drives a wedge between that community and the larger body politic. 
Consider, for example, the tension between originalism and majoritarianism in constitutional theory. 
For an interesting example of such a dissynchronization, see Hovenkamp, The Political Economy of 
Substantive Due Process, 40 STAN. L. REV. 379 (1988) (discussing conflict between political economy 
of the Court at the turn of the century and the state of professional economics). 
205. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176-78 (1803), for an early example of 
legitimation of judicial review through the use of this claim. 
206. See, e.g., Dahl, Decision-making in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as a National Policy- 
Maker, 6 J. PUB. L. 279, 293 (1957) (arguing that "the Supreme Court is inevitably a part of the 
dominant national alliance"). 
207. See A. BICKEL, supra note 24, at 20-21 (challenging claim that majority has freely consented 
to constitutional authority of the Court). 
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that brought Bickel to his theory of the passive virtues as the means by 
which the Court may establish such a linkage by participating in the crea- 
tion and direction of public opinion. 
Fiss recognizes that he has not provided an account of objectivity that 
bears on legitimacy when he writes that interpretationin is countermajor- 
itarian, even if properly understood. On the other hand, a proper concep- 
tion of interpretation will help us understand the pervasiveness of the 
countermajoritarian dilemma and thus, in my judgment, reduce its signifi- 
cance."208 In truth, however, Fiss does not explain the "pervasiveness of 
the countermajoritarian dilemma." This pervasiveness is presumably a 
function of his claim that interpretation occurs within a bounded commu- 
nity. Interpretation is always by someone and for someone. The bounds 
that hold speaker and listener together are constitutive of a particular 
community. In most fields of interpretation, for example literary criticism, 
there are a plurality of such communities.209 Objectivity will hold within 
each, but not across all of them. 
Fiss denies precisely this pluralism in legal interpretation: "There can 
be many schools of literary interpretation, but . . . in legal interpretation 
there is only one school and attendance is mandatory."2'0 The counterma- 
joritarian difficulty remains not because of the theory of interpretation, 
but because of the identification of a particular community as the authori- 
tative source of interpretation in constitutional law. The countermajori- 
tarian difficulty is produced by the denial of an "exit" option and the 
insistence on "loyalty" in the face of disagreement.21' That this choice is 
neither obvious nor compelled is clear from the embrace of anarchy by 
Cover.212 Authority, not interpretation, is the source of the unique coun- 
termajoritarian difficulty of constitutional law. 
Fiss does suggest that there are powerful interactions between law and 
morality which will encourage the judge to interpret the legal text in a 
way consistent with popular morality.213 A judge who understands the 
disciplining rules of the professional community to require an interpreta- 
tion of the text that renders the Constitution "immoral" is, according to 
Fiss, inviting the broad question of legitimacy: "Why must we respect the 
Constitution?"'214 Such an interpretation, Fiss argues, represents a bad 
strategy, although not necessarily a bad interpretation.215 A political sys- 
208. Fiss, Conventionalism, supra note 182, at 182. 
209. See supra notes 196-99 and accompanying text. 
210. Fiss, Objectivity, supra note 182, at 746. 
211. See A. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE AND LOYALTY (1970). 
212. See infra Part III, Section B. 
213. Fiss, Objectivity, supra note 182, at 753. 
214. Id. 
215. Fiss, like Bickel, suggests that a judge must manage the interaction between popular opinion 
and adjudication. Indeed, Fiss inherits much of Bickel's concern with the interaction between a judge's 
function of articulating long-term values and the judge's remedial role of re-making social reality in 
light of those principles. See id. at 759-62; see also Fiss, supra note 39, at 53-58. 
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tern can take just so much dissonance between its moral community and 
its legal community. The authority of law is, in this sense, always tenu- 
ous. Judges are, therefore, well advised to look to the larger community's 
reception of the interpretive products of adjudication. 
While these forces of public morality may contribute to the actual out- 
come of adjudication, they are outside of, not within, interpretation itself. 
These are forces which constrain interpretation apart from the disciplin- 
ing rules of the legal community. They are the price law pays for failing 
to provide a compelling ground of its own authority.2"' 
To be sure, Fiss writes that "[flt is important to note that the claim of 
authoritativeness . . . is extrinsic to the process of interpretation."217 But 
this statement, while perhaps true in itself, is fundamentally inconsistent 
with Fiss' whole project, which is to respond to the nihilist's challenge. 
First, that challenge directly links authority and objectivity. The nihilist's 
point is that judicial subjectivity or arbitrariness is incompatible with the 
proposition that judicial authority represents a "legitimate" rule of law. 
Accordingly, Fiss cannot simply detach objectivity from authority, as if the 
latter did not depend critically upon the former. If the objectivity of inter- 
pretation remains arbitrary from an external perspective, the nihilist's 
challenge to legal authority remains in place.218 
Second, Fiss cannot defend his appeal to interpretation in order to 
ground a theory of adjudication by pointing to the potential of interpreta- 
tion to offer a unified theory of social meaning,219 and then suggest that 
the unique aspect of law-its authoritative character-must be explained 
on noninterpretive grounds. The claim of interpretation is more thorough. 
Interpretation cannot ground objectivity and then be set aside as we turn 
to authority.220 
For Fiss, the grounds of authority of the interpretive community re- 
main, therefore, elusive. He frequently suggests that authority is a func- 
tion of the constitutional text itself, as if we could get to the Constitution 
in itself, prior to any interpretation. Thus, he writes that "[t]he ultimate 
216. If moral rules were within, or part of, legal interpretation, then the relevant interpretive 
community would be that within which that morality holds sway, not the professional community of 
lawyers. Fiss emphasizes this insulation of the legal community when he writes that "the judge is to 
read the legal text, not morality or public opinion, not, if you will, the moral or social texts." Fiss, 
Objectivity, supra note 182, at 740. 
217. Id. at 757. 
218. This is just the point of the example of the religious community. See supra text accompany- 
ing notes 203-04. For similar refusals to take at face value Fiss' effort to separate his inquiry into 
objectivity and interpretation from the larger problem of authority, see Brest, Interpretation and 
Interest, 34 STAN. L. REV. 765, 765 (1982) ("Professor Fiss' mission . . . is to reaffirm the morality 
of legal process-to reaffirm that adjudication, performed in good faith and according to professional 
canons produces outcomes deserving of respect and obedience."). 
219. See supra text accompanying note 197. 
220. Dworkin's more thorough interpretivism is evident on both of these points. He argues both 
that judicial interpretation is not different in kind from the interpretive activity of every citizen, see 
infra notes 277-78 and accompanying text, and that the grounds of legitimacy must be found within 
the theory of interpretation, see infra notes 334-38 and accompanying text. 
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authority for a judicial decree is the Constitution, for that text embodies 
public values and establishes the institutions through which those values 
are to be understood and expressed."22' But the Constitution does not first 
establish institutions and embody values and then become a subject of in- 
terpretation. The institutions and values are themselves products of consti- 
tutional interpretation. Fiss remains, nevertheless, not quite sure whether 
there is an escape from interpretation, somewhere out there beyond the 
confrontation with text. Thus, his final response to the problem of author- 
ity once again suggests that he would, at some point, abandon interpreta- 
tion: "The answer to such a question [why respect the Constitution] is not 
obvious or easily discovered, for one must transcend the text and the rules 
of interpretation to justify the authority of the text. . . one must move 
beyond law to political theory, if not religion."222 Perhaps Fiss believes 
that this move is simply from one interpretive community to an- 
other-perhaps larger-community,223 but then we need to know how 
these communities interact in producing an interpretation of law that 
grounds the authority of the professional community. 
2. The Internal Critique 
While Fiss ultimately has little to say about the authority of the profes- 
sional, legal community over other interpretive communities-the question 
of legitimacy-he has much to say about authority within this professional 
community. The internal critique of his account of interpretation focuses 
on his explanation of hierarchy and authority within the law. 
Authority is critical to Fiss' account of the character of the professional 
legal community because of his recognition that whatever objectivity the 
disciplining rules provide to constitutional adjudication, they do not pro- 
vide constraints sufficiently strong to prevent profound disagreement 
among judges and lawyers.224 The objectivity provided by the disciplining 
rules is compatible not only with disagreement, but also with error.225 
Error is not simply a product of unconstrained subjectivity. Controversy 
within law, as opposed, for example, to controversy between law and mo- 
rality, may arise from disagreement over the application of a disciplining 
rule or even over the existence of a rule. Such disagreement, however, is 
resolved by the structure of authority within the legal community. There 
are appellate courts and, if need be, constitutional amendments to resolve 
conflict. "The presence of such procedures and a hierarchy of authority 
221. Fiss, Objectivity, supra note 182, at 751. 
222. Id. at 753. For a similar critique of Fiss, arguing that he seeks ultimately to escape interpre- 
tation, see Fish, Fish v. Fiss, 36 STAN. L. REV. 1325, 1326-28 (1984). 
223. Of course, in both political theory and religion we can point to a professional class which has 
its own discourse. Thus, the interpretive community in each may be no larger-in fact, it may be 
smaller-than that of the law. 
224. See supra note 202 and accompanying text. 
225. Fiss, Objectivity, supra note 182, at 748. 
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for resolving disputes that could potentially divide or destroy an interpre- 
tive community is one of the distinctive features of legal interpretation."226 
Because there is such an authority structure within this community, it can 
remain one community instead of splintering into many. 
Fiss has linked authority and communal identity, but he still must link 
authority and interpretation. What is it about the interpretation offered by 
an institution of authority within this community that makes it correct? 
Or, is it rather that correctness is simply a function of authority? 
Disagreement is not occasional or exceptional in law. Rather, the ad- 
versary structure used in much legal process, and in all adjudication, sug- 
gests that the constraining effects of the disciplining rules will hardly ever 
be sufficient to resolve a serious legal dispute, and particularly a constitu- 
tional dispute. Members of the profession know how to frame an argu- 
ment within these rules for either side of a case. This is given effect in the 
practice of brief writing. It is given a continuing, visible presence in adju- 
dication through the practice of writing dissents. Dissenters may lack the 
votes, but it is hardly true that they lack the objectivity of the disciplining 
rules. Yet Fiss suggests that the rules themselves can resolve such disa- 
greement. This is simply an implausible claim.227 
Fiss picks an easy target when he argues with the nihilist who claims 
that there are no constraints at all on the judge's decision. The more diffi- 
cult target is the legal realist who claims that the constraints are insuffi- 
cient to ground a choice between two contrary outcomes.228 True, not 
everything can be said, but enough can usually be said to support as ob- 
jective, within the bounded professional community, either of two possible 
outcomes of a case. 
Because the possibility of disagreement within the disciplining rules is 
built into the very structures within which legal interpretation occurs, Fiss 
must go beyond objectivity to "correctness." Indeed, he usually couples 
objectivity and correctness: The disciplining rules "constrain the inter- 
preter, thus transforming the interpretive process from a subjective to an 
objective one, and they furnish the standards by which the correctness of 
the interpretation can be judged."229 This suggests that objectivity and 
correctness are on a kind of continuum: The correct decision arises simply 
from a further application of the same rules that provide the objectivity of 
a decision. Fiss says as much when he writes, "The image I have in mind 
226. Id. at 747. 
227. For an even more radical view, see Tushnet, supra note 5, at 819 ("[Tlhe limits of [the 
lawyers'] craft are so broad that in any interesting case any reasonably skilled lawyers can reach 
whatever result he or she wants."). 
228. See, e.g., K. LLEWELLYN, Some Realism About Realism, in JURISPRUDENCE: REALISM IN 
THEORY AND PRACTICE 42, 58 (1962) ("[T]he line of inquiry [of the legal realists] has come close to 
demonstrating that in any case doubtful enough to make litigation respectable the available authorita- 
tive premises-i.e., premises legitimate and impeccable under the traditional legal techniques-are at 
least two, and that the two are mutually contradictory as applied to the case in hand."). 
229. Fiss, Objectivity, supra note 182, at 745. 
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is that of a judge moving toward judgment along a spiral of norms that 
increasingly constrain.""' At an early point of constraint, the judge passes 
the threshold of objectivity; further on, he passes that of correctness.231 
Conflict in constitutional interpretation, however, is so profound that 
Fiss' claim seems simply inaccurate. Right decisions are not likely to be 
distinguished from wrong decisions by their greater attention to the disci- 
plining rules. It is not in the quality of historical research or the attention 
to precedent that right interpretations will be distinguished from wrong 
ones. Disagreement is more likely to arise from the application of different 
disciplining rules: One judge wants to return to original history; another 
wants to follow more recent precedent. Both are objective within the 
norms of the professional community; neither is pursuing simply his own 
subjective preferences. Moreover, there is no reason to believe that resolu- 
tion of conflict among the rules can be achieved by further application of 
the rules themselves. If we have second order rules for resolving these 
conflicts, Fiss surely has not elaborated them.232 Fiss' argument, in fact, 
supports a simpler, but far less useful claim. While we have authoritative 
institutions for resolving such conflicts, we do not have authoritative rules 
of interpretation for resolving them. 
If the rules do not lead to a single, "correct" outcome-and they are not 
likely to do so unless they also fall within a hierarchy of author- 
ity233-Fiss must choose between two equally problematic alternatives. 
First, conflict may indicate that there is more than one professional com- 
munity that interprets the Constitution. If communities are defined by 
their disciplining rules and if conflict over the rules is sufficiently 
profound, then it would seem to follow that there are a plurality of 
communities.234 
The problem with a theory of multiple communities is not internal to 
interpretation. There is nothing about the concept of interpretation that 
precludes a plurality of legal communities, just as there are a plurality of 
communities of literary interpretation. Rather, the problem with such a 
theory is one of political legitimacy. If there is more than one legal com- 
munity, which one legitimately exercises authority? Profound disagree- 
ment within the professional community will raise, from an internal per- 
spective, exactly the same problem of legitimacy that arose in the external 
230. Fiss, Conventionalism, supra note 182, at 185. 
231. Cf Bennett, Objectivity in Constitutional Law, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 445 (1984) (judicial 
decisions can be "objective" only in weak sense of relying on sources external to judge's own values; 
those sources of objectivity cannot yield "correct" decisions). 
232. Cf. R. DWORKIN, Hard Cases, in TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 81 (1977) (distinguishing 
principles from policies and arguing that Courts must rely on former). 
233. Cf. Fallon, A Constructivist Coherence Theory of Constitutional Interpretation, 100 HARV. 
L. REV. 1189 (1987) (in most cases various kinds of constitutional arguments prescribe the same 
results, but when arguments fail to do so, they are hierarchically ordered). 
234. The possibility of developing a theory of plural communities is demonstrated by Robert 
Cover's work. See infra Part III, Section B. 
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critique.235 A splintering of the legal community will shatter the authority 
of the alleged professionals.236 
Fiss, accordingly, rejects pluralism within the legal community. He la- 
bels a community that forms around an alternative set of disciplining rules 
a "clique": "The legal community transcends cliques; some cliques may 
dissolve over time, others may come to dominate the community."237 Some 
cliques win, others lose. Now, however, he is speaking of force and coer- 
cion as the marks of authority, not the objectivity of interpretation. Inter- 
pretation may support some sort of objectivity, but not authoritatively im- 
posed uniformity. 
Alternatively-and indeed the only option that seems to remain open to 
Fiss-he can define the community's disciplining rules to include accept- 
ance of an institutional hierarchy of authority. Such an argument, how- 
ever, is circular. The disciplining rules were meant to ground the objectiv- 
ity of the institutions of legal authority-in particular, constitutional 
adjudication by the Supreme Court. This alternative, however, suggests 
that only the authority of the Court can ground the rules. Instead of legal 
disagreements being resolved by appealing to the disciplining rules of the 
community, this alternative would resolve disagreement over the disciplin- 
ing rules by an appeal to the courts.238 On this view, we are left no expla- 
nation of either the objectivity or correctness of the courts' decisions. They 
are right because it is their role to be right. Authority again stands alone 
without the support of interpretation. 
In the end, neither the authority of the legal community to govern the 
larger community, nor the authority of an appellate court majority within 
the professional community has been grounded in interpretation. At every 
turn, Fiss' arguments may be challenged by the claims of other communi- 
ties of interpretation. This proliferation of communities may occur both 
outside of the professional, legal community, and within it. Each such 
community, from the standpoint of interpretation, stands on the same 
ground. Thus, authority characterizes adjudication, but interpretation 
does not characterize authority. No one has better grasped the splitting 
apart of authority and interpretation than Robert Cover. 
235. See supra note 202 and accompanying text; see also M. TUSHNET, RED, WHITE, AND BLUE: 
A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 3 (1988) ("Grand theory [in contemporary consti- 
tutional law] and its problems are just constitutional law's version of this general crisis of 
legitimacy."). 
236. See Kahn, supra note 1, at 492-93, on the splintering of the professional legal community in 
the early 1800's, with respect to the grounds of constitutional authority. 
237. Fiss, Objectivity, supra note 182, at 748. 
238. See Carter, Constitutional Adjudication and the Indeterminate Text: A Preliminary De- 
fense of an Imperfect Muddle, 94 YALE L.J. 821, 835-36 (1985) (Fiss' claim of authority does not 
rest on interpretation). 
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B. Robert Cover: Interpretation and Anarchy 
Like other works that assault an established tradition, an important as- 
pect of Nomos and Narrative239 is the invention of a new vocabulary. 
Cover introduces us to a narrative of conflict between the "jurisgenic" and 
the "jurispathic," between the "paideic" world of the "nomos" and the 
violent world of the "imperial." His sources are equally unfamiliar-or at 
least out of place in this context. Large parts of the essay are devoted to 
biblical exegesis, while the specifically legal texts that do appear tend to 
be lawyers' briefs rather than judicial opinions.240 This represents an ex- 
treme assault on our ordinary legal sensibilities and an immediate chal- 
lenge to Fiss' confident reliance on the language and habits of the profes- 
sional, legal community. Yet the object of this new vocabulary is once 
again the community of discourse. Cover and Fiss share a common under- 
standing of the meaning-generating function of the community of dis- 
course, yet they diverge radically in their appraisals of the community or 
communities that are relevant to the creation and maintenance of law. 
Cover's assault on traditional constitutional theory is best introduced by 
juxtaposing his views to those given short-hand expression in the famous 
footnote four of the Carolene Products opinion.24" Cover proposes a com- 
plete inversion of what has been seen as the canonical text of the modern 
Court.242 Precisely those aspects of political life previously understood as 
most problematic, and thus most requiring judicial correction, become, for 
Cover, the locus and source of political meaning and value. 
Footnote four purports to identify a number of structural problems in 
the pluralist, liberal model of politics. This model understands the society 
as composed of competing interest groups, none of which constitutes a ma- 
jority. The political process is one in which these diverse self-interested 
groups coalesce to form effective majorities in order to gain control of gov- 
ernmental institutions. Politics, on this model, remains fluid as groups 
perceive diverse possibilities for compromise and coalition building. Politi- 
239. Cover, supra note 181. 
240. See, e.g., id. at 26-33 (discussing Mennonite amicus brief in Bob Jones Univ. v. United 
States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983)). 
241. United States v. Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). Interestingly, Cover wrote 
an essay on the footnote in 1979, in which he concluded: 
Each constitutional generation organizes itself about paradigmatic events and texts. For my 
generation, it is clear that these events are Brown v. Board of Education and the civil rights 
movement and that the text is footnote four. For, whether or not the footnote is a wholly 
coherent theory, it captures the constitutional experience of the period from 1954 to 1964. And 
that experience, more than the logic of any theory, is the validating force in law. 
Cover, The Origins of Judicial Activism in the Protection of Minorities, 91 YALE L.J. 1287, 1316 
(1982). Cover did not himself see the extreme tension between his soon-to-emerge views on commu- 
nity and the footnote's understanding of the "minorities problem." Yet in one critical respect, this 
essay did anticipate his later views. See infra note 247. 
242. See, e.g., J. ELY, supra note 42; Brilmayer, Carolene, Conflicts and the Fate of the "Inside- 
Outsider," 134 U. PA. L. REV. 1291 (1986); Lusky, Footnote Redux: A Carolene Products Reminis- 
cence, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1093 (1982); Powell, Carolene Products Revisited, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 
1087 (1982). 
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cal success for any particular group requires the possibility of participat- 
ing in this process. Paragraph three of the footnote recognizes that this 
ideal of participation is not a reality for certain groups: "Prejudice against 
discrete and insular minorities may be a special condition, which tends 
seriously to curtail the operation of those political processes ordinarily to 
be relied upon to protect minorities, and which may call for a correspond- 
ingly more searching judicial inquiry."243 
Discreteness and insularity were meant to refer to those marks of dif- 
ference from the majority that prevent participation in coalition politics 
and thus prevent a sharing in the public goods that are the result of that 
process.244 The role of the courts, accordingly, is to act as political physi- 
cians and thus to heal this defect in the political process. This remedial 
role is twofold: First, to facilitate participation of discrete and insular mi- 
norities in the ordinary, pluralist politics of coalition building; second, to 
assure fair access to the outcomes of the political process, when that out- 
come reflects a process to which minority groups have been denied access. 
Group difference, therefore, is a political defect that requires an extra- 
political, judicial effort to overcome. 
The differences identified by the expression "discrete and insular mi- 
norities" are products of history. For the Carolene Products Court, there 
would be no such political defects-because there would be no 
prejudice-if there were no history. The absence of history would not cre- 
ate an identity of interests. It would, however, allow every individual to 
establish his or her own political associations and thus define those inter- 
ests that the individual seeks to further through the process of 
majoritarian politics. The role of the Court, accordingly, is to remove the 
burden of history as an external restraint on private freedom of choice.245 
Carotene Products thus understands the problem of politics as the pres- 
ervation of an idea of individual freedom that is pre-political. The attrac- 
tiveness of the Carolene Products theory is precisely this promise of a 
political order that affirms, rather than undermines, individual autonomy. 
As long as the individual could freely choose his associations-thus the 
critical importance of the discovery of a "right of association"--the Court 
243. 304 U.S. at 152 n.4. 
244. For a different view of the political consequences of discreteness and insularity in contempo- 
rary politics, see Ackerman, Beyond Carolene Products, 98 HARV. L. REV. 713 (1985). 
245. For this reason, once the Court adopted a Carolene Products ideology, it had to create both 
a constitutional right to travel and a constitutional right of association. See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 
U.S. 618 (1969) (right to travel): Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160 (1941) (same); NAACP v. 
Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958) (right to association). The two rights correspond to 
the freedom "to leave one community and to join or establish another" described by Fiss. See text 
accompanying note 197. More generally, the Carolene Products Court can be understood as trying to 
create the conditions-and outcomes-of a free market model of politics. See, e.g., J. ELY, supra note 
42, at 102-03 (describing Carolene Products process-oriented approach to constitutional law as based 
on "antitrust" model of "political market"). 
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could imagine a coincidence of individual autonomy and political order, of 
subjective freedom and public constraint. 
On the Carolene Products model, then, history is the source of 
prejudice, which denies individual freedom. The Carolene Products Court 
understood its function to arise out of the need to overcome history in 
order to create the conditions of freedom within the political order.246 A 
society without a history would be a society of completely free individuals: 
Each individual would be entirely free to mold himself on the basis of his 
present preferences. Each association formed by the aggregation of such 
free choices would have equal access to the political process. 
This model of the political process and of the Court's role is the object 
of Cover's attack. For Cover, discreteness and insularity are marks of po- 
litical virtue; they are not the source of a political defect.247 Discreteness 
and insularity are the conditions of "jurisgeneration"; uniformity is the 
goal of the "jurispathic." The former gives birth to meaning; the latter 
marks the death of meaning, including the meaning and value of law. 
Perfect justice on the model of Carolene Products might eliminate injus- 
tice, but at the cost of all that can be meaningful in life. It might secure 
negative freedom by removing the burden of history, but at the cost of 
positive freedom which only exists in the historically situated community. 
The central concept of Cover's theory is announced in his first sentence: 
"We inhabit a nomos-a normative universe."248 Both words of this defi- 
nition-"normative" and "universe"-are equally critical to understand- 
ing the nomos. The normative character of the nomos distinguishes it from 
the physical universe: The nomos is the domain "of right and wrong, of 
lawful and unlawful, of valid and void."249 But by describing the nomos 
as a "universe," Cover asserts that the normative has an objective charac- 
ter. The nomos is a universe because it constitutes a world in which sub- 
jects find themselves; it is not a creation of individuals' subjective value 
choices. "This nomos is as much 'our world' as is the physical universe of 
mass, energy, and momentum. . . . Our apprehension of the structure of 
246. This task of dismantling history, set by Carolene Products, is most evident in the Court's 
reapportionment decisions, in their insistence upon the rule of "one person, one vote" regardless of 
political history. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 579-80 (1964); see also, Gewirtz, Choice in the 
Transition: School Desegregation and the Corrective Ideal, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 728, 735 (1986) 
(corrective concept of antidiscrimination law requires Court "to purge the present of the past"). 
247. In one significant respect, Cover's earlier essay on Carolene Products, Cover, supra note 
241, anticipated his later work. Cover recognized that one method of protecting blacks from the conse- 
quences of prejudice would have been the imposition of national values of equality on local political 
and social life. About this method, which the Court used in cases like Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 
U.S. 250 (1952) and Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953), Cover wrote: 
It may be, of course, that a sanitized political discourse-one free of racist invective-and a 
hygienic principle of political organization that would not tolerate racial exclusion at any level 
would produce at least as good a political system as we now have. But, certainly, candor 
requires recognition of the risks entailed. 
Cover, supra note 241, at 1313. 
248. Cover, supra note 181, at 4. 
249. Id. 
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the normative world is no less fundamental than our appreciation of the 
structure of the physical world."250 Subjects find themselves in a world of 
meaning in just the same way that they find themselves in a world of 
space and time. 
This twofold character of the nomos is captured in Cover's account of 
its locus and source. The nomos exists in and arises out of discourse. Dis- 
course supplies a normative meaning by creating "history and destiny, be- 
ginning and end, explanation and purpose. "25' Discourse cannot be pri- 
vate; it requires a community. The scope of the community of discourse 
defines the scope of the universe that is the nomos.252 
By now, the conceptual model that is the object of Cover's difficult rhet- 
oric should be clear. The nomos rests upon the familiar model of discur- 
sive particularity.253 This is once again the discourse on moral unity that 
constitutes the history of the community. For Cover, a community's dis- 
course produces a meaningful history by offering an "explanation and 
purpose" for the social life it finds itself already to have and to have had. 
History is inseparable from destiny, because a community that under- 
stands a unique, normative past will understand itself as carrying that set 
of meanings into the future.254 
Individuals do not create values through private subjective choices; 
rather, they discover their values in a universe of which they are always 
already a part, and in which they are never alone. Thus, Cover writes: 
"The intelligibility of normative behavior inheres in the communal char- 
acter of the narratives that provide the context of that behavior. Any per- 
son who lived an entirely idiosyncratic normative life would be quite 
mad."255 The commonality, and so objectivity, of the normative universe 
for Cover is marked by his constant return to the idea of discourse and 
variations on discursive action: speech, myth, narrative, communication, 
and signification.26 
Cover writes: "The nomos that I have described requires no state."257 
Nevertheless, the legal system of the state requires a nomos. Like the 
Carotene Products understanding, Cover suggests that political order 
250. Id. at 5. 
251. Id. 
252. Cf. supra note 193 and accompanying text. 
253. Like Fiss, Cover cites C. GEERTZ, THE INTERPRETATION OF CULTURES (1973), as the 
familiar starting point for this perspective on social phenomena. See Cover, supra note 181, at 5 n.7. 
254. Cover takes this account one step further in his description of the objectivity of "narrative." 
Every narrative is tied to a particular community: there are no disembodied narratives, just as there 
are no disembodied discourses. But once created, a narrative has a continuing life. The objectivity 
discourse attains in the narrative provides an objectivity to the community. The community can now 
be defined by its relationship to a text. 
255. Cover, supra note 181, at 10. 
256. See, e.g., id. at 8 ("Legal precepts and principles are . . . signs by which each of us com- 
municates with others."); id. at 9 ("A legal tradition. . . includes not only a corpus juris, but also a 
language and a mythos-narratives in which the corpus juris is located. 
257. Id. at 11. 
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stands on a prior, pre-political domain that is the source of value and 
meaning. Unlike Carolene Products, the pre-political for Cover is not 
constituted by autonomous, private agents exercising free choice. Rather, 
just as the state is derivative of the nomos, so is the individual. There is 
nothing behind or prior to the normative universe: The world of social 
meaning and so of individual freedom is irreducibly communal.258 
Legal prescriptions do not simply appear as the formal demands of an 
external sovereign upon an otherwise private person. Like every social 
practice, law will have a meaning, or, in Cover's vision, many meanings, 
which explain why the law is as it is. Meaning can only arise within a 
nomos. "[L]aw and narrative are inseparably related. Every prescription 
is insistent in its demand to be located in discourse-to be supplied with 
history and destiny, beginning and end, explanation and purpose."259 In- 
deed, law is nothing more than "a resource in signification" ;26O it is a 
device for communicating meaning within a shared nomos. A complex so- 
ciety is, for Cover, one in which the legal norms perform a multiplicity of 
signifying acts as they are given meaning in a number of discursive com- 
munities, each with its own nomos. Different communities talk differently 
about the same legal norm, whether written or unwritten. Accordingly, 
they give a common text different meanings. Fiss's professional commu- 
nity is, for Cover, just one nomos among many, all of which are construct- 
ing the meaning of law.261 
This superabundance of law, or more precisely of legal meaning, cre- 
ates the problem of constitutionalism from the perspective of the state. 
That problem is not to create law, but to limit it. Without such limits, the 
jurisgenerative forces that create meaning would lead to anarchy among 
competing communities. "It is the problem of the multiplicity of mean- 
ing-the fact that never only one but always many worlds are created by 
the too fertile forces of jurisgenesis-that leads at once to the imperial 
virtues and the imperial mode of world maintenance."262 A common text 
is not itself a constraint on the construction of meaning; rather, it is an 
invitation to the jurisgenic forces of community. 
Cover has in mind the plurality of sects that give meaning to the com- 
258. This theme will be fully developed in Dworkin's work. See infra notes 300-03 and accompa- 
nying text. 
259. Cover, supra note 181, at 5. 
260. Id. at 8. 
261. Cover explicitly rejects Fiss: 
[M]y position differs fundamentally from [that] of Fiss . . . in that I accord no privileged 
character to the work of the judges. I would have judges act on the basis of a committed 
constitutionalism in a world in which each of many communities acts out its own nomos and is 
prepared to resist the work of the judges in many instances. 
Id. at 57 n.158. See also R. COVER, 0. Fiss, J. RESNIK, PROCEDURE 729-30 (1988) (previously 
unpublished note of Cover's, accusing Fiss of having a "romantic" notion of a "community of inter- 
pretation that is national in character"). 
262. Cover, supra note 181, at 16. 
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mon text of the Bible. The text is the starting point of creative interpreta- 
tion; not the end, but the beginning of meaning.263 The same creative 
forces are at work in the law, particularly with a law as open to diverse 
readings as the Constitution. Constraint on this potential anarchy of juris- 
genesis must come from outside of the text. More importantly, it must 
come from outside of the process by which meaning is given to the text. 
No interpretation is authoritative in its character as an interpretation. No 
single meaning has any more authority than any other. Authority is sim- 
ply not built into the structure of the nomos.264 Or, more precisely, the 
claim of authority only appears legitimate to those within the paideic com- 
munity. Even that claim has no power against those who would disagree 
and leave the community to form a new community organized around a 
new interpretation. 
For Cover, then, the imperial virtues of world maintenance are necessa- 
rily "jurispathic." Their function is to control the anarchy of legal mean- 
ings. They cannot do this, however, by the creation of a competing, yet 
authoritative, meaning, because all meaning is a function of the nomos: 
The precepts we call law are marked off by social control over their 
provenance, their mode of articulation, and their effects. But the nar- 
ratives that create and reveal the patterns of commitment, resistance, 
and understanding . . . are radically uncontrolled. They are subject 
to no formal hierarchical ordering, no centralized, authoritative prov- 
enance, no necessary pattern of acquiescence. . . . [A]n interdepen- 
dent system of obligation may be enforced, but the very patterns of 
meaning that give rise to effective or ineffective social control are to 
be left to the domain of Babel.265 
Thus, the meaning of every legal norm, including constitutional norms, 
is "essentially contested."268 In that contest, there is no justification for a 
hierarchy of authority. The Supreme Court is not a privileged source of 
meaning. Rather, to the extent that it engages in jurisgenesis at all, it acts 
263. See S. LEVINSON, CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH (1988) (developing theological analogy). Levin- 
son's contrast of the Catholic and the Protestant approaches to the constitutional text, id. at 27-30, is 
a fair approximation to the contrast of Fiss and Cover. Fiss sees the constitutional world of meaning 
through the institutional hierarchy of a professional community that parallels the church hierarchy. 
The hierarchy in each case exercises the authority to decide, and that authority is independent of the 
disciplining rules which define the boundaries of the community of believers. Cover's insistence on an 
unmediated relation of each community to the constitutional text parallels the Protestant vision in 
which sects can freely multiply as new claims to truth are made. 
264. This is precisely the problem of the conflict between internal and external perspectives that 
undermined so much of the work of the new republicans: there is no common measure of the good 
between those inside and those outside of the interpretive, self-governing community. See supra Part 
II. 
265. Cover, supra note 181, at 17 (footnotes omitted). On the image of Babel, Cover writes, "It 
suggests not incoherence but a multiplicity of coherent systems and a problem of intelligibility among 
communities." Id. at 17 n.45. 
266. Id. at 17. 
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"in that respect, in an unprivileged fashion."267 The Court may have a 
nomos of its own, but even then it is simply one among many communi- 
ties.268 Its privileged place of authority comes not from its unique capacity 
to create meaning, but from a unique power to deny other meanings.269 
Cover uses the example of the Mennonite community to elaborate his 
vision of the relationship between nomos and law. The Mennonite com- 
munity is defined by its particular narrative, which combines a moral vi- 
sion with an historical account of the community's conflicts with civil au- 
thorities. The narrative is a story of struggle between moral ideals and 
recalcitrant social reality. "[T]he narrative creates a people dedicated to 
the vision-a people whose actions and norms for action render the vision 
a constant, with the various civil demands constituting shifting variables 
around it."270 A people and their nomos precede the appearance of an 
individual confronting the law of the state. Thus, "[t]he Mennonite narra- 
tives . . . help to create the identity of the believer and to establish the 
central commitment from which any law . . . of the state will be ad- 
dressed."'271 The individual believer and law are abstractions from the no- 
mos, which is the only source of meaning for both. 
Cover's project is to deny the abstraction and separation of individual 
subject and objective law. Instead, he wants to return both to their foun- 
dation in the nomos. The denial of the abstract individual, distinct from 
any community, is relatively easy in his example. To be a Mennonite is to 
be a member of a community. Only as a member of that community, not 
as a disembodied subject, is Mennonite belief a plausible way of life. 
More difficult to accept is Cover's argument that law too can only have 
meaning to the extent that it is incorporated within a nomos. This leads 
him to make the extraordinary claim that "within the domain of constitu- 
tional meaning, the understanding of the Mennonites assumes a status 
equal (or superior) to that accorded to the understanding of the Justices of 
the Supreme Court. In this realm of meaning . . . the Mennonite com- 
munity creates law as fully as does the judge."272 And again, "[t]he mean- 
ing judges thus give to the law . . . is not privileged, not necessarily worth 
any more than that of the resister they put in jail."273 Discursive commu- 
nities are diverse; they are not hierarchical. 
267. Id. at 18. 
268. Cf. supra notes 143-58 and accompanying text (Michelman defends nometic understanding 
of Court, but fails to ground authority of that particular nomos). 
269. Cover developed this theme most explicitly in his work on judges as people of "violence." See 
Cover, The Bonds of Constitutional Interpretation: Of the Word, the Deed, and the Role, 20 GA. L. 
REV. 815, 817 (1986) ("For legal interpretation occurs on a battlefield . . . which entails the instru- 
ments both of war and of poetry. Indeed, constitutional law is . . . more fundamentally connected to 
the war than it is to the poetry."); see also Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 YALE L.J. 1601 (1986). 
270. Cover, supra note 181, at 27. 
271. Id. at 28. 
272. Id. 
273. Id. at 60. 
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At this point, Cover's reversal of the political theory of Carolene Prod- 
ucts is complete. The Constitution does not save the discrete and insular 
community from the defects of the political process; rather, the discrete 
and insular community saves the Constitution from the burden of mean- 
inglessness. Carotene Products' pursuit of homogeneity and its denial of 
history are not the virtues of the legal system but rather its vices. Thus, 
for Cover, Carolene Products is little more than the benign form of the 
jurispathic character of the state. The non-benign form of this same phe- 
nomenon is the violence which supports authority. Both forms come to- 
gether in the Court: "Because of the violence they command, judges char- 
acteristically do not create law, but kill it. Theirs is the jurispathic 
office."274 Cover sees a choice between the creative anarchy of meaning 
and the violence of authority. "By exercising its superior brute force . . . 
the agency of state law shuts down the creative hermeneutic of principle 
that is spread throughout our communities."27" 
There is no easy way out of this dilemma. In fact, there may be no way 
out at all. Having located meaning within the discrete and insular com- 
munities of the diverse nomoi, a national politics-and so a national polit- 
ical community-will appear always to rest upon the violence of the juris- 
pathic. If the cost of statehood is the destruction of meaning, then we 
cannot have a political life in the state that preserves individual integrity. 
The individual that appears in, and to, the national state is just as much a 
product of violent abstraction from the community of meaning as is the 
state itself. Indeed, they are essentially linked, for the violence of the juris- 
pathetic will always appear simultaneously as the freeing of the subject 
from the burdens of communal history.276 This is the lesson of Carolene 
Products. To be a member of the state is to participate in the violent 
destruction of meaning. 
For Cover, the discursive community, not the private individual, is the 
basic unit of social reality. This community is not a part of, but rather an 
alternative to, the state. Its existence challenges the state's claim upon the 
individual. Within the discourse of this community, the public order of the 
state appears as a threat of violent death to meaning. A choice must be 
made, therefore, between the anarchy of meaning and the politics of vio- 
lence.277 To choose meaning, however, is not simply to reject the violence 
of the state, it is ultimately to reject the Carolene Products vision as well. 
Modern liberalism's vision of the autonomous, private individual is at the 
center of Cover's attack upon the state. 
274. Id. at 53. 
275. Id. at 44. 
276. See R. NISBET, THE QUEST FOR COMMUNITY (1953) (on simultaneous and linked develop- 
ment of centralized state and autonomous, private individual). 
277. See R. COVER, 0. Fiss, J. RESNIK, PROCEDURE 730 (1988) (" 'Nomos' is fundamentally a 
piece about the necessary disjuncture between the range of state violence and the range of legal 
meaning."). 
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The stripping away of communal identity from the individual, the por- 
trayal of the individual as a free, undetermined agent who may define his 
values as he pleases, requires a parallel political process in which the state 
frees the individual from the claims of intermediate communities.278 His- 
torically, this meant freeing the individual from the bonds of religion, 
family, work-place, and local political associations. A world of individual 
contractors is a world in which central political authority has come to 
dominate all other communities. The public order of the free, private indi- 
vidual is the state, not the community. This is the political world of the 
jurispathic state. 
Cover's effort to recover community threatens the value of the modern 
achievement of centralized political authority. His world of jurisgenesis is 
closer to the feudal world of sect, family and guild, than to the liberal 
world of free individuals interacting within a nation state. It is, therefore, 
no accident that Cover's central example of a meaningful political life is 
the Mennonite community. 
Despite the shock to our political sensibilities, Cover's narrative of an- 
archy is faithful to the theory of discursive particularity that is so 
powerfully attractive to contemporary legal theorists. He alone puts the 
juxtaposition of the anarchy of community and the authority of law at the 
center of his theory. His vision of anarchy suggests that, as a theory of 
constitutional law, interpretation may remain forever outside of the practi- 
cal reality of constitutional law. Constitutional law is above all about or- 
der and authority. Interpretation, however, seems to lead to anarchy in 
the place of order. Unless interpretation can somehow be made to support 
authority-a task that Fiss essentially avoided-Cover's accusation that 
the work of the courts is the death of law signals the limits of the useful- 
ness of the interpretive approach. 
Such an effort to ground legal authority in a theory of the interpretive 
community is at the heart of Dworkin's latest work. Dworkin represents a 
third approach, somewhere between that of Fiss and Cover. He tries to 
save the discursive community from Cover's vision of anarchy and Fiss' 
unexplained embrace of authority. Even more importantly, he offers the 
most powerful, philosophical account of the model of community to which 
so many contemporary theorists appeal. While the philosophical account 
is lucid and compelling, the conclusion he reaches, which tries to privilege 
a certain kind of community, is completely unsupported by the larger the- 
ory, and indeed, seems inconsistent with that theory. 
278. This has been generally recognized as the move from status to contract. 
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C. Ronald Dworkin: Community in the Transcendental Analytic of 
Adjudication 
Dworkin's most recent and comprehensive work is Law's Empire.279 
Much in this book is a restatement of his earlier positions, including the 
claims that there are right answers to hard cases and that law is an inter- 
pretive exercise.280 What is new is the prominent place given the concept 
of community. Community is the foundation for the entire legal structure 
that Dworkin builds. 
The foundational character of community is twofold. First, community 
is the conceptual ground of interpretation. Because Dworkin argues that 
law is itself an interpretive exercise, it follows that community is the con- 
ceptual ground of law. Second, community is the ground of legitimacy for 
law. Without a community of a particular character, what Dworkin calls 
a "true community," the commands of law will not provide a normative 
ground for action. Conversely, only in such a true community do citizens 
have a moral obligation to comply with law. Community, then, makes law 
possible, as well as legitimate. The move from the community of interpre- 
tation to the true community is Dworkin's attempt to move from a theory 
of meaning to a theory of authority: The true community is that singular 
form of community that may legitimately exercise authority. Unfortu- 
nately for Dworkin's theory, these two functions of community are incon- 
sistent: The community of interpretation undermines the special claims to 
authority of the true community. 
This is a complex and difficult theory, which is best approached by 
focusing on three key concepts-"interpretation," "integrity," and "legiti- 
macy." Each of these concepts is dependent upon a prior conceptual con- 
struction, which is community. 
1. Interpretation and Community 
Legal disagreements, argues Dworkin, do not raise problems about 
whether some rule or judgment satisfies an agreed upon set of characteris- 
tics that define the concept of law. Rather, legal disagreements are more 
fundamental: They are about what law is. This observation poses some- 
thing of a conundrum, which Dworkin labels the "semantic sting": How 
can we so easily and commonly use a term, "law," upon the meaning of 
279. Dworkin is not a "constitutional theorist" in the same way as the others discussed in this 
essay. His theoretical object is law as such, not the Constitution. Nevertheless, he applies his general 
theory of law to constitutional adjudication. This, coupled with the fact of his commanding presence 
within contemporary discussions of legal theory, including constitutional theory, justifies consideration 
of his work in this essay. 
280. See R. DWORKIN, supra note 37; Dworkin, Law as Interpretation, 60 TEX. L. REV. 527 
(1982). But cf. Christie, Dworkin's Empire (Book Review), 1987 DUKE L.J. 157, 184 (arguing 
Dworkin has abandoned the one right answer claim). 
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which we do not agree?281 Dworkin's answer is that such disputes are 
characteristic of a common category of concepts, which he labels "inter- 
pretive." The semantic sting misrepresents the nature of a large portion, if 
not the whole, of our communicative practices.282 To avoid the semantic 
sting, we must understand the nature of interpretation. To understand 
law, we must understand it as an interpretive concept. 
In particular, we must understand the nature of "creative interpreta- 
tion." The object of creative interpretation-that which is interpreted-is 
"something created by people as an entity distinct from them, rather than 
what people say [the object of conversational interpretation] . . . or events 
not created by people [the object of scientific interpretation]."283 To inter- 
pret an object as "created by people" is to understand it as meaningful. Of 
all such objects, we can ask why they were created. In response, we expect 
an explanation that relies on ends that are valuable to someone or to some 
group.284 Human creation is distinguished from both nature and accident 
by its purposiveness.286 A created, meaningful object may be a work of 
art, but it may also be a social practice, including law. 
Meaning does not inhere in the interpreted object independently of the 
interpreter. There is not a world of meaningful objects to which subjects 
are subsequently introduced. Objects appear meaningful only because they 
have already been interpreted. Dworkin has effectively shifted the locus of 
creativity in "creative interpretation": Creativity does not inhere in the 
object as a product of a past act; rather, creativity is a process of interac- 
tion between the subject who interprets and the object he interprets.286 
This is as true of a social practice as it is of a work of art. 
Because there is no such thing as a disembodied interpretation, the pro- 
cess of interpretation always joins subject and object. More precisely, sub- 
ject and object-including citizen and social practice-are only partial ab- 
stractions from a prior whole which is the creation of meaning.287 This 
collapse of individual and social practice through the process of discursive 
particularity is given its strongest expression when Dworkin describes 
"social interpretation as a conversation with oneself."288 This is not a sug- 
gestion of solipsism; rather, it is a suggestion that the line between subject 
281. R. DWORKIN, supra note 150, at 15-16. 
282. See id. at 53 (suggesting that all concepts may be interpretive). 
283. Id. at 50. 
284. Much of Dworkin's discussion of interpretation is simply a discussion of the central role of 
"final causes" in our understanding. See ARISTOTLE, PHYSICS II 3-9 (on final causes). 
285. See Kahn, supra note 1, at 453. (distinguishing constitutional creation from nature and 
accident). 
286. Not only does Dworkin challenge the distinction between subject and object, but also that 
between the creator of the object to be interpreted and the interpreter. See R. DWORKIN, supra note 
150, at 55-62 (attacking "artist's intention" theories of interpretation). 
287. See supra notes 248-52 and accompanying text. 
288. R. DWORKIN, supra note 150, at 58. Dworkin, accordingly, argues that to interpret a social 
practice is to participate in it: "A social scientist who offers to interpret the practice . . . must . . . 
join the practice he proposes to understand...." Id. at 64 (emphasis in original). 
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and object, between citizen and the community of which he is a part, is 
disappearing in the face of the analysis of interpretation. We cannot get 
outside of the self to see the social practice pure. This is not because we 
always stand too far from the community, but because we are already 
within a community, or it is within us. 
The interpretive attitude toward a social practice, Dworkin argues, can 
only take hold in a community of a certain kind.289 He lays out the condi- 
tions of such a community in a description of the three "stages" of inter- 
pretation. First, there must be a large degree of agreement on the "rules 
and standards" that inform the pattern of behavior that is to be the object 
of interpretation.290 These are the practices and the beliefs about those 
practices that define the ordinary understanding of the community within 
which we already find ourselves. This commonality of practices and be- 
liefs allows us to identify and speak of a particular, historical community. 
A community that exhibited no consistent patterns of behavior would 
not offer an object of interpretation, but only a field for possible political 
invention. Without such commonalities, it would be wrong to speak of a 
community. This would be, instead, the proverbial "state of nature." 
Moral and political theory would either meet no resistance-they would 
write on a blank slate-or theory would be overcome by the resistance of 
anarchy. 
For Dworkin, theory must meet some resistance. Interpretation must 
be of something, if interpretation is to be distinguished from invention. 
Interpretation, then, presupposes a "preinterpretive" community as that 
pattern of social practices and beliefs in which we always find ourselves 
already located.292 Among the practices we understand and follow in this 
preinterpretive way are those that we identify as "law." 
To say that a pattern of social practices is preinterpretive is not to say 
that it is uninterpreted: "[S]ome kind of interpretation is necessary even at 
this stage. Social rules do not carry identifying labels."293 Only to an in- 
terpreting subject does social behavior appear as a practice putting into 
effect a common rule.294 Someone who could find no such unifying rule 
289. This is not meant to be a practical restriction on particular communities; rather, it is a 
description of what it is that allows a community to present a meaningful set of social practices. 
290. See R. DWORKIN, supra note 150, at 65-66. 
291. On the other hand, if that resistance is too solid, if ritual is too hardened, the interpretive 
attitude is again precluded. See infra text accompanying notes 297-99. 
292. R. DWORKIN, supra note 150, at 65. Compare Cover's understanding of the "nomos" as a 
"normative universe," see supra notes 248-50 and accompanying text. 
293. Id. at 66. See J. DEWEY, THE PUBLIC AND ITS PROBLEMS 3 (1927) ("[N]o one is ever 
forced by just the collection of facts to accept a particular theory of their meaning."). 
294. The purpose that gives meaning to the practice, as understood by someone, is not necessarily 
the same as the purpose that may have originally motivated the creation of the practice. The author's 
intention is no more privileged with respect to social practices than with respect to works of art. See 
supra text accompanying note 286. 
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would see only chaotic or random behavior. Thus, even to identify a social 
practice as an object for explicit interpretation requires interpretation. 
Preinterpretive practice, therefore, does not describe social regularity 
without meaning, but a social life in which the interpretive attitude has 
not been made explicit. Interpretation will not be explicit as long as there 
is substantial consensus on the character and meaning of the practice.29" 
Interpretation only becomes explicit when conflict arises. Dworkin identi- 
fies this as the second stage of interpretation. 
Conflict may be over the meaning of a practice or it may be over what 
exactly the practice requires. An interpretive attitude only fully takes hold 
when both dimensions-meaning and practice-are open issues. Practice 
must be responsive to meaning, just as meaning must be responsive to 
practice. This reciprocity between theory and practice, interpretation and 
the object of interpretation, characterizes the "interpretive attitude." 
Interpretation exists in this tension between historically given practice 
and normative intelligibility. An interpretation must "fit" the social prac- 
tice: It must "count as an interpretation of it rather than the invention of 
something new."296 Nevertheless, an interpretation is not an explanation 
of the causes of the practice, as if the practice were a natural phenome- 
non. It is, instead, a justification of the practice. A justification isolates the 
most important elements of the practice and explains how they contribute 
to a valuable end. Conversely, a justification will also isolate those ele- 
ments of the practice that do not contribute to the attainment of that end. 
A justification thereby offers a perspective from which to criticize the 
practice in its full range.297 
The third and final stage of interpretation is the reconstruction of social 
practice to serve better the justification offered. Interpretation is reformist 
in its justificatory ideal. A justification is offered not only as an explana- 
tion, but as a ground for reform. This complete interpenetration of prac- 
tice and meaning is given expression in Dworkin's careful choice of 
words: "[T]here must be a postinterpretive or reforming stage, at which 
[the interpreter] adjusts his sense of what the practice 'really' requires so 
as better to serve the justification he accepts at the interpretive stage. "298 
The interpretive attitude, in short, denies that prior to interpretation 
the practice was "really" something, which is now being changed in light 
of values subsequently discovered. Rather, the nature of the practice is 
295. "[P]erhaps an interpretive community is usefully defined as requiring consensus at this stage 
..[..Tihe classifications it yields are treated as given in day-to-day reflection and argument." R. 
DWORKIN, supra note 150, at 66. 
296. Id. at 67. 
297. The critique is "internal" because it assumes the perspective of values that are themselves 
understood to be the ends of the social practice. For more elaborate articulations of this theory of 
social criticism, see M. WALZER, INTERPRETATION AND SOCIAL CRITICISM (1987); White, Introduc- 
tion: Is Cultural Criticism Possible? 84 MICH. L. REV. 1373 (1986). 
298. R. DWORKIN, supra note 150, at 66. 
68 The Yale Law Journal [Vol. 99: 1 
itself a product of this reciprocal relationship of meaning and practice. 
What a social practice is, therefore, changes as interpretations change. 
"Creative interpretation . . . is a matter of interaction between purpose 
and object."299 There is no way to get to the object prior to, or apart from, 
the interpretation. The reformist stage of interpretation is not a moment 
of "reform" which follows an interpretive inquiry into a social practice. 
Rather, reform is a part of interpretation, the product of which is the 
social practice of a community. One important part of that social practice 
is law. Accordingly, there is no real law that confronts the subject as an 
already formed "thing-in-itself." 
This emphasis on reform as a part, and not a consequence, of interpre- 
tation reminds the reader that the analysis of the stages of interpretation is 
only an explanatory device. These stages do not represent a temporal se- 
quence, but a conceptual structure. The identification and explication of 
this structure forces a reconsideration of the place and character of com- 
munity. Community, understood as a shared set of practices and beliefs, 
was the starting point of the analysis. It provided the preinterpretive 
ground for the possibility of an interpretive attitude toward created ob- 
jects, including law. At the end of the analysis, however, it is clear that 
community is itself an interpretive concept. Community is not something 
apart from interpretation which provides an independent, objective foun- 
dation. Community is simultaneously the condition of interpretation of so- 
cial practices and the end of interpretation. Like Plato's Ideas, which in- 
form discourse before we set them forth as the objects of discourse, or 
Kant's categories, which structure our understanding before we under- 
stand them, Dworkin's community informs interpretation before it is itself 
the object of interpretation.300 This characteristic of community as both 
the origin and the end of interpretation suggests that community plays a 
unique role in the theory. 
Community describes the deep structure of the social imagination.301 
The social imagination does not look, for example, to the aesthetic value 
of human action; rather, it looks for and finds a value expressing the his- 
torical identity of a group committed to a moral vision of their communal 
life.302 In the next section I will pursue further the implications of this 
idea that community provides the conceptual structure of interpretive un- 
299. Id. at 52. 
300. I owe this insight to Harry Frankfurt. 
301. For just this reason, Dworkin's community is best described as the "transcendental condi- 
tion" of law. See I. KANT, CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON 59 (N.K. Smith trans. 1929) ("I entitle 
transcendental all knowledge which is occupied not so much with objects as with the mode of our 
knowledge of objects insofar as this mode of knowledge is to be possible a priori."). 
302. A full description of imagination would describe the various domains of its construction, 
including, e.g., the social, aesthetic, and scientific. Such an effort would parallel Kant's three 
Critiques. 
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derstanding. Here it is enough to notice the transformation in the locus of 
community. 
Community is bound to interpretation. Since it is itself the product of 
interpretation, it cannot-as Bickel thought it could-validate interpreta- 
tion. One can no more get to the real community before interpretation 
than one can get to the real painting before any interpretation. As an 
interpreted object, community does not exist as an historical and geo- 
graphical entity independent of the subject who understands it. Commu- 
nity exists only in the citizen's imagination-the faculty by which object 
and value, practice and meaning are combined.303 
2. Integrity and Community 
So far, I have said only that Dworkin argues that law is an interpretive 
concept and that legal judgments are acts of interpretation. I have not yet 
said anything about the interpretation of law that he offers. Dworkin 
identifies the preinterpretive understanding of the practice of law as that 
of not using force "no matter how useful that would be to ends in view, 
no matter how beneficial or noble these ends, except as licensed or re- 
quired by individual rights and responsibilities flowing from past political 
decisions about when collective force is justified."304 An interpretation of 
law, therefore, must explain how a legal judgment "provides a justifica- 
tion for the use of collective power against individual citizens or 
groups."305 Dworkin takes up this task of justification by offering an in- 
terpretation that focuses on the virtue of "integrity." Law is an expression 
of integrity as a political virtue. 
In its simplest form, integrity is the virtue of "treating like cases 
alike."306 While accurate, this description of integrity as consistency fails 
to focus on the assumptions about community that are built into the con- 
cept of integrity: "Political integrity assumes a particularly deep personifi- 
cation of the community or state."307 Once again, the moving force in 
Dworkin's theory is an understanding of community. 
Integrity, for Dworkin, is a second-order virtue because it attaches to 
other political or moral virtues. He mentions, in particular, fairness, jus- 
tice and procedural due process.308 These are substantive values, about 
which there may be substantial disagreement. Such disagreements are the 
subject of traditional moral and political theory. Integrity is a response to 
this possibility of disagreement. An agent who has integrity relies upon 
303. This belief accounts for the complete absence of discussion, by Dworkin, of the traditional 
political devices for community representation, e.g., elections. 
304. R. DWORKIN, supra note 150, at 93. 
305. Id. at 109. 
306. Id. at 165. 
307. Id. at 167. 
308. See id. at 164-65. Dworkin does not mean this to be a comprehensive list. 
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the same understanding of a substantive value in diverse circumstances. 
An agent has integrity with respect to justice, for example, when he gives 
expression to a single understanding of the meaning of justice in all of his 
interactions with others.309 
There is nothing in the concept of justice that points to consistency as 
the appropriate response to such a conflict over its meaning.310 If there 
are competing concepts of justice, then, from the point of view of justice 
itself, it makes as much sense to alternate among them as consistently to 
choose one over the others. Nevertheless, our moral sensibilities, according 
to Dworkin, are offended by such inconsistent conduct. Since the offense 
cannot be to our sense of justice there must be another virtue at stake. 
This is "integrity.""' Having isolated this distinct virtue of integrity, 
Dworkin makes a strong claim for it: "This ability is an important part of 
our more general ability to treat others with respect, and it is therefore a 
prerequisite of civilization."312 
A political community has integrity when it applies its best understand- 
ing of justice, fairness and procedural due process in a consistent fashion, 
despite the presence of moral conflict within the community.313 As a prin- 
ciple of legislation, integrity prohibits enactment of what Dworkin de- 
scribes as "checkerboard" statutes, i.e., statutes in which conflicts about 
the meaning of a substantive value are resolved by assigning each defini- 
tional claim a discrete area of application.314 A state would lack integrity 
if it were redistributive one week, but libertarian the next. Similarly it 
would lack integrity if it were to resolve conflicts over procedural due 
process by assigning juries in some cases but not in others, without some 
explanation of the different requirements of procedural fairness in each. 
Adjudicative integrity requires the judge to act as the representative of a 
community that has the virtue of integrity. To do so requires that he un- 
derstand the community as itself a single moral agent. Hence, the "deep 
personification" to which Dworkin refers.315 The judge must articulate 
the principles of justice, fairness and due process that are operative in the 
309. Dworkin is not clear about the relationship between the different substantive virtues. It is 
not clear, therefore, whether he believes that an agent may have integrity with respect to justice, yet 
lack integrity with respect to fairness. 
310. The same is true of fairness, due process, and any other moral or political virtue. 
311. To exercise integrity may, in fact, lead to less rather than more justice. The agent may come 
to learn that he was entirely wrong in his conception of justice. In that case, alternating among 
different conceptions of justice would have resulted in the accomplishment of more justice. 
312. R. DWORKIN, supra note 150, at 166. This statement remains unexplained by Dworkin. 
One possible explanation would argue that integrity is required if we are to treat others as having a 
single, moral identity over time. It is, in this sense, a condition of personal identity. If behavior failed 
to arise out of a single source of identity, there would be no grounds for respecting it. 
313. Dworkin's insistence that compromise not occur within the domain of principle recalls 
Bickel's insistence that political compromise within the Court never occur within the principles of 
decision themselves. See supra notes 50-54 and accompanying text. 
314. R. Dworkin, supra note 150, at 178-79. 
315. See supra text accompanying note 307. 
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practices of the community. He must tell a single story about the commu- 
nity, which displays its diverse practices as the work of a single actor who 
is putting in place a single moral point of view. This justification of past 
practice will, then, be juxtaposed to the facts of the current controversy. 
This is the reformist moment of all interpretation.316 The result of this 
process is a statement of what the law is in this situation. 
To interpret law as integrity, then, is to assert that through law the 
state expresses itself as a single moral agent. This personification of the 
state forces on us a recognition of a dualism in our moral vision.317 On the 
one hand, the citizen can understand himself as an individual who on 
occasion contributes to a group decision, but remains morally responsible 
only for his own contribution. The community remains, from a moral 
point of view, simply an aggregate of individual actors each of whom can 
be held accountable only for his own actions.318 On the other hand, we 
can understand a public act as the moral responsibility, in the first in- 
stance, of the community considered as a moral agent in its own right. 
When we take this point of view, individual moral responsibility arises 
out of membership in the community. This is the point of view we assume 
when we feel responsible for public actions against which we may have 
voted or, even more dramatically, for public actions that preceded our own 
membership in the state.319 
While neither of these moral points of view is more basic than the 
other, we are not free simply to choose between them in the different 
areas of our experience. Different areas of experience are dominated by 
one point of view or the other. By interpreting law as integrity, Dworkin 
tells us that the possibility of law requires the communitarian point of 
view. The possibility of this moral identification of the state as prior to, 
and larger than, the sum of its parts allows us to see the state as continu- 
ous through time, despite its changing membership. Integrity makes not 
only law, but political history, possible.320 
Identification of the moral agency of the state, however, has profound 
implications for our understanding of the character of the individual citi- 
zen. The moral independence of the state is essentially connected to the 
moral dependence of the individual. Dworkin is describing the possibility 
of a deep identification of the individual with the state. We see national 
history as an expression of our own identity-think of the "founding fa- 
thers"-regardless of any actual, empirical connection to that history.321 
316. See supra notes 298-99 and accompanying text. 
317. See R. DWORKIN, supra note 150, at 168-75. 
318. This is generally the viewpoint of pluralist models of government. See Michelman, supra 
note 101, at 1507-13 (pluralist, private interest model cannot account for constitutionalism). 
319. Dworkin provides as illustrations the attitude of many contemporary Germans toward Jews, 
or white Americans toward black Americans. See R. DWORKIN, supra note 150, at 172-73. 
320. It may also make individual history possible. See supra note 312. 
321. See Kahn, supra note 1, at 514-15 (on mythical concept of popular sovereignty). 
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We may, for example, be the children of recent immigrants. We hold our- 
selves responsible, and are held responsible, for the actions of the state, 
even when there is little we can do, or could have done, about them. 
Dworkin is claiming that this identification with the state exists wherever 
we find a system of law.322 
When we take this attitude, the personified community is understood as 
an expression of individual political identity.323 Dworkin argues, accord- 
ingly, that this concept of integrity is central to our ability to see politics 
as a manifestation of self-government: "The ideal [of self-government] 
needs integrity . . . for a citizen cannot treat himself as the author of a 
collection of laws that are inconsistent in principle, nor can he see that 
collection as sponsored by any Rousseauian general will."324 The connec- 
tion to Rousseau is deeper than this passage suggests. 
Dworkin is simultaneously borrowing from and transforming classical 
notions of sovereignty. Like the sovereign, the state understood on the 
model of integrity is a single moral agent that is the source of law. The 
community as sovereign, however, is neither the people themselves under- 
stood as prior to the state, nor an entity-e.g., king or parliament-that is 
distinct from the people themselves. Rather Dworkin's sovereignty is the 
people as the state. The closest parallel in the history of political theory is 
Rousseau's concept of the "general will," which is the whole of the state 
but not the aggregate of individuals who constitute the state.326 
To connect integrity to self-government is to begin to move to the next 
step of this inquiry: the connection between political legitimacy and the 
theory of community that Dworkin offers. Before that, however, I want to 
connect integrity more explicitly to the theory of interpretation discussed 
above. 
Dworkin writes that "[l]aw as integrity is . . . both the product of and 
the inspiration for comprehensive interpretation of legal practice. The 
program it holds out to judges deciding hard cases is essentially, not just 
contingently, interpretive. .."326 The connection between interpretation 
and political integrity is not simply that integrity requires interpretation 
of social practices. Rather, both present a conceptual structure that dis- 
solves the distinction between the subject and the community of which he 
is a part. Both are deeply participatory in the sense that individual iden- 
322. But see Soper, Dworkin's Domain, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1166, 1182 (1987) ("'[Liaw as 
integrity' . . . fits only one particular society."). 
323. The distinction between political and moral identity hardly exists for Dworkin. Political 
identity is, therefore, quite broadly understood. See, e.g., R. DWORKIN, supra note 150, at 189-90. 
324. Id. at 189. 
325. See J. ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT 27-31 (C. Sherover trans. 1974). Just as Dwor- 
kin's theory of interpretation tracks Kant's transcendental deduction, his theory of integrity tracks 
Rousseau's theory of political freedom. On the general influence of Rousseau's thought on Kant, see 
E. CASSIRER, Kant and Rousseau, in ROUSSEAU KANT GOETHE (1963). 
326. R. DWORKIN, supra note 150, at 226. 
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tity is found in and through the community. Both rest on the same idea of 
a community of discourse, of discursive particularity. 
Community, Dworkin warns, does not represent a metaphysical entity, 
but a conceptual structure.327 It is, nevertheless, a conceptual structure 
that deeply challenges our ordinary metaphysics of individual identity. 
Both interpretation and political integrity suggest that community is not 
the aggregation of individual subjects whose existence precedes that of the 
community. Rather, community and individual are two perspectives on 
the same phenomenon: The particularistic discourse that creates meaning 
in the present by constantly writing, or rewriting, history.328 
Dworkin uses the metaphor of a "chain novel" to illustrate the adjudi- 
cative function of integrity.329 This is a novel written in serial fashion by 
a number of writers, each of whom, after the first, inherits a work in 
progress. Despite the diversity of past authors, the present author must 
interpret the work as a single whole. His task is to construct an interpre- 
tation that gives the best unitary shape to the material with which he is 
presented and, in adding his own chapter, to give expression to that 
interpretation. 
This literary metaphor has obvious connections to Bickel's idea of con- 
stitutional adjudication as a dialogue about the moral unity of the commu- 
nity.330 While discourse remains central, Dworkin expresses this through 
the image of the author. This is an image quite different from Bickel's 
teacher who is a participant in a national dialogue.331 Dworkin's novelist 
may be talking about the discourse of others-those who preceded him in 
the chain-and he may be trying to direct the discourse of those who will 
come later in the chain, but he is primarily talking to himself.332 At any 
given moment, the novel exists as a meaningful whole only in the imagi- 
nation of the particular author whose turn it is to write. As with the 
novel, so with the community: At any given moment, the unity of the 
community is sustained only in the imaginative construction of integrity 
out of a set of social practices. 
When we move from the metaphor to actual adjudication, we confront 
not just a sequence of historical authors, but also a diversity of contempo- 
rary authors. There are many judges-as well as other citi- 
zens-simultaneously working with the same serial text. Yet Dworkin 
says virtually nothing about the way in which they are to talk to one 
327. Id. at 168. 
328. It is this sense of two perspectives on a single phenomenon that I meant to capture in my 
earlier characterization of the new theorists' conception of the relationship between individual and 
community as that of a microcosm to a macrocosm. See supra text accompanying note 15. 
329. See R. DWORKIN, supra note 150, at 228-32. 
330. See supra Part I, Section D. 
331. See supra note 64 and accompanying text. 
332. For a similar reflection on the singular character of discourse in Dworkin's account, see 
Michelman, Traces, supra note 120, at 76. 
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another in order to generate a single meaning of the history they receive 
and create. Judges may be writing many novels in their isolated chambers. 
There may be as many communities as there are stories that can be told 
with integrity. Indeed, there must be, for there is no way to get to the 
"community-in-itself" as an "objective" source of political legitimacy. The 
community does not exist apart from the interpretive judgment that gives 
meaning to community by giving integrity to its history. Community exists 
only in the imagination of the interpreter, in the dialogue he holds with 
himself.333 
3. Legitimacy and Community 
The legitimacy of the state's use of coercion to enforce law is dependent 
upon the moral claim made by law: "Do citizens have genuine moral obli- 
gations just in virtue of law ?331 If there is no moral obligation to obey 
law, then there is no moral ground for enforcing compliance. Dworkin 
argues that the moral ground of law must be found in the "obligations of 
community." For a third time, community is at the center of Dworkin's 
theory. 
Obligations of community are responsibilities that arise from the indi- 
vidual's understanding of himself as maintaining a "role" within a social 
order.336 Such obligations are found, for example, among family members, 
friends and colleagues. In these relationships, moral obligation arises out 
of a complex history of association. Consent may be an element in some of 
these relationships-for example in friendship, but not in family-but it 
is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition of obligations of commu- 
nity. Neither do such obligations arise out of abstract principles of justice. 
Obligations of family and friendship are not abstract and uniform. 
Rather, they depend upon actual understandings of what is at stake 
within a particular family or friendship. 
Participation in such a relationship, membership in such a community, 
is simultaneously descriptive and normative. The conundrum of how an 
"ought" can arise from an "is" arises, therefore, from a failure of moral 
self-perception. Much of what we believe we ought to do, according to 
Dworkin, arises from the factual circumstances in which we find our- 
selves.336 Moral obligation runs to members of one's own family, for ex- 
ample, simply because of what it means to be a member of that family. As 
a social practice, family is simultaneously an object and product of inter- 
333. The community's legitimacy will be a function of the interpreter's own ability to find princi- 
ples of justice, fairness and due process in the history of the community that he writes. Thus, Dwor- 
kin completely breaks with the model of representation as the paradigm for an explanation of legiti- 
macy: "The new approach . . . relocates the problem of legitimacy and so hopes to change the 
character of the argument." R. DWORKIN, supra note 150, at 207. 
334. Id. at 191. 
335. Id. at 195-96. 
336. See id. at 196. 
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pretation. Interpretation grounds its object in a normative context of pur- 
pose. Familial obligation may, of course, be the subject of intense debate, 
even within a particular family.337 Nevertheless, each member has an ob- 
ligation to act consistently on the basis of his own best understanding of 
what it means to be a member of the family. Dworkin emphasizes the 
coincidence of "is" and "ought" in these communal associations by 
describing the moral obligation that they generate as a "natural duty."338 
Dworkin's jurisprudential strategy, then, is to place the question of 
law's legitimacy within a context of obligation that is similarly "natural" 
without being universal-this is not an abstract theory of natural 
law-and particularistic without being contractual-this is not a theory of 
consent. He argues that at least certain political communities support obli- 
gations of role. 
To support this argument, he must first specify the qualities of a com- 
munity that generate a "natural duty" or "obligation of role." Second, he 
must demonstrate that a political community can possess those character- 
istics. Finally, to complete his project on the legitimacy of law, he must 
demonstrate that the kind of political community that possesses those 
characteristics is one that interprets law as integrity: "[A] political society 
that accepts integrity as a political virtue thereby becomes a special form 
of community, special in a way that promotes its moral authority to as- 
sume and deploy a monopoly of coercive force."339 Dworkin argues each 
of these propositions, but the total argument is hardly a success. 
First, he argues that obligations of role can arise only in communities 
that meet four conditions. The community must demonstrate a concern 
that (1) is special to members of that community, (2) runs "directly from 
each member to each other member," (3) reaches to the general well- 
being of each member, and (4) is egalitarian.340 A community that meets 
these conditions is referred to by Dworkin as a "true community.'341 
Second, he argues that a political community that accepts what he calls 
the "model of principle" meets these four conditions. This is a community 
in which political life is "a theater of debate about which principles the 
community should adopt as a system, which view it should take of justice, 
fairness, and due process . ."342 This is a community characterized by 
what I have called discursive particularity.343 Finally, he argues that this 
community of principle is one that understands law as integrity: "A com- 
337. Such interpretive conflict may, but does not necessarily, strain the bounds of obligation. Not 
every conflict is so significant as to undermine the possibility of reciprocal obligation. See id. at 
204-05 (example of sexism within family). 
338. Id. at 198. See generally Dworkin, Natural Law Revisited, 34 U. FLA. L. REV. 165 (1982). 
339. R. DWORKIN, supra note 150, at 188. 
340. Id. at 199-200. 
341. Id. at 201. 
342. Id. at 211. 
343. See supra at text accompanying note 11. 
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munity of principle accepts integrity."344 The argument can then be run 
backwards: To interpret law as integrity is to create a community of prin- 
ciple within which legal obligations will coincide with moral obligations of 
role. 
The weakness of this argument begins with Dworkin's specification of 
the conditions a community must satisfy to generate obligations of role. 
Dworkin argues that a particular conception of justice, focusing on an 
equal concern for the well-being of each individual, is such a condition.345 
This claim, however, remains unfounded. Worse, the argument he offers 
threatens to trivialize the theory of interpretation and community that he 
has built. 
The theory of legitimacy that one would expect from Dworkin is one 
which would focus on the collapse of the distinction between the individ- 
ual and community. This collapse is central to his account of both inter- 
pretation and political integrity. Dworkin suggests just such a theory of 
legitimacy when he writes that politicalcl obligation is . . . not just a 
matter of obeying the discrete political decisions of the community . . . 
[but rather of] fidelity to a scheme of principle each citizen has a responsi- 
bility to identify, ultimately for himself, as his community's scheme."348 
Because the community does not exist apart from the individual's imagi- 
native construction of it as a meaningful, normative entity, the question of 
legitimacy does not appear as a question of obligation to a social order 
that confronts the citizen from outside of himself. Imagination is simulta- 
neously the locus of community and the source of obligations of role. 
Through imagination the citizen achieves a self-understanding that is al- 
ready deeply embedded in an historical web of roles which simultaneously 
constitute the community. One of the strengths of Dworkin's account is 
the continuity it suggests between the functions of the judge and the imag- 
inative community construction that each citizen pursues in reaching a 
self-understanding. 347 
This theory of legitimacy would argue that by acting as a member of 
the state, the individual gives expression to his own identity. The demands 
of law appear as moral obligations because in imaginatively constructing 
the political community, the individual has already brought into play his 
own understanding of the values of justice and fairness. There can be no 
344. R. DWORKIN, supra note 150, at 214. 
345. I focus on this fourth condition-equality-because it is that with which Dworkin is most 
concerned and is the only substantive condition among the four. One may legitimately question, how- 
ever, the ground-and meaning-of his second and third conditions as well: direct interpersonal con- 
cern with the general well-being of each member. These conditions suggest a concern with something 
like Kant's categorical imperative that each person be treated as an end, rather than a means, but 
Dworkin fails to explain the link between such a moral rule and obligations of role within a 
community. 
346. Id. at 190. 
347. Cf. Ackerman, supra notes 92-99 and accompanying text (legitimacy depends upon self- 
understanding). 
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separate moment of moral evaluation of associational role, because there is 
no way to get beyond the interpretative construction of community. This 
is the idea behind Dworkin's statement that integrity "fuses citizens' 
moral and political lives .. "$48 
Because obligations of legal role are constructed in part out of beliefs 
about justice and fairness, legal obligations do not confront the subject as 
an arbitrary set of demands. We do not first make our selves as moral 
subjects and then come to politics, possessing a moral identity against 
which to measure the demands of law. Moral and political obligation, just 
as the individual and the state, are products of interpretation and thus rest 
upon the conceptual structure of community which makes interpretation 
possible. 
If this is a correct reading of the theory of legitimacy implicit in Dwor- 
kin's account of interpretation and community-and at times rather ex- 
plicitly suggested by Dworkin himself-then Dworkin's implicit theory 
undermines his explicit claims about liberal egalitarianism.349 Dworkin's 
account of interpretation and community provides a theory of legitimacy 
from an "internal" perspective.350 It explains why the law appears legiti- 
mate to the member of the community. It does not purport to explain 
why, or if, the law is legitimate from an "external" perspective. Ulti- 
mately, however, Dworkin is not satisfied with the internal account. He 
tries to press the theory further in order to provide an external account of 
legitimacy. But to do that he must justify the authority of law in a way 
that his theory, built out of an internal account, simply cannot support. 
There is nothing in the implicit theory of legitimacy that suggests a 
moral and political life of a certain character. Associative communities 
that support obligations of role are surely not noted, in general, for their 
commitment to individual equality. Obligations of role traditionally have 
more to do with understanding one's place in a social hierarchy-"my 
station and its duties'351- than with a commitment to individual equality. 
Nor is it sufficient to contend that such a hierarchy reflects "the group's 
assumption that its roles and rules are equally in the interest of all, that 
no one's life is more important than anyone else's."352 The first part of 
this sentence-equal interest-will be asserted by every community; the 
second part-equal value-will likely be asserted only by some select 
group of communities that satisfy Dworkin's idea of equality. 
This difference between an internal and external perspective is clear in 
Dworkin's own example of the traditional family, in which Dworkin im- 
348. R. DWORKIN, supra note 150, at 189. 
349. By "liberal egalitarianism" I mean to employ a short-hand expression for the conditions of a 
"true community." See supra note 338 and accompanying text. I use this expression because of the 
criteria's concern with individual self-fulfillment and equality. 
350. R. DWORKIN, supra note 150, at 14. 
351. See F.H. BRADLEY, ETHICAL STUDIES 173 (2d ed. 1927). 
352. R. DWORKIN, supra note 150, at 200-01. 
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mediately discovers a conflict between justice and obligations of role.3"3 
Yet Dworkin contends that only a community that supports an interpreta- 
tion of justice that accepts a particular view of individual equality can 
sustain the identity of individual and community that is the ground of 
legitimacy. To ground this claim Dworkin would need a theory of justice 
that provides an external measure of community and of obligations of role. 
Yet, Dworkin has already argued that "justice" is simply another inter- 
pretive concept, grounded in the same account of community as law. 
By pushing on to an "external" account, Dworkin risks trivializing his 
own account of the role of community in interpretation. The concept of 
community that he describes is not contingent upon the emergence of the 
liberal idea of individual equality. Rather, it marks a deep conceptual 
structure that makes human history possible.354 History as an imaginative 
construction is dependent upon just those features of a community that 
Dworkin identifies in setting forth the conditions of interpretation. Com- 
munity is not a product of recent history, but rather the transcendental 
condition of history.355 
Finally, and most important, Dworkin's argument for the legitimacy of 
only one particular kind of political community assumes that there is a 
perspective on justice that is separate from the perspective of interpreta- 
tion within a community.356 Dworkin's own chapter in the chain novel 
may embrace this particular form of political community, but he has pro- 
vided neither a plot that compels this conclusion, nor an answer to the 
question of why each of our chapters must embrace this conclusion. In 
singling out this community, Dworkin seems to suggest the possibility of a 
trans-communal perspective on community, but he has already committed 
himself to the view that there is no escape from interpretation and so none 
from community. 
This opening to an Archimedian point is again implicit in the attitude 
Dworkin takes toward his observation that obligations within the commu- 
nity are special to members of that community. Communities are discrete; 
their identity is formed, in part, by opposition to nonmembers. The mean- 
ing of the community is always bound up with understanding this line 
defining appropriate behavior within and without the community.357 
353. See id. at 204-05. 
354. See supra notes 301-03 and accompanying text. The problems with the explicit theory of 
legitimacy that is based upon the idea of a "true community" are clear in the alternatives Dworkin 
suggests. A "true community" must be committed to individual equality. The alternative to a true 
community is either a "bare community" or a "rule book community." R. DWORKIN, supra note 150, 
at 208-15. But none of these characterize the communities that we actually find prior to the modern 
era. Where is the Church? Where is feudal society or the polis of ancient Greece? 
355. See supra note 301 (on Kant's transcendental analytic). 
356. See Fish, Dennis Martinez and the Uses of Theory, 96 YALE L.J. 1773, 1788 (1987) ("To 
think within a practice is to have one's very perception and sense of possible and appropriate action 
issue 'naturally'-without further reflection-from one's position as a deeply situated agent."). 
357. See e.g., Hirsch, The Threnody of Liberalism: Constitutional Liberty and the Renewal of 
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Dworkin responds that justice provides a moral standard against which to 
measure the community's attitude toward outsiders.358 But from where 
does this idea of justice come? Justice, Dworkin had argued, is itself an 
interpretive concept.359 If so, then it too arises out of the imaginative 
bringing of meaning to social practice, which is the construction of com- 
munity. There is, by this view, no abstract definition of justice by which 
to measure a community's practices either within or without its bounda- 
ries. There are only competing communities of meaning: "Our lives are 
rich because they are complex in the layers and character of the communi- 
ties we inhabit."360 There is no neutral perspective from which to evaluate 
the whole. If this is true, and it does seem to follow from Dworkin's the- 
ory of interpretation, then Dworkin has not told us why the community 
we call the state should be allowed to use coercion to enforce its particular 
concept of justice.361 
4. The Transcendental Community and the Just State 
In the end, Dworkin's account of the transcendental conditions of inter- 
pretation is stronger than his argument for a liberal concept of justice. 
Because we generate our history through the imaginative construction of 
meaning, we find ourselves always already in communities which entail 
obligations of role. This participation, which is based neither on will nor 
reason alone, is the ground of legitimacy. This is why we accept the com- 
munity's use of force both within the community and against other com- 
munities. Indeed, Dworkin's account would be stronger had he thought to 
link the internal coercion sanctioned by law with the external coercion 
expressed in war.362 Force, in both cases, is an expression of our own 
identity. This is why Dworkin finds himself speaking the language of 
Rousseau: Like Rousseau, he suggests that we can force people to be 
free.363 Legitimacy, by this view, precedes justice, just as the conditions of 
interpretation precede any particular community. 
This answer to the problem of legitimacy is hardly a ground for opti- 
Community, 14 POL. THEORY 423, 424-25 (1986) (community requires policing of "borders" and 
protection of "frontier"); Young, Polity and Group Difference: A Critique of the Ideal of Universal 
Citizenship, 99 ETHICS 250, 257 (1989) ("People necessarily and properly consider public issues in 
terms influenced by their situated experience and perception of social reactions."). 
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361. What Dworkin needs is not an account of how history is possible, which he offers, but of 
how the conditions that make history possible lead to a certain kind of historical outcome-that is, an 
account of how the liberal idea of justice is the end of history, perhaps because it is the full actualiza- 
tion of the conditions of history. This theory would argue that individual equality is a function of the 
self-generation of history. Here Dworkin's theory would follow Hegel rather than Rousseau. 
362. For a contemporary work that makes such a linkage of internal and external coercion and 
that understands both as a working out of the relationship between individual identity and commu- 
nity, see E. SCARRY, THE BODY IN PAIN (1985). 
363. J. ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT 31 (C. Sherover trans. 1974). 
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mism. To the degree that we are not optimistic, however, we expose the 
limits of the transcendental account of interpretation as the ground of le- 
gitimacy. Our felt ability to measure the community's justice makes us 
strangers to the community once again.31" Each of us is simultaneously 
writing the novel and criticizing the novel we write. Dworkin appeals to 
that critical ability but has exhausted his explanatory apparatus before he 
reaches it. Or, even worse, the same explanatory apparatus can be applied 
to it, in which case the critique becomes simply the expression of yet an- 
other interpretation. Interpretations multiply, with no ground for hierar- 
chically ordering them. The implications of Dworkin's theory, therefore, 
lead quickly to the same dilemma that faced Cover: Authority and com- 
munity split apart as multiple possibilities for interpretation emerge. 
Dworkin suppresses this potential anarachy by appealing to an idea of a 
''true community," yet the authority of that community remains 
unsupported.365 
The failure of Dworkin's philosophical project of linking community 
and interpretation to an idea of justice as individual equality should not 
blind us to the success of his more narrow jurisprudential project. Dwor- 
kin offers a powerful account of how law appears from the perspective of 
those engaged in legal practice, particularly the judge and the lawyers 
who argue before the judge. This is the perspective of what I have else- 
where called "maintenance":366 Obligations of role are essentially tied to 
the maintenance of an historical social construction-in this case, the 
state. Dworkin oversteps the bounds of his own theory when he moves 
from an internal to an external perspective, when he tries to derive from a 
theory of the interpretive community an abstract measure of the legiti- 
macy of authority. To achieve that, he would need to move from the per- 
spective of maintenance to that of "criticism." He would need to describe 
the character of a community which is wholly critical in its attitude to- 
ward all claims of authority. That community would make a decisive 
break with the past, always constructing for itself the character of its own 
freedom. In the conclusion, I briefly describe one such community: the 
Platonic community of philosophical discourse. 
That Dworkin stumbles here simply demonstrates again what has been 
evident in the analysis of each of the communitarians: A theory of com- 
munity cannot provide an adequate ground of authority. Instead of speak- 
364. It may be that we understand ourselves as members of a world community in the discourse 
on justice. But that community is not marked by special obligations to members, and, therefore, the 
concept of community becomes trivial. 
365. Dworkin also suppresses this potential for anarchy among interpretations and interpretive 
communites by substituting a mythical "Hercules" for actual judges and citizens. See R. DWORKIN, 
supra note 150, at 239. The device of Hercules permits Dworkin to suppress differences by appealing 
to an idea of "exhaustiveness," by which all other competing interpretations can be dismissed as 
partialal" 
366. See Kahn, supra note I, at 451 n.9. 
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ing directly of authority, Dworkin speaks of legitimacy, but the point is 
the same. The argument for legitimacy is designed to provide the grounds 
for the authority of the legal rules of this community rather than other 
competing communities. This, however, is precisely what communitarian 
theories cannot provide. 
While Dworkin provides the most compelling and analytically complete 
account of community, he comes no closer to providing an adequate ac- 
count of authority. That he too feels the need to provide such an account 
again demonstrates the limits of the communitarians' approach to law. 
Each of the new communitarians attempts to perceive-and must attempt 
to justify-the authority of law through a theory of discursive particular- 
ity or historicized reason. The most such an account can provide, however, 
is an account of the appearance of authority within a particular commu- 
nity. It cannot provide an argument for the authority of law to anyone 
outside of that community or even to one who takes himself out of the 
community by assuming a critical attitude toward its claims. That each of 
us can take this attitude and ask the question of law's justice reveals again 
the need for Dworkin's Archimedean point or, as I will argue in the con- 
clusion, for an understanding of a community of critical inquiry that is 
not bound to the state. 
CONCLUSION: COMMUNITY AND AUTHORITY 
I hope to have demonstrated three points in this Article. First, the com- 
munity of discourse provides a conceptual model of order common to di- 
verse efforts in contemporary constitutional theory. Second, the idea of 
discursive particularity, which is at the heart of this model, is powerfully 
attractive because of its synthetic features. It offers a synthesis of reason 
and will and a synthesis of individual and community. Third, despite the 
enormous theoretical attractiveness of this model, none of the contempo- 
rary theorists surveyed has managed successfully to use it to support a 
political structure of authority. This should make us skeptical, in general, 
of the usefulness of the communitarian model in constitutional theory. 
The object of that theory is, after all, the structure of authority in the 
state. 
Despite the disjunction between community and authority, I do not 
think it surprising to find constitutional theory moving in the direction of 
community. For two hundred years, constitutional theory has been bound 
up with the question of political legitimacy. Legitimacy has not meant 
simply a political system that makes morally compelling demands. Rather, 
constitutional theory has aspired to achieve an understanding of the politi- 
cal order under which the regulatory demands of the community-a sig- 
nificant aspect of which are law-do not appear as external, coercive com- 
mands, but as consistent with, and even as an expression of, individual 
82 The Yale Law Journal [Vol. 99: 1 
autonomy. The search has been for a conception of the political order that 
could encompass in a single whole both the community and the individual, 
the state and the citizen. The goal of constitutional theory has been a 
conception of politics that could portray the citizen's life under public law 
as simultaneously the individual's giving of law to himself.367 
This problem of reconciling the individual and the state has generally 
resulted in appeals to two different models: one based on reason and polit- 
ical science; the other based on will and popular consent. Constitutional 
order has been understood as either the expression of a science with which 
no "rational" individual could disagree or as the objective embodiment of 
an act of consent by which the individual had bound himself. The entire 
history of constitutional theory can be seen as a cycling between these two 
concepts.368 The modern period opens with Alexander Bickel's attempt to 
achieve a new synthesis of reason and will by explaining the consensual 
basis of the Supreme Court's rule of reason. For the reasons I explain 
above, this effort fails. Instead of achieving a synthesis, Bickel's theory 
fails to provide either reason or will with sufficient grounds to respect the 
other. 
The new communitarians emerge out of this cyclical history of theory. 
They also seek to achieve a synthesis of the individual and the public 
order, but they seek to do so by overcoming the dichotomy of reason and 
will. The power of the idea of the community of discourse to resolve both 
of these dichotomies-that of reason and will and that of citizen and com- 
munity-has been evident at least since Plato wrote his dialogues. 
Through the very form of expression employed, the dialogue, Plato por- 
trayed the goal of philosophy as the simultaneous creation of communal 
and individual identity. The dialogue creates individual identity through 
mutual creation of a discursive community. Through the discursive in- 
quiry a new community emerges, the citizens of which are those who 
speak to each other. The dialogue is therefore simultaneously about the 
moral life of the individual and of the group. The constitutive function of 
the dialogue has long served as a model of positive freedom. 
For this reason, Plato's greatest dialogue, The Republic, introduces the 
inquiry into justice in the city as simply a metaphorical device for inquir- 
ing into justice in the individual. Ultimately, the two inquiries are one 
and the same because the well-ordered, or just, soul only forms itself in 
the community of dialogue which constitutes a just community. Philoso- 
phy for Plato is not a body of knowledge, but a commitment to dialogue. 
Plato therefore exists only through Socrates, who can be found nowhere 
but in the community of discourse that is re-presented in the dialogue. 
367. See Michelman, supra note 101, at 1500-03 (American constitutionalism seeks unity of gov- 
ernment by the people and government by law). 
368. See supra notes 1-3 and accompanying text. 
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Plato has no substantive body of knowledge to transfer; rather, he has 
only the methodological insight into the character of positive freedom. 
While the platonic dialogue is about the politics of positive freedom and 
the creation of community, it is not about the state as a structure of histor- 
ical authority which confronts us with the power of coercion through law. 
Or, to the degree that it does address the state, it presents a critique of 
state authority. The community of discourse that emerges in the platonic 
dialogue is always an alternative to the state. The legitimate community 
of dialogue stands always against the coercive community of state author- 
ity. The character of the challenge that this alternative community poses 
to the state is never out of mind, because of the fate of Socrates. Socrates is 
executed by a democratic Athens because of his subversive activity, which 
consists of nothing other than the activity of engaging others in dialogue. 
Community and authority split apart in the platonic dialogue. This in- 
compatibility of the community of discourse and the authority of the state 
is the great lesson of Plato's Socrates. The choice for positive freedom is a 
rejection of authority. This remains a lesson, however, that most contem- 
porary theorists have yet to learn. While they see the need for the theory 
of a legitimate political order to work itself pure through a theory of the 
discursive community, they have not accepted the possibility that this com- 
munitarian model of a "legitimate" public order is not one that can sup- 
port the historical state. As constitutional theorists, they remain bound to 
the Constitution, despite the subversive character of their own theories. 
Having accused contemporary constitutional theorists of failing to rec- 
ognize the fault line that runs between the constitutional and theoretical 
aspects of their enterprise, I want to conclude by reflecting on the reasons 
for this divide. Even if this tension between theory and authority is what 
Plato hopes to teach by asking us to engage in a dialogue which promises 
us positive freedom, we can still ask if it is a necessary lesson. What is it 
about the character of the dialogue, of discursive particularity, that pre- 
cludes a conjunction of genuine community and legal authority? Here, I 
can offer only my own tentative speculations, backed up by the failure of 
contemporary theory to demonstrate how the link between authority and 
community is to be made successfully. 
Fundamentally, the problem is one of taking positive freedom seriously. 
If we create ourselves in and through the dialogue, then we cannot know 
in advance the conclusion to which the dialogue will lead. If the commu- 
nity of discourse is to be the locus of positive freedom, then it cannot be 
limited in advance. This is not to say that there are no internal limits; not 
everything can be said at every moment. But these are limits that inhere 
in the language and history within which we find ourselves. To use 
Dworkin's metaphor, they are the limits of the previous chapters. These 
limits never preclude a surprising turn of events in the next chapter. 
Without external political constraints on the discourse, we cannot know 
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whether the product of the dialogue will be an affirmation or denial, a 
unifying or a splintering, of the inherited political order. To be free in 
that dialogue, we must deny the state any privileged place. Authority be- 
comes one voice, but one with no greater privilege than any other. As 
many states have learned, there may be no greater danger than uncon- 
strained discourse. 
Robert Cover saw this most clearly and was most willing to accept its 
implications.369 Each of the other theorists seeks somehow to constrain the 
discourse or to privilege one particular discourse as a means of supporting 
the authority of law. That is exactly what must be done, if the authority 
of the state is to be supported. Yet those constraints cannot rest on a com- 
munitarian foundation. Those constraints may come from a theory of jus- 
tice or from a privileging of one political institution's discourse over 
others. Any such choice, however, must be supported. I surely would not 
suggest that no such support can be offered. Rather, I want to suggest that 
the support must come from some source other than the ideas of commu- 
nity, interpretation, or discursive particularity. 
Law is always a structure of authority and constitutional law is a struc- 
ture of ultimate authority. Law may tolerate much discussion, but it must 
also locate the authority to decide, and its decisions are binding. Yet those 
binding decisions do not enter into a real community of discourse with any 
privileged place. Truth, not authority, is the measure of that discourse. 
Truth, however, is the end, not the beginning of the discourse. 
Another way to explain this incomensurability of constitutional law and 
the dialogical community is to focus on the conflicting attitudes toward 
time that characterize each. The authoritative character of the Constitu- 
tion points always to the past.370 The Constitution represents the histori- 
cal continuity of the state and thus the authority of the past over the pre- 
sent. Just for this reason, American constitutional law has always had a 
backward-looking cast, focusing on the Founding and precedent.371 We 
expect the authority of law to be grounded in a discourse about past polit- 
ical acts. This is in stark contrast with the true community of discourse. 
That community exists only in the present. Its present character is cap- 
tured in its creative function: The community of discourse represents the 
possibility of self-creation in every encounter among those willing truly to 
engage in serious discourse about moral values. Because the community of 
discourse cannot privilege the past, it cannot promise respect to authority. 
The possibility of making ourselves anew, of rejecting the authority of the 
past, hangs over every true, discursive engagement. 
369. See supra Part III, Section B. 
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1989] Contemporary Constitutional Theory 85 
Yet law represents authority. Those responsible for enforcing the law 
understand themselves as standing apart from the rest of the community 
by virtue of their authority. Their authority derives in part from their 
unique responsibilities for maintaining the historical identity of the state. 
For them, the discourse has stopped. At least it has stopped to the degree 
that there are limits on what can and cannot be said and, perhaps even 
more important, on who can and cannot speak. Not everything is "up for 
grabs," not every possibility remains open for those responsible for the 
law. If this is true, there must be a splitting apart of the theory of law 
from the practitioners of law. Theory must go on to seek the resolution of 
antinomies within which law must live. Law exercises authority, even if it 
cannot give a theoretically complete account of the legitimacy of that 
authority. 
To seek to found a theory of the legitimacy of constitutional law in the 
community of dialogue may therefore be wholly reasonable, if not inevita- 
ble, from the perspective of the development of theory. But it may also be 
wholly unreasonable from the perspective of law. From the latter perspec- 
tive, this may appear as an effort to found law in the destruction of the 
conditions of law. Authority and discourse are both powerfully attractive 
ideas, but that does not make them reconcilable. If they are not, then per- 
haps we confront a genuine tragedy. Theory will inevitably move beyond 
practice, but no man lives wholly in theory. Even Socrates had to suffer 
the deeds of authority. Those who seek to find a harmony of discourse and 
authority might do well to recognize the Socratic risks that accompany 
genuine discourse. 
